01—INTRODUCTION: OVERLAPPING TERRAINS

JAMES D. PROCTOR

“Well?” said the geographer expectantly.

“Oh, where I live,” said the little prince, “it is not very interesting. It is all so small. I have three volcanoes. Two volcanoes are active and the other is extinct. But one never knows.”

“One never knows,” said the geographer.

“I have also a flower.”

“We do not record flowers,” said the geographer.

“Why is that? The flower is the most beautiful thing on my planet!”

“We do not record them,” said the geographer, “because they are ephemeral.”

(Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince, 1943: 53-54)

GEOGRAPHY? ETHICS?

If geography were accurately represented by the man the Little Prince encountered on the sixth planet of his galactic journey, if indeed the one thing the child cared most about meant nothing to the geographer, then this volume would never have come to be.

I grew up, as perhaps did many readers, with a sense of geography as the one subject most to be avoided. “A geographer,” the man of the sixth planet explained to the Little Prince, “is a scholar who knows the location of all the seas, rivers, towns, mountains, and deserts,” or, to quote from a t-shirt I have stuffed in my drawer, “Geography is where it’s at.” This is not the subject matter most of us would consider to be extremely compelling, intellectually, morally, or otherwise, and thank goodness there is more to say from the perspective of geography than that location counts.

This volume is dedicated to what geographers have to say about ethics—another field of intellectual inquiry ripe with potential for misconstrual. Ethics is often held to be a hopelessly abstract and speculative field, one as impractical as it is incomprehensible, of interest only to scholars paid to think thoughts bearing little
connection to reality outside of the ivory tower. As Peter Singer argues in his preface to a recent multiauthored overview of the subject:

It is vital that ethics not be treated as something remote, to be studied only by scholars locked away in universities. Ethics deals with values, with good and bad, with right and wrong. We cannot avoid involvement in ethics, for what we do—and what we don’t do—is always a possible subject of ethical evaluation. Anyone who thinks about what he or she ought to do is, consciously or unconsciously, involved in ethics (Singer 1993: v).

If ethics is not necessarily limited to intellectual abstraction on the one hand, neither is it necessarily dominated by moral evangelism on the other. The very term “ethics” conjures up for many the specter of strident declarations of right and wrong, of facile moral judgment, or even worse, of cloaking the realms of power in moral drapery, as charged by Marx in his famous dismissal of morality as ideology (Wood 1993).

This volume speaks to the possibility of creating a space for ethics somewhere other than that inhabited by the out-of-touch scholar and the “in-your-face” evangelist. Its motivation lies in the important work geographers are doing that explores ethics from the diverse perspectives that constitute contemporary geography (for recent reviews, see Smith 1997; 1998a; Proctor 1998a). The subtitle, Journeys in a Moral Terrain, suggests both the geographical grounding of these essays and their inherent pluralism: there is no one journey, no final word possible on the relationship between ethics and the geography of our lives. Our hope here is that, rather than closing exploration of this overlapping terrain, something of the richness and relevance of geography and ethics emerges as an inspiration for further work in this area.
The purpose of this brief introduction is to sketch a space for geography and ethics that minimally avoids the misunderstood identities of each, and ideally suggests something to the reader of their intimate relation. I will begin with a clarification of ethics, then propose a conceptual framework for geography and ethics that addresses the dual nature of geographical practice as ontological project (the realities geographers seek to elucidate) and epistemological process (the means of knowledge generation by which geographers represent these realities). I close with an overview of the structure, emphasis, and limitations of this volume and its eighteen constituent essays.

**Ethics**

Most people place the term ethics in the same category as values and morality; some clarification and differentiation of the three may be helpful at the outset. The term *values* is the kind of word everyone understands but few have carefully examined. Its common usage often involves idealistic and static/atomistic connotations—namely, that values “guide” actions (a form of idealistic reductionism: ideas determine practice) and that values are things (rather than processes) that exist primarily at the level of individual persons. Its reputation in social research ranges from its outright ostracism as the polluter of sound factual knowledge to its elevation in status as the ultimate determinant of what people believe to be facts (Outhwaite 1993). Nonetheless, in spite of its problematic tendencies, the term values points to a whole realm of concerns that somehow never get mentioned in scholarly discourse (as feminists have long reminded us), often due to their highly personal and political implications, and of course their assumed polarity with “facts.” For this reason alone I find the term a useful corrective in an intellectual climate that largely exists in denial of this realm.
Morality is often used in a repressive Victorian sense in Western society, implying sexual taboos and the like; but this is a severely myopic definition. The Latin root of morality is also found in the word mores, meaning the manner, customs, or conduct of a particular society. Morality thus refers in a very general sense to standards of conduct by which human action is judged right or wrong in an absolute sense, or better or worse in a relative sense. Yet right/wrong or better/worse decisions affect a wide range of scales in our lives, running for example from deliberations over capital punishment to decisions concerning how one should dress for the day. The difficulty in weeding out relatively trivial decisions from the weightier ones leads some philosophers such as Feldman (1978) to consider morality to be difficult term to bound, though most of us would accept that matters of prudence and etiquette are different (if only in degree) from moral matters.

Morality concerns the normative sphere of human existence and practice, a term which (as with values) has been used in a pejorative sense in much twentieth-century social science. Under the influence of positivism, the realm of the normative has been unfavorably contrasted with positive knowledge, knowledge gained via dispassionate empirical observation in the spirit of the natural sciences (Wacquant 1993). This judgment follows from the original Comtean spirit of positivism, a theory that knowledge has evolved through earlier theological and metaphysical stages—both tangled up in unprovable normative speculation—to the contemporary positive stage. Yet, thankfully, some recent accounts (most significantly, Sayer and Storper 1997) call for a “normative turn” in social theory and social science, not so much to discard so-called “positive knowledge” as to shed intellectual light on the values that inform the object and the process of social inquiry.
What, then, is ethics? In science, ethics typically involves reflection upon moral questions that arise in research, publication, and other professional activities (e.g., NAS Committee on Science 1995); yet philosophical usage is broader than this prevailing scientific interpretation. Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, is commonly understood as systematic intellectual reflection on morality in general, or specific moral concerns in particular. The former can be called theoretical ethics and the latter applied ethics, though the two are closely related. One realm of applied ethics that has garnered considerable attention outside of philosophy focuses on professional conduct; thus the moral questions asked in the fields of science, law, medicine, and business are common examples of ethical inquiry.

Another distinction is typically drawn between descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics (though only the latter two are represented in philosophical literature). The aim of descriptive ethics is to characterize existing moral schemes; this has been an important feature of, for instance, cultural anthropology, which in so doing has raised the problem of relativism (Benedict 1934; Geertz 1989). Normative ethics are devoted to constructing a suitable moral basis to inform human conduct; contemporary examples include Rawls’ theory of justice (Rawls 1971) and, in a quite different approach, the contrasting ethics of care proposed by feminists building upon psychologist Carol Gilligan’s pioneering work (1982). Metaethics, in distinction, is more an examination of the characteristics of ethical reasoning or systems of ethics. A classic metaethical problem, as exemplified in David Hume’s is-ought dichotomy (Hume 1978), concerns the relationship between facts (descriptive statements) and values (normative statements); this problem has been a major concern of, for instance, 20th century social theory (O’Neill 1993).
Much work in Western ethics is thus derived from the way in which moral philosophy has developed. For instance, one major theme to which many theoretical discussions—primarily normative but also metaethical—have returned involves the relationship between the **right** and the **good**. While the right corresponds to a particular act or intent, the good implies rather the end or justification for a particular act or intent. These terms are of primary significance in Western ethics in that they correspond to the two major classes of moral theories: teleological theories such as utilitarianism, where the good is the primary concern, and deontological theories, where the right becomes a more paramount concern (for introductory discussion, see Davis 1993: 206ff.; Goodin 1993: 241). Recent developments in Western ethics are many (see, for instance, the online Ethics Updates site at [http://ethics.acusd.edu](http://ethics.acusd.edu)): important examples include feminist and postmodernist/post-structuralist approaches, which have critically reexamined, though in important ways also extended, this heritage (e.g., Benhabib 1992; Bauman 1994). The result is that those interested in ethical reflection have, perhaps more so than in any previous era, a greatly enriched conceptual vocabulary to draw upon.

This heritage of thought on ethics may sound intellectually formidable; yet ethics is too important to be left to the moral philosopher. Perhaps the most important step in doing ethics simply involves asking questions such as “How is it that people say this is a bad thing?”, of “Why do I feel I am right in doing this?.” This is something we all can do, whether or not we are versed in virtue theory or Kantian deontology. Many areas of our lives—our jobs, our hobbies, our family and social relationships—are treated as ethically unproblematic, and thus gain **de facto** moral legitimacy (i.e., a thing is **right** because it **is**) precisely because we do not ask the question. In its best sense, then, ethics
becomes a practice of consistent (hopefully not neurotic!) moral reflection, turned both
inward and outward.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE: A FRAMEWORK

Geography and ethics: Process and substance

The confluence of geography and ethics represents no radical recent turn of events:
one need only go back to Immanuel Kant to find “moral geography” proposed as a
major subdivision of the discipline, focusing on “diverse customs and characteristics of
people of different regions” (May 1970: 263). Yet Kant would never have imagined the
range and depth of philosophical questions geographers have explored in the last
century (Johnston 1986; Livingstone 1992; Buttimer 1993), and geographical engagement
with philosophical issues touching on ethics (e.g., social justice and related
concepts—see Smith 1994; Hay 1995) has grown tremendously in recent decades.

A glimpse at contemporary work by geographers on ethics is impressive. Two
eXamples of recent monographs include David Harvey’s Justice, Nature and the
Geography of Difference (1996), which offers a materialist and geographically-situated
grounding of environmental and political values and attempts a rapprochement of
social justice and environmental concern, and Robert David Sack’s ambitious Homo
Geographicus (1997), which grounds human existence in geography (hence the title)
and ultimately moves toward a geographical framework for morality. Or, consider a
recent issue of Environment and Planning D: Society and Space (volume 15 #1, 1997)
devoted explicitly to the reengagement of social science in general and geography in
particular with moral theory. As examples of the important contributions this issue
makes, Andrew Sayer and Michael Storper argue convincingly for a greater level of
normative self-criticality among geographers and social scientists, given the moral
propositions they often unreflectively deploy (Sayer and Storper 1997), and Sarah
Whatmore revisits mainstream approaches to social and environmental ethics, offering
a feminist and geographically-informed relational theory of ethics based on a
reconfiguration of the self (Whatmore 1997). Indeed, an entire journal, Ethics, Place and
Environment, has recently been launched by an international body of geographers,
devoted broadly to geographical and environmental dimensions of ethics.

How did this burst of geographical scholarship on ethics arise? One clear antecedent
is a broader interest dating back several decades among geographers on values
(Buttimer 1974), in large part a response to the professed value-neutrality of the
burgeoning quantitative approach in geography, with its emphasis on objectivist spatial
analysis (Billinge, Gregory, and Martin 1984; Cosgrove 1989). Values-based concerns
among geographers have underscored diverse political struggles in the discipline,
including those calling for greater relevance in research (Mitchell and Draper 1982),
more explicitly critical theoretical approaches (e.g., Peet and Thrift 1989), and the
inclusion of women in general, and feminist perspectives in particular, in the practice
and substantive emphasis of geography (Rose 1993).

Two paths distinguish geographical engagement with ethics: the first attends to the
process of doing geography and is broadly similar to professional ethics, the second the
substance of geographical inquiry and is more akin to theoretical ethics. These paths are
intimately related, as the former represents the context out of which the content, the
result, of substantive ethics emerges. In this paired approach, geographers point to a
manner of being properly reflexive in the moral statements they make about the world
without getting lost in this reflexivity to the point that they cannot speak anything of
substance.
This twofold approach suggests one possible conceptual framework for a geographical perspective on ethics. As with other academic disciplines, geography is in large part a knowledge-building enterprise consisting of two major components: its ontological project and its epistemological process. Geography’s ontological project is, simply, to make sense of those aspects of reality (thus “ontology,” a term referring to being or reality) historically engaged in geographical analysis. Much of geography’s ontological project is bound up in specific metaphors used to organize reality; for convenience I will adopt the common threesome of space, place, and nature as the interweaving metaphors informing the geographical imagination (e.g., Gregory 1994: 217). Space is the metaphor underlying a good deal of geography’s ontological project, including emphases as disparate as spatial science and marxist critique. The metaphor of place is prominent in more humanistic and interpretive work in geography; it speaks of a reality as lived and understood by active human subjects. The metaphor of nature underlies physical geography and geography of the society-nature tradition. Though these three metaphors are by no means comprehensive, they do suggest the different ways in which geography proceeds in its project of making sense of reality.

Geography accomplishes this ontological project via an epistemological process; knowledge of space, place, and nature do not arise from thin air. This is the manner in which professional and substantive ethics in geography are connected, as process and product, context and content, are not comprehensible outside of the other. Yet the epistemological process of geography is far broader than what is typically subsumed under the category of “professional ethics.” Minimally, this process involves a set of guiding concepts implemented via research and analytical techniques to generate knowledge, which has a certain form of representation and leads to specific social and
other implications. Guiding concepts include the metaphors of reality discussed above, which play an important general role in the constitution and reconstitution of geography’s identity and thus provide a delimited range of appropriate inquiry in geographical research. Guiding concepts also include philosophical commitments as to how knowledge is to be produced and what kind of knowledge is worth producing, other important components of the constitution of geography. Research and analytical techniques are more specific and include methods of data collection and analysis, such as qualitative interviews, field reconnaissance, GIS-based spatial modeling, and so forth. Representation of research results by geographers commonly include mapping and writing, though other forms of representation are possible as well. Implications, whether intentional or unintentional, follow from the production of geographical knowledge; these may touch upon social, environmental, political, intellectual, and/or other worlds.

**Ethics and geography’s ontological project**

The metaphor of space provides perhaps the most familiar entry of geographers into substantive questions of ethics. Indeed, one of the strongest areas of attention among geographers has concerned spatial dimensions of social justice (Harvey 1973; 1993; Smith 1994; Gleeson 1996). This work builds on geographical analyses of spatial exclusion and control (Ogborn and Philo 1994; Sibley 1995), and considers questions such as geographical perspectives on some of its major philosophical figures (Clark 1986), professional and personal responsibilities to spatially distant and less powerful others (Corbridge 1993; Corbridge 1998), immigration and social justice (Black 1996), and territorial justice (Boyne and Powell 1991).
Work by geographers on social justice is not, however, limited to its spatial dimensions. Geographers are, for instance, devoting increasing attention to environmental racism and justice, bridging the social justice paradigm to the metaphor of nature. Though contributions by geographers are barely evident in recent anthologies (e.g., Bryant 1995; Westra and Wenz 1995), an upswing of book-length publications (Pulido 1996; Low and Gleeson 1998), articles in mainstream journals (Bowen et al. 1995), and indeed whole issues of geographical journals (see, for instance, Antipode 28[2], Urban Geography 17[5]), attest to its burgeoning significance.

As another example of this interweaving of metaphors, David Smith has recently posed the question, “How far should we care?” (Smith 1998b), in an effort to work through the dual perspectives of ethics as spatial justice, where principles of indifference and universality are prioritized, and ethics as care, a relationally based ethics where one’s families, communities, and other social groups of relational significance are the primary emphasis, where ethics and partiality, morality and passion, are not polar opposites. Smith’s question clearly considers on the plane of ethics what many others have considered on the plane of epistemology: the tension between the objectivist, rationalistic metaphor of space, and the explicitly perspectival, embodied metaphor of place (Tuan 1977; Buttimer and Seamon 1980; Entrikin 1991; Sack 1992).

Place is, of course, already a significant category in the works of Sibley and others noted above. It is perhaps best exemplified, however, in work on “moral geographies,” which could loosely be translated as thick descriptions of the moral features of place. To call this work “descriptive ethics” is missing something, however, as place-based ethical inquiry may be closer to the mark of understanding human morality than its placeless equivalents commonly in abundance in more abstract normative and metaethical
inquiry (Walzer 1994; O’Neill 1996: 68). Indeed, though geographical work in moral
geographies and other questions of ethics has shied away from an explicitly normative
and/or metaethical focus, the fact that geographers have attended to questions such as
universalist versus particularist ethics suggests the relative ease with which place-based
geographical analysis lends itself to addressing these more abstract issues (e.g.,
Corbridge 1993).

The concept of place itself has been invoked by geographers in order to critically
reflect on the problematic objectification of subjective community or regional values
(Entrikin 1991: 60-83), as well as to ground the moral context of production and
consumption in advanced industrial societies (Sack 1992: 177-205). Indeed, the moral
realm is deeply implicated in the work of many humanist geographers on place—of
which the example of Yi-Fu Tuan is perhaps most prominent (Tuan 1974; 1989; 1993).
But the sheer range of recent work on moral geographies makes the important collective
point that the diverse places geographers study are inescapably normative, that
normativity is not so much something to be added on to place as to be teased out of it.
Some instances of this work include the explorations of Jackson and others on moral
order in the city (Jackson 1984; Driver 1988), “moral locations” of nineteenth century
Portsmouth (Ogborn and Philo 1994), the moral geography of reformatories (Ploszajska
1994), the moral geography of the Norfolk Broadlands (Matless 1994), the moral
discourse of climate (Livingstone 1991), and the “moral geography of the everyday”
(Birdsall 1996). Though the term has had some use outside of geography (e.g., Shapiro
1994; cf. Slater 1997 for a related geographical perspective), it would be a gross
overstatement to suggest that, by means of moral geographies, geographers have made
their indelible mark on how ethics ought to be encountered. Though Kant would
perhaps be perplexed at this outcome, geographers are rather used to intellectual
anonymity; the question is whether the important voice geographers have to add on the ethics of place will be heard outside of the discipline.

The metaphor of nature (understood as biophysical environment) is evident in much of what was presented above, but as a primary focus of ethical interest among geographers it has not enjoyed such diffuse attention as social justice and moral geographies. One important reason is that the vast majority of work by geographers under this metaphorical trajectory is largely physical and life science-based, and as such rarely if ever entertains questions of human ethics (one important recent exception being a forum on ethics in environmental science in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* [88:2]). Is this lack of attention by physical geographers to ethics justified? At the level of their immediate topics of interest, perhaps: fluvial geomorphology and microclimatolgy involve processes that have important human impacts and arise in part from human drivers, but in and of themselves there is arguably little ground for ethical reflection. Yet the historical process by which science decoupled from explicit attention to morality is well-rehearsed elsewhere, and as such suggests that this immediate detachment of physical geography from ethics is as much a particular historical result as some inevitable corollary of its subject-matter.

Nonetheless, there has been a rising interest among geographers in environmental ethics (Proctor 1998c). In addition to the literature cited above on environmental racism and justice, there is ample supplemental evidence of this interest. The inaugural issue of *Philosophy and Geography*, for instance, was devoted to environmental ethics (Light and Smith 1997). Whole books now are arising which engage with questions of nature and morality in significant ways (Simmons 1993; Harvey 1996).

Work in this area is predictably diffuse, though not at all limited to the recent past, as suggested for instance in the writings of Reclus (Clark 1997). Some geographers have
situated questions of environmental ethics in the context of culturally-based ideas of nature (Simmons 1993), while others have discussed the spatial scale dependency of optimal formulations of environmental ethics (Reed and Slaymaker 1993), and still others have critically reviewed the values underlying environmental movements (O’Riordan 1981; Lewis 1992), at times rejecting them in favor of less sociopolitically naive alternatives (Pepper 1993). Some have looked at environmental ethics from a cross-cultural perspective (Wescoat 1997), while others have engaged with the modernist and anti-modernist underpinnings of western environmental thought (Gandy 1997). Indeed, the diverse linkages geographers have drawn between social theory and environmental ideology and ethics (Proctor 1995; Gandy 1996) are broadly suggestive of the important contributions geographers can make.

As suggested above, perhaps the most interesting substantive work by geographers on ethics transcends the boundaries between the metaphors of space, place, and nature. Indeed, the key contribution geographers have to make arises from the diverse metaphors of reality they invoke; hence critical tensions between universals and difference, justice and care, can be thoughtfully entertained by geographers, given the solid establishment of the discipline upon the metaphors of space and place. This strength in metaphorical diversity is also evident in the contribution geographers can make to environmental ethics; here, for instance, the problem of how to resolve conflicts between social and natural goods can be meaningfully addressed, as geographers have a foot planted in both nature and culture. The diversity of geographical imaginations cast upon this world thus offers an important point of beginning for geographers to make a real contribution to moral discourse.
Geographical knowledge does not arise in a vacuum. The statements geographers make about space, place and nature come out of a particular process, of which four sequential steps were noted above. The first step, guiding concepts, draws upon the metaphors that inform geography’s ontological project, as well as intrinsic or extrinsic epistemological rules (e.g., universalizability or the lack thereof) that govern the application of these metaphors to knowledge-building. This discussion is well-rehearsed in the literature: the critique of positivism over the last several decades, for instance, is in large a part a critique of how particular ontological and epistemological assumptions associated with positivism have constrained the kinds and implications of knowledge arising from geographical research (Gregory 1979). Though this critical literature does not go by the self-ascription of “ethics,” nonetheless its reasoned normative pronouncements are of similar intent. Further inquiry into the ways in which basic ontological and epistemological assumptions shape geographical research in ethically-significant ways is needed.

One of the most familiar areas of ethical inquiry in geography involves research and analytical techniques, ranging from cartography (Harley 1991; Monmonier 1991; Rundstrom 1993) to remote sensing and geographic information systems (Wasowski 1991; Lake 1993; Curry 1994; Crampton 1995). The act of research itself, and the consideration of the role of the researcher vis-à-vis the research subject(s), has also been a popular subject of inquiry (e.g., Eyles and Smith 1988; England 1994). Another area where important work has been done concerns how geographical knowledge is represented, in realms ranging from cartography (see above) to academic publication (Brunn 1989; Curry 1991) to education (Havelberg 1990; Kirby 1991; Smith 1995).
work has considered implications of geographical research, though explicit attention
has been paid to areas with direct social significance such as planning (Entrikin 1994),
and it should be noted that some of the most provocative publications by geographers
have taken seriously the implications of geographical research as a starting-point for
reconfiguring geography (e.g., Kropotkin 1885; Harvey 1974). Indeed, ethical issues
become more focused as one moves from a particular geographical concept to its
technical implementation and finally to its application. For instance, conceiving space as
an isotropic surface appears innocent enough until one builds a GIS upon this naive
assumption for the purpose of, say, specifying social service facility location. This
example suggests also the interrelation of ethical issues across the continuum of
game’s epistemological process, and points out the severe limitations in a
“professional ethics” circumscribed solely to questions of research data and publication
(though see Brunn 1998; Hay 1998 for recent theoretically and historically rich accounts
of professional ethics in geography).

THE ESSAYS

What follows include eighteen original essays contributed by geographers on ethics.
The volume is structured into the themes of space, place, nature, and knowledge
following the framework above; each section is preceded by a short introductory
summary of the component essays and some major issues they jointly raise. The volume
ends with a conclusion by David M. Smith which offers further reflections on these four
themes, linking them to related issues in geography and ethics.

Yet as already noted, what is interesting about geographical work is often the ways
in which these themes are joined—indeed, some would argue that this is a defining
feature of geography. The inherent multidimensionality of the essays comprising this
volume indeed presented the editors with an organizational challenge: do we categorize them \textit{a posteriori} according to the prevalent theme they address, or do we simply present them as they are, without some imposed (and admittedly modernist) Procrustean structure? We have chosen the former approach as a manner of providing some conceptual clarification on the potentially limitless ways in which geography and ethics interweave, as well as to suggest the flavor and diversity of each of these themes as exemplified in their representative essays. Some clearly focus on their given theme; others invoke it only implicitly. Some themes (e.g., the production of geographical knowledge) are “tighter” than others. We assume the reader will not expect an overly tidy match between essay and theme: we gave each author free reign to explore the confluence of geography and ethics, and thus all stand on their own as well as contribute to a given thematic conversation. The real work of real geographers is far too many-layered to collapse entirely onto such a simple rubric.

There are other commonalities among essays the reader will detect that are not emphasized in this fourfold structure. Some overarching commonalities combine geographical themes: hence, for example, the tension between space and place comes out as a tension between universalism and particularism, thin and thick moralities, justice and caring. Other commonalities speak more to the broad relationship between ethics, reality and knowledge. For instance, the well-known “is-ought” problem surfaces in discussions of ethnicity and morality, the natural as good, and knowledge as power; and some essays speak explicitly of the ontological and epistemological embeddedness of ethics. Some commonalities involve method: many essays adopt a case method of argumentation, whereas others proceed more in the abstract. And, of course there is a strong resonance among all essays as to the geographical embeddedness of ethics, an argument made implicitly or explicitly that geography
matters in finding clarifications of, or solutions to, ethical questions. The most accurate organizational motif for these essays would thus probably be some sort of analogue to hyperspace, in which each essay were linked to essays related to it in all the ways noted above; this approach, however, is clearly far more suited to electronic than hardcopy publication!

The volume's diverse essays speak not only to a multitude of ways to consider ethics from geographical perspectives; they also speak to some flexibility in what ethics is all about. Here, several key tensions are important. One tension—particularly exemplified in comparing the essays on knowledge and ethics with the other essays—concerns the difference between ethics as “thinking about caring” and ethics as “caring”: in the first sense (much as ethics was defined above), being ethical involves intellectual reflection on moral matters, and in the second, being ethical involves doing the right (at least the best possible) thing. The net effect of these essays is that both are honored as key in any authentic project of ethics: an excess of thinking-without-doing, or an excess of caring-without-thinking, would otherwise result. Another key tension (highlighted especially in the important essay by Ó Tuathail) considers the valence of any project labeled “ethics”: are its moral implications ultimately positive or, viewed in a far more negative sense, can projects of this nature impose some political project, veiled in moral guise, upon others? Though most will probably agree that the kinds of moral reflection exemplified in these essays are by and large positive in their implications, any project of ethics such as that comprising this volume that is mindless of its potential coercive power is dangerous.

A final, important, note. There are many fine authors and ideas that made this volume; there are many more that did not. We regret, for instance, the nonparticipation of physical geographers in our volume, yet there is no necessary reason why they
should be excluded (Proctor 1998b); and though we made a point to encourage balance of gender, seniority, subspecialty, philosophical predisposition, and other differences among us, still many sectors are inadequately represented. The editors particularly regret the absence of a chapter with an explicitly feminist stance, but take comfort from the reflection of feminist perspectives in some of the essays as well as in the Conclusion, and from the focus on feminist ethics in other recent geographical publications. Ethics in geography is simply too rich at this moment to be fully captured in one volume, for the simple reason that geography is far richer than that suggested by its representative on that distant planet visited by the Little Prince on his journey. If this volume is a testimony to that fact, it is also in its finitude an indication of the rich work yet to be written as geographers continue their journeys on this moral terrain.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I acknowledge the helpful comments of Caroline Nagel, David M. Smith, and two anonymous reviewers on an earlier draft. I also acknowledge kind permission from the Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) to use portions of a recently-published review article on geography and ethics in this essay (Proctor 1998a).

REFERENCES


for geographical analysis*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

concern*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.


Routledge.

London: Routledge.

Blackwell Publishers Ltd.


583-590.

—— (1998a) ‘Geography and moral philosophy: Some common ground’, Ethics, Place,
and Environment 1: 7-34.


