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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20091105T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20091105T163000
LOCATION:Albany Quadrangle\, Smith Hall
SUMMARY:Two Cheers for Affirmative Action
DESCRIPTION:David Boonin\, associate professor of philosophy at the Unive
rsity of Colorado at Boulder\, will offer a talk titled\, "Two Cheers for
Affirmative Action." Boonin's primary area of teaching and research is
applied ethics\, including the moral status of animals\, our obligations
to future generations\, euthanasia and same-sex marriage. His current boo
k examines race\, focusing on slave reparations and affirmative action\,
as well as hate speech codes\, hate crime laws and racial profiling.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
David Boonin\, associate professor of p
hilosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder\, will offer a talk ti
tled\, "Two Cheers for Affirmative Action."
Boonin's primary area
of teaching and research is applied ethics\, including the moral status
of animals\, our obligations to future generations\, euthanasia and same-
sex marriage. His current book examines race\, focusing on slave reparati
ons and affirmative action\, as well as hate speech codes\, hate crime la
ws and racial profiling.
UID:20091105T233000Z-471@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20091029T110915Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/471-two-cheers-for-affirmative
-action
LAST-MODIFIED:20091029T181925Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
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X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE-CAPTION:11/05/2009\, 3:30pm\, Albany Quadrangle\, Smith
Hall
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:David Boonin\, associate professor of philosophy at t
he University of Colorado at Boulder\, will offer a talk titled\, "Two Ch
eers for Affirmative Action."
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:diversity|lecture|open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100219T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100219T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Immortality by John Martin Fischer (University of California Rive
rside)
DESCRIPTION:I discuss various objections to the idea that embodied immort
ality could be desirable for human beings. I argue against the "immortali
ty curmudgeons"\, such as Heidegger and Bernard Williams\, that such immo
rtality could conceivably be attractive to human beings. THIS EVENT IS F
REE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
I discuss various objections to the ide
a that embodied immortality could be desirable for human beings. I argue
against the "immortality curmudgeons"\, such as Heidegger and Bernard Wil
liams\, that such immortality could conceivably be attractive to human be
ings.
THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
UID:20100219T233000Z-1170@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100203T094848Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1170-immortality-by-john-marti
n-fischer-university-of
LAST-MODIFIED:20100216T190323Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:1170
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:I discuss various objections to the idea that embodie
d immortality could be desirable for human beings. I argue against the "i
mmortality curmudgeons"\, such as Heidegger and Bernard Williams\, that s
uch immortality could conceivably be attractive to human beings. \n<
br />\nTHIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100226T033000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100226T043000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Berkeley and Reid on Acquired Perception by Rebecca Copenhaver (L
ewis & Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:A common view in psychology and philosophy holds that strictl
y speaking we see very little – strictly speaking\, we see only facing
surface features like color\, boundaries and illumination. \; Everyth
ing else is filled in by the mind. \; For example\, we don't have vis
ual experiences of three-dimensional tomatoes. \; Rather we have visu
al experiences of a two-dimensional field colored and illuminated a certa
in way. \; I think that this view is wrong\, but surprisingly persist
ent. \; I will dragoon two historical figures\, George Berkeley and T
homas Reid\, to do my arguing for me\, and to illustrate how this putativ
ely common sense view is a piece of theory and a product of history. THI
S EVEN IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
A common view in psychology and philoso
phy holds that strictly speaking we see very little – strictly speaking
\, we see only facing surface features like color\, boundaries and illumi
nation. \; Everything else is filled in by the mind. \; For examp
le\, we don't have visual experiences of three-dimensional tomatoes. 
\; Rather we have visual experiences of a two-dimensional field colored a
nd illuminated a certain way. \; I think that this view is wrong\, bu
t surprisingly persistent. \; I will dragoon two historical figures\,
George Berkeley and Thomas Reid\, to do my arguing for me\, and to illus
trate how this putatively common sense view is a piece of theory and a pr
oduct of history.
\n A common view in psychology and philosophy hol
ds that strictly speaking we see very little – we see only facing surfa
ce features like color\, boundaries and illumination. \; Everything e
lse is filled in by the mind. \; I think that this view is wrong.
0\; I use George Berkeley and Thomas Reid to illustrate how this putative
ly common sense view is a piece of theory and a product of history.\n
\n
\n THIS EVEN IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.\n
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|open to the public|student
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100305T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100305T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Plato on Ignorance as a Cognitive Power by Nick Smith (Lewis &
; Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:In Book V of Plato's Republic\, Plato has Socrates distinguis
h between three distinct cognitive powers (dunameis): knowledge (episteme
)\, opinion (doxa)\, and ignorance (agnosia). Powers\, Socrates goes on t
o explain\, are distinguished in virtue of what they are related to and w
hat they accomplish (477d1). In this section of the dialogue\, the second
of these two differentiae is not invoked again\; instead\, all of the di
stinctions Socrates makes here are made in terms of the different objects
to which the powers are related. Knowledge\, we are told\, is related to
what is (to on)\; ignorance is related to what is not (to me on)\; opini
on is related to what both is and is not.Scholars have attended almost en
tirely to the distinction between knowledge and opinion\, and for good re
ason: It is clear that this distinction is the primary one that Plato wis
hes to explicate here\, as it is in terms of this distinction that the im
portant difference between the philosopher rulers and ordinary rulers wil
l be drawn. The distinctions between knowledge and ignorance and opinion
and ignorance are only very briefly mentioned\, and ignorance itself rema
ins almost wholly unexplained. In this paper\, I discuss the role of ign
orance in Plato's epistemology. My analysis is novel in four ways: First\
, other scholars have attended almost exclusively to the roles assigned t
o knowledge and opinion in this passage\, and have neglected to explain w
hether – and if so\, how – their analyses could explicate what Plato
has Socrates say about ignorance. \; Secondly\, I argue that we shoul
d not understand the analysis as an intensional one: cognitive powers are
not objects to which they are related\, as scholars have generally suppo
sed. The relationship of the powers to objects\, rather\, is a nomologica
l one. \; Thirdly\, I argue that what is produced by the cognitive po
wers are what we would call conceptualizations (or conceptions) of the en
tities to which they are said to be related (epi). Finally\, I argue that
the case of ignorance makes clear that the "is" in Plato's analysis of t
he relata of each cognitive power must be understood neither veridically
(where "is" means "is true")\, nor existentially (where "is" means "exist
s")\, but \; \; predicatively (wherewhere "is" means "is F\," whe
re F is the name of a Platonic Form). THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE
PUBLIC.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In Book V of
Plato's Republic\, Plato has Socrates distinguish between three distinct
cognitive powers (dunameis): knowledge (episteme)\, opinion (doxa)\, and
ignorance (agnosia). Powers\, Socrates goes on to explain\, are distingui
shed in virtue of what they are related to and what they accomplish (477d
1). In this section of the dialogue\, the second of these two differentia
e is not invoked again\; instead\, all of the distinctions Socrates makes
here are made in terms of the different objects to which the powers are
related. Knowledge\, we are told\, is related to what is (to on)\; ignora
nce is related to what is not (to me on)\; opinion is related to what bot
h is and is not.
S
cholars have attended almost entirely to the distinction between knowledg
e and opinion\, and for good reason: It is clear that this distinction is
the primary one that Plato wishes to explicate here\, as it is in terms
of this distinction that the important difference between the philosopher
rulers and ordinary rulers will be drawn. The distinctions between knowl
edge and ignorance and opinion and ignorance are only very briefly mentio
ned\, and ignorance itself remains almost wholly unexplained.
In this paper\, I discuss the role of ignorance in Plato's epistemology
. My analysis is novel in four ways: First\, other scholars have attended
almost exclusively to the roles assigned to knowledge and opinion in thi
s passage\, and have neglected to explain whether – and if so\, how –
their analyses could explicate what Plato has Socrates say about ignoran
ce. \; Secondly\, I argue that we should not understand the analysis
as an intensional one: cognitive powers are not objects to which they are
related\, as scholars have generally supposed. The relationship of the p
owers to objects\, rather\, is a nomological one. \; Thirdly\, I argu
e that what is produced by the cognitive powers are what we would call co
nceptualizations (or conceptions) of the entities to which they are said
to be related (epi). Finally\, I argue that the case of ignorance makes c
lear that the "is" in Plato's analysis of the relata of each cognitive po
wer must be understood neither veridically (where "is" means "is true")\,
nor existentially (where "is" means "exists")\, but \; \; predic
atively (wherewhere "is" means "is F\," where F is the name of a Platonic
Form).
THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
UID:20100305T233000Z-1385@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100301T103804Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1385-plato-on-ignorance-as-a-c
ognitive-power-by-nick
LAST-MODIFIED:20100304T193125Z
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100312T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100312T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Eudaimonia and Practical Wisdom by Joel Martinez (Lewis & Cla
rk College)
DESCRIPTION:In this paper\, I defend an interpretation of the distinctive
ly ethical application Aristotle made of the notion of deliberation (boul
esis). \; This involves understanding the sense in which the virtuous
person grasps a conception of living well (eudaimonein) and puts that co
nception into practice. \; In doing so\, the virtuous person manifest
s the excellences of character and practical wisdom (phronesis). \; T
he interpretation I defend is in contrast to the overly intellectual ones
favored by many commentators on Aristotle. \; The interpretation I d
efend sees moral development as central to Aristotle's account of practic
al wisdom. \; In addition\, it provides a powerful response to the ob
jection that Aristotle's ethics is egoistic. \; My view also explains
how diverse lives can all be well-lived on Aristotle's view. \; The
primary obstacle in my way is to explain how Aristotle thought one can de
liberate with a view to living well without saddling him with the view th
at the correct conception of living-well is fixed by an autonomous operat
ion of the practical intellect\, rather than one's moral education. \
; I do this by showing that\, in addition to identifying salient features
of situations\, the practical intellect also\, and importantly\, unifies
an agent's life.THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In this paper\
, I defend an interpretation of the distinctively ethical application Ari
stotle made of the notion of deliberation (boulesis). \; Thi
s involves understanding the sense in which the virtuous person grasps a
conception of living well (eudaimonein) and puts that conception
into practice. \; In doing so\, the virtuous person manifests the ex
cellences of character and practical wisdom (phronesis). \;
The interpretation I defend is in contrast to the overly intellectual one
s favored by many commentators on Aristotle. \; The interpretation I
defend sees moral development as central to Aristotle's account of practi
cal wisdom. \; In addition\, it provides a powerful response to the o
bjection that Aristotle's ethics is egoistic. \; My view also explain
s how diverse lives can all be well-lived on Aristotle's view. \; The
primary obstacle in my way is to explain how Aristotle thought one can d
eliberate with a view to living well without saddling him with the view t
hat the correct conception of living-well is fixed by an autonomous opera
tion of the practical intellect\, rather than one's moral education. 
\; I do this by showing that\, in addition to identifying salient feature
s of situations\, the practical intellect also\, and importantly\, unifie
s an agent's life.
THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
UID:20100312T233000Z-1396@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100304T113332Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1396-eudaimonia-and-practical-
wisdom-by-joel-martinez
LAST-MODIFIED:20100311T233541Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/9886_aristotle_tutoring_alexander_by_j_l_g_ferris_1895.rev.137393688
8.jpg
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v.1373936888.jpg
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100319T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100319T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Epistemic Norms In Light Of Doxastic Voluntarism by Alex von Stei
n (Lewis & Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:When presented with a pink ice cube\, it seems as though I ca
nnot but believe that there is a pink object before me. My belief is caus
ed. In stark contrast to this\, we think that if one believes in God\, th
ey have chosen to do so\, and so believe on the basis of reasons. How can
we account for this difference in the control we have over our beliefs?
In this paper I seek to resolve this confusion. I then examine how the co
ntrol we have over belief informs our conceptions of epistemic norms –
the criteria by which we evaluate beliefs as they relate to knowledge.THI
S EVEN IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
When presented
with a pink ice cube\, it seems as though I cannot but believe that ther
e is a pink object before me. My belief is caused. In stark contrast to t
his\, we think that if one believes in God\, they have chosen to do so\,
and so believe on the basis of reasons. How can we account for this diffe
rence in the control we have over our beliefs? In this paper I seek to re
solve this confusion. I then examine how the control we have over belief
informs our conceptions of epistemic norms – the criteria by which we e
valuate beliefs as they relate to knowledge.
<
span style="font-family: Garamond\;">THIS EVEN IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
UID:20100319T223000Z-1417@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100310T113314Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1417-epistemic-norms-in-light-
of-doxastic-voluntarism
LAST-MODIFIED:20100317T163022Z
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100409T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100409T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Skilled Movement and Embodied Cognition by John Sutton (Macquarie
Centre for Cognitive Science at Macquarie University\, Sidney\, Australi
a)
DESCRIPTION:Theorists of embodied cognition often mention the interactive
real-time dynamics of jazz improvisation\, fast team sports\, or animate
d conversation. This paper uses these case studies to address the specifi
c problem of understanding how experts can (fallibly) influence their own
grooved skilled performances – an applied version of the mind-body pro
blem. Phenomenologists\, cognitive scientists\, and expert practitioners
alike reject the intellectualist idea that skilled movement is governed b
y rich internalized motor programs which specify actions in advance. But
many over-react by evacuating skilled action of all cognition\, awareness
\, and control. I discuss three empirical research programmes – in spor
t\, music\, and dance – which might seem to support the view that skill
ed movement is thus "mindless": in fact each suggests a complex interplay
in which flowing action remains open to certain forms of awareness and c
ontrol. Both phenomenology and cognitive science offer reasons to resist
the idea that skilled action is sealed off from cognition. \;THIS EVE
NT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Theorists of e
mbodied cognition often mention the interactive real-time dynamics of jaz
z improvisation\, fast team sports\, or animated conversation. This paper
uses these case studies to address the specific problem of understanding
how experts can (fallibly) influence their own grooved skilled performan
ces – an applied version of the mind-body problem. Phenomenologists\, c
ognitive scientists\, and expert practitioners alike reject the intellect
ualist idea that skilled movement is governed by rich internalized motor
programs which specify actions in advance. But many over-react by evacuat
ing skilled action of all cognition\, awareness\, and control. I discuss
three empirical research programmes – in sport\, music\, and dance –
which might seem to support the view that skilled movement is thus "mindl
ess": in fact each suggests a complex interplay in which flowing action r
emains open to certain forms of awareness and control. Both phenomenology
and cognitive science offer reasons to resist the idea that skilled acti
on is sealed off from cognition.
\;THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
UID:20100409T223000Z-1395@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100304T101939Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1395-skilled-movement-and-embo
died-cognition-by-john
LAST-MODIFIED:20100310T193633Z
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100415T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100415T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 302
SUMMARY:When Things Fall Apart: On The Insufficiency Of Virtue For Happin
ess by Emily Long (Lewis & Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:In the early dialogues\, it is unclear whether Socrates thoug
ht virtue sufficient for happiness. In two passages in the Euthydemus\, S
ocrates appears to contradict himself on the topic of non-moral goods\, a
nd whether they can contribute to\, or are required for\, one's happiness
. In this paper I investigate four perspectives on what Socrates thought
was virtue's relation to happiness\, and more specifically whether the ha
ppiness of a virtuous person is static or eliminable. If a virtuous agent
is stricken with a debilitating disease or physically constrained from c
ommitting virtuous acts — can they still be genuinely happy? However\,
the most salient reading of Socrates' account is one that does not invoke
a logical connection between virtue and happiness\, but rather a nomolog
ical one — and in this paper I hope to show why this is supported by th
e text.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In the early d
ialogues\, it is unclear whether Socrates thought virtue sufficient for h
appiness. In two passages in the Euthydemus\, Socrates appears to contrad
ict himself on the topic of non-moral goods\, and whether they can contri
bute to\, or are required for\, one's happiness. In this paper I investig
ate four perspectives on what Socrates thought was virtue's relation to h
appiness\, and more specifically whether the happiness of a virtuous pers
on is static or eliminable. If a virtuous agent is stricken with a debili
tating disease or physically constrained from committing virtuous acts
can they still be genuinely happy? However\, the most salient reading o
f Socrates' account is one that does not invoke a logical connection betw
een virtue and happiness\, but rather a nomological one — and in this p
aper I hope to show why this is supported by the text.
UID:20100415T223000Z-1559@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100409T112650Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1559-when-things-fall-apart-on
-the-insufficiency-of
LAST-MODIFIED:20100409T182823Z
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100415T170000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100415T180000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 302
SUMMARY:The Racist and the Existentialist: A Testimonial Account of the B
asing Relation by Hannah Tierney (Lewis & Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:The relationship between a belief and its warrant is an incre
dibly important aspect of an appropriate theory of knowledge. Without suc
h an account\, the bar for knowledge can be set both too high and too low
. Furthermore\, forming an account of the basing relation both motivates
and tests internalist and externalist intuitions. In this paper\, I exami
ne Marshall Swain's causal connection\, Hamid Vahid's Davidsonian underst
anding\, Gilbert Harman's explanatory account\, Joseph Tolliver's probabi
lity-centric theory and Keith Lehrer's testimonial version of the basing
relation. In evaluating these theories\, I explore several variations of
two central thought experiments: Lehrer's Racist case and Harman's Existe
ntialist example. I explore the implications to which each theory is comm
itted in relation to these cases\, concluding that Lehrer's testimonial a
ccount is the most acceptable. \;The relationship between belief and
warrant is important for any account of knowledge\; it is the relationshi
p that determines where the bar be set for knowledge. \; In this pape
r\, I \; explore five accounts of the basing relation– three causal
theories and two doxastic defend a testimonial understanding of the conn
ection between warrant and belief. In so doing\, I explore how different
theories of the basing relation explain many variations of Keith Lehrer's
Raco case and Gilbert Harman's Albert the Existentialist case. I have di
stinguished between two doxastic accounts\, both clarifying what I take t
o be Lehrer's position and rejecting Tolliver's overly strict conception
of the basing relation. Clearly\, it would be beneficial for Lehrer to in
clude this account in his later work in order to defend his view from the
objection that it does not require a connection between warrant and beli
ef.Click here to download Hannah's paper
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
The relationsh
ip between a belief and its warrant is an incredibly important aspect of
an appropriate theory of knowledge. Without such an account\, the bar for
knowledge can be set both too high and too low. Furthermore\, forming an
account of the basing relation both motivates and tests internalist and
externalist intuitions. In this paper\, I examine Marshall Swain's causal
connection\, Hamid Vahid's Davidsonian understanding\, Gilbert Harman's
explanatory account\, Joseph Tolliver's probability-centric theory and Ke
ith Lehrer's testimonial version of the basing relation. In evaluating th
ese theories\, I explore several variations of two central thought experi
ments: Lehrer's Racist case and Harman's Existentialist example. I explor
e the implications to which each theory is committed in relation to these
cases\, concluding that Lehrer's testimonial account is the most accepta
ble.
\;The relationship between belief
and warrant is important for any account of knowledge\; it is the relatio
nship that determines where the bar be set for knowledge. \; In this
paper\, I \; explore five accounts of the basing relation– three ca
usal theories and two doxastic defend a testimonial understanding of the
connection between warrant and belief. In so doing\, I explore how differ
ent theories of the basing relation explain many variations of Keith Lehr
er's Raco case and Gilbert Harman's Albert the Existentialist case. I hav
e distinguished between two doxastic accounts\, both clarifying what I ta
ke to be Lehrer's position and rejecting Tolliver's overly strict concept
ion of the basing relation. Clearly\, it would be beneficial for Lehrer t
o include this account in his later work in order to defend his view from
the objection that it does not require a connection between warrant and
belief.
UID:20100416T000000Z-1549@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100407T101320Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1549-the-racist-and-the-existe
ntialist-a-testimonial
LAST-MODIFIED:20100407T175229Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:1549
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:academic honor|open to the public|staff event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100423T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100423T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Conscientiousness and Harmony by Rachana Kamtekar (University of
Arizona)
DESCRIPTION:This paper has two goals. The first goal is to argue that Pla
to's Republic gives two accounts of virtue's relation to happiness – a
weaker relationship\, according to which the virtuous person is always ha
ppier than the vicious person\, and a stronger relationship\, according t
o which virtue is sufficient for happiness – because he does not know t
he nature of the soul-parts and the limits of their capabilities. His not
knowing this results in his not knowing whether reason rules in the virt
uous person's soul by force or by command-and-consent. The second goal is
to argue that the features of the Republic's soul that are responsible f
or raising the question whether soul-parts can be harmoniously integrated
or not – viz.\, the agent-like nature of the parts\, including their i
ndependence and the different parts' duplication of reasoning and desider
ative capacities – is turning out to be corroborated by contemporary co
gnitive science. This ought to make Plato's approach to the relationship
between virtue and happiness particularly interesting to us.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
This paper has
two goals. The first goal is to argue that Plato's Republic gives two ac
counts of virtue's relation to happiness – a weaker relationship\, acco
rding to which the virtuous person is always happier than the vicious per
son\, and a stronger relationship\, according to which virtue is sufficie
nt for happiness – because he does not know the nature of the soul-part
s and the limits of their capabilities. His not knowing this results in h
is not knowing whether reason rules in the virtuous person's soul by forc
e or by command-and-consent. The second goal is to argue that the feature
s of the Republic's soul that are responsible for raising the question wh
ether soul-parts can be harmoniously integrated or not – viz.\, the age
nt-like nature of the parts\, including their independence and the differ
ent parts' duplication of reasoning and desiderative capacities – is tu
rning out to be corroborated by contemporary cognitive science. This ough
t to make Plato's approach to the relationship between virtue and
happiness particularly interesting to us.
UID:20100423T223000Z-1397@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100304T113903Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1397-conscientiousness-and-har
mony-by-rachana-kamtekar
LAST-MODIFIED:20100421T162137Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:1397
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101015T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101015T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Reason and Evaluative Luck by Eddie Cushman (Lewis & Clark Co
llege)
DESCRIPTION:In his classic paper "Moral Luck\," Nagel argues that a dilem
ma is embedded in our common moral thought. On the one hand\, there appea
rs to be a deep form of incoherence in the thought that moral evaluations
are applicable to an individual as a result of good or bad luck—that i
s\, by virtue of factors that lie outside her control. On the other hand\
, if we deny that moral evaluations can apply to an individual by virtue
of factors that lie outside of her control\, then morality appears to eva
porate. We are never suitable objects of moral evaluation. In this talk\
, I explore how these issues generalize to the epistemic domain. On the o
ne hand\, there seems to be some form of incoherence in the idea that eva
luations of reasonability in belief are open to luck\, though this is arg
uably the defining claim of a thoroughgoing externalism in epistemology.
On the other hand\, our concept of reasonable belief may be immune to luc
k only under a version of access internalism so strict as to have externa
l world skepticism as a consequence. Thus\, there is a genuine threat tha
t Nagel's dilemma is robust in the epistemic domain. I close by offering
an explanation for these striking affinities. The problems of moral and
epistemic luck are particular manifestations of more fundamental problem
the problem of evaluative luck. Though our evaluative concepts are hete
rogeneous and many of them remain unproblematically applicable on the bas
is of good or bad fortune\, our concept of reasonability—applicable to
both choice and belief—remains immune to luck. \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In his classic
paper "Moral Luck\," Nagel argues that a dilemma is embedded in our comm
on moral thought. On the one hand\, there appears to be a deep form of in
coherence in the thought that moral evaluations are applicable to an indi
vidual as a result of good or bad luck—that is\, by virtue of factors t
hat lie outside her control. On the other hand\, if we deny that moral ev
aluations can apply to an individual by virtue of factors that lie outsid
e of her control\, then morality appears to evaporate. We are never suita
ble objects of moral evaluation.
In this talk\, I explore ho
w these issues generalize to the epistemic domain. On the one hand\, ther
e seems to be some form of incoherence in the idea that evaluations of re
asonability in belief are open to luck\, though this is arguably the defi
ning claim of a thoroughgoing externalism in epistemology. On the other h
and\, our concept of reasonable belief may be immune to luck only under a
version of access internalism so strict as to have external world skepti
cism as a consequence. Thus\, there is a genuine threat that Nagel's dile
mma is robust in the epistemic domain.
I close by offering a
n explanation for these striking affinities. The problems of moral and ep
istemic luck are particular manifestations of more fundamental problem—
the problem of evaluative luck. Though our evaluative concepts are hetero
geneous and many of them remain unproblematically applicable on the basis
of good or bad fortune\, our concept of reasonability—applicable to bo
th choice and belief—remains immune to luck.
\;
UID:20101015T223000Z-3268@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100921T105920Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/3268-reason-and-evaluative-luc
k-by-eddie-cushman-lewis
LAST-MODIFIED:20130128T190256Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:3268
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:In his classic paper "Mora
l Luck\," Nagel argues that a dilemma is embedded in our common moral tho
ught. On the one hand\, there appears to be a deep form of incoherence in
the thought that moral evaluations are applicable to an individual as a
result of good or bad luck—that is\, by virtue of factors that lie outs
ide her control. On the other hand\, if we deny that moral evaluations ca
n apply to an individual by virtue of factors that lie outside of her con
trol\, then morality appears to evaporate. We are never suitable objects
of moral evaluation. \n \nIn this talk\, I explore how these is
sues generalize to the epistemic domain. On the one hand\, there seems to
be some form of incoherence in the idea that evaluations of reasonabilit
y in belief are open to luck\, though this is arguably the defining claim
of a thoroughgoing externalism in epistemology. On the other hand\, our
concept of reasonable belief may be immune to luck only under a version o
f access internalism so strict as to have external world skepticism as a
consequence. Thus\, there is a genuine threat that Nagel's dilemma is rob
ust in the epistemic domain. \n \nI close by offering an explan
ation for these striking affinities. The problems of moral and epistemic
luck are particular manifestations of more fundamental problem—the prob
lem of evaluative luck. Though our evaluative concepts are heterogeneous
and many of them remain unproblematically applicable on the basis of good
or bad fortune\, our concept of reasonability—applicable to both choic
e and belief—remains immune to luck.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|lecture|open to the public|philoso
phy colloquium series|staff event|staff|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101021T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101021T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 244
SUMMARY:so you DON'T want to go to grad school in philosophy?
DESCRIPTION:Come find out about the many options\, resources\, and opport
unities you have as a philosophy major to begin planning for a career rig
ht now.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Come find out
about the many options\, resources\, and opportunities you have as a phil
osophy major to begin planning for a career right now.
UID:20101021T223000Z-3543@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20101021T090446Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/3543-so-you-dont-want-to-go-to
-grad-school-in
LAST-MODIFIED:20101021T160551Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:3543
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Come find out about the ma
ny options\, resources\, and opportunities you have as a philosophy major
to begin planning for a career right now.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:staff|student event|student events|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101028T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101028T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 244
SUMMARY:So you think you want to go to law school from philosophy?
DESCRIPTION:Come find out about how philosophy prepares you for law schoo
l\, about how law school differs from philosophy\, and about what careers
you might seek with a law degree.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Come find out about how philosophy prepare
s you for law school\, about how law school differs from philosophy\, and
about what careers you might seek with a law degree.
UID:20101028T223000Z-3546@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20101021T111851Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/3546-so-you-think-you-want-to-
go-to-law-school-from
LAST-MODIFIED:20101021T182128Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:3546
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Come find out about how ph
ilosophy prepares you for law school\, about how law school differs from
philosophy\, and about what careers you might seek with a law degree.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:law|people|Portland|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101105T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101105T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:"Virtue Ethics" and the Problem of Advising Fools by Eric Brown (
University of Washington at St. Louis)
DESCRIPTION:"Virtue ethics" tells us to do what the virtuous person would
do in our circumstances. But if we are not virtuous—if we are "fools"
then the virtuous person would not be in our circumstances. What\, then
\, can virtue theory say to advise a fool about what to do? I quickly sug
gest reasons to be pessimistic about recent approaches to this problem\,
and then I turn to the ancients' eudaimonism for a more a fresh alternati
ve. The ancient Socratics\, including especially the Stoics\, counsel not
causally promoting one's virtue or trying to follow "v-rules" but approx
imating virtue. I argue that Stoic psychopathology offers considerable he
lp in making sense of how fools might approximate virtue and how advisers
might use Socratic eudaimonism's conception of virtue to guide fools to
the best action in their circumstances.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
"Virtue ethics
" tells us to do what the virtuous person would do in our circumstances.
But if we are not virtuous—if we are "fools"—then the virtuous person
would not be in our circumstances. What\, then\, can virtue theory say t
o advise a fool about what to do? I quickly suggest reasons to be pessimi
stic about recent approaches to this problem\, and then I turn to the anc
ients' eudaimonism for a more a fresh alternative. The ancient Socratics\
, including especially the Stoics\, counsel not causally promoting one's
virtue or trying to follow "v-rules" but approximating virtue. I argue th
at Stoic psychopathology offers considerable help in making sense of how
fools might approximate virtue and how advisers might use Socratic eudaim
onism's conception of virtue to guide fools to the best action in their c
ircumstances.
UID:20101105T223000Z-3270@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100921T110618Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/3270-virtue-ethics-and-the-pro
blem-of-advising-fools-by
LAST-MODIFIED:20101103T220110Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:3270
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:"Virtue ethics" tells us t
o do what the virtuous person would do in our circumstances. But if we ar
e not virtuous—if we are "fools"—then the virtuous person would not b
e in our circumstances. What\, then\, can virtue theory say to advise a f
ool about what to do? I quickly suggest reasons to be pessimistic about r
ecent approaches to this problem\, and then I turn to the ancients' eudai
monism for a more a fresh alternative. The ancient Socratics\, including
especially the Stoics\, counsel not causally promoting one's virtue or tr
ying to follow "v-rules" but approximating virtue. I argue that Stoic psy
chopathology offers considerable help in making sense of how fools might
approximate virtue and how advisers might use Socratic eudaimonism's conc
eption of virtue to guide fools to the best action in their circumstances
.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|staff event|sta
ff|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101112T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101112T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:Moral Properties and Patterns: Some Problems for Particularism by
Joel Martinez (Lewis & Clark College) and Sarah Raskoff (Lewis &
Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:Moral particularism is the view that there are no justifiable
moral principles. The particularist insists that the relationship betwee
n the descriptive and the evaluative is irreducibly complex: she denies t
hat there is any non-trivial and explanatorily significant pattern to the
way descriptive or natural properties determine supervening evaluative o
r moral properties. Hence\, the particularist also denies that proper mor
al judgment consists in the application of general moral principles to pa
rticular cases because she doubts that there are any moral principles tha
t are sufficiently precise and contentful to be action-guiding. \; Th
e foundation of moral particularism is a commitment to holism rather than
atomism about moral reasons. Atomism about moral reasons is the view tha
t "a feature that is a reason in one case will be a reason\, with the sam
e polarity\, in any other" (Dancy\, 2006). \; In contrast\, holism ab
out moral reasons is the view that a feature that is a reason in one case
may be no reason or even a reason with the opposite polarity\, in any ot
her. Whether a particular feature is morally relevant\, and if so\, to wh
at polarity\, is not linked to the feature itself\, but varies from situa
tion to situation. The move from holism about moral reasons to particular
ism\, then\, is straightforward: if the very valence of moral-making feat
ures varies from case to case\, then we have good reason to suspect that
the moral landscape is not the sort of place that lends itself to excepti
onless and explanatory codification. \; In this paper\, we briefly e
xplain some of the more common objections to particularism. \; We art
iculate a problem for the particularist\, what we call "the application p
roblem\," that has not been discussed in the literature. \; In additi
on\, we consider how some prominent particularists might respond. \;
We conclude by spelling out some lessons we have learned from investigati
ng particularism.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Moral particul
arism is the view that there are no justifiable moral principles. The par
ticularist insists that the relationship between the descriptive and the
evaluative is irreducibly complex: she denies that there is any non-trivi
al and explanatorily significant pattern to the way descriptive or natura
l properties determine supervening evaluative or moral properties. Hence\
, the particularist also denies that proper moral judgment consists in th
e application of general moral principles to particular cases because she
doubts that there are any moral principles that are sufficiently precise
and contentful to be action-guiding. \; The foundation of moral part
icularism is a commitment to holism rather than atomism about moral reaso
ns. Atomism about moral reasons is the view that "a feature that is a rea
son in one case will be a reason\, with the same polarity\, in any other"
(Dancy\, 2006). \; In contrast\, holism about moral reasons is the v
iew that a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason or even
a reason with the opposite polarity\, in any other. Whether a particular
feature is morally relevant\, and if so\, to what polarity\, is not linke
d to the feature itself\, but varies from situation to situation. The mov
e from holism about moral reasons to particularism\, then\, is straightfo
rward: if the very valence of moral-making features varies from case to c
ase\, then we have good reason to suspect that the moral landscape is not
the sort of place that lends itself to exceptionless and explanatory cod
ification. \;
In this paper\, we briefly explain some of
the more common objections to particularism. \; We articulate a prob
lem for the particularist\, what we call "the application problem\," that
has not been discussed in the literature. \; In addition\, we consid
er how some prominent particularists might respond. \; We conclude by
spelling out some lessons we have learned from investigating particulari
sm.
UID:20101112T233000Z-3271@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100921T110958Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/3271-moral-properties-and-patt
erns-some-problems-for
LAST-MODIFIED:20101102T175612Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:3271
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Moral particularism is the
view that there are no justifiable moral principles. The particularist i
nsists that the relationship between the descriptive and the evaluative i
s irreducibly complex: she denies that there is any non-trivial and expla
natorily significant pattern to the way descriptive or natural properties
determine supervening evaluative or moral properties. Hence\, the partic
ularist also denies that proper moral judgment consists in the applicatio
n of general moral principles to particular cases because she doubts that
there are any moral principles that are sufficiently precise and content
ful to be action-guiding. \; The foundation of moral particularism is
a commitment to holism rather than atomism about moral reasons. Atomism
about moral reasons is the view that "a feature that is a reason in one c
ase will be a reason\, with the same polarity\, in any other" (Dancy\, 20
06). \; In contrast\, holism about moral reasons is the view that a f
eature that is a reason in one case may be no reason or even a reason wit
h the opposite polarity\, in any other. Whether a particular feature is m
orally relevant\, and if so\, to what polarity\, is not linked to the fea
ture itself\, but varies from situation to situation. The move from holis
m about moral reasons to particularism\, then\, is straightforward: if th
e very valence of moral-making features varies from case to case\, then w
e have good reason to suspect that the moral landscape is not the sort of
place that lends itself to exceptionless and explanatory codification.&#
160\; \n \nIn this paper\, we briefly explain some of the more
common objections to particularism. \; We articulate a problem for th
e particularist\, what we call "the application problem\," that has not b
een discussed in the literature. \; In addition\, we consider how som
e prominent particularists might respond. \; We conclude by spelling
out some lessons we have learned from investigating particularism.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|staff event|sta
ff|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101203T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101203T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
SUMMARY:"Biting the Bullet: Levelling-Down and Radical Egalitarianism" by
Alexander Sager (Portland State University)
DESCRIPTION:Radical egalitarians advocate a moral standard under which pe
ople should not only enjoy equal rights\, liberties\, and opportunities\,
but also share approximately equal goods. Most philosophers who defend d
istributive justice reject radical egalitarianism in favour of a version
of the difference principle or the doctrine of sufficiency. One reason fo
r this rejection is the levelling-down objection. Radical egalitarianism
is a comparative view: the goodness of a distribution depends partly on h
ow much other people have. This has a counterintuitive implication. It is
possible to achieve equality by levelling down – instead of improving
the lot of the worst off\, levelling down would involve taking goods away
from people with more until everyone has an equal share. In this case eq
uality is achieved in a way that harms the better-off people while appear
ing to benefit no one. I argue that radical egalitarians should not be d
aunted by the levelling-down objection. Drawing on an analysis of the mor
al emotions of sympathy and envy\, I provide a number of examples in whic
h levelling-down appears morally permissible and is perhaps even required
. This provides grounds for a version of radical telic egalitarianism in
which levelling-down sometimes results in outcomes that are better all-th
ings considered.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Radical egalit
arians advocate a moral standard under which people should not only enjoy
equal rights\, liberties\, and opportunities\, but also share approximat
ely equal goods. Most philosophers who defend distributive justice reject
radical egalitarianism in favour of a version of the difference principl
e or the doctrine of sufficiency. One reason for this rejection is the le
velling-down objection. Radical egalitarianism is a comparative view: the
goodness of a distribution depends partly on how much other people have.
This has a counterintuitive implication. It is possible to achieve equal
ity by levelling down – instead of improving the lot of the worst off\,
levelling down would involve taking goods away from people with more unt
il everyone has an equal share. In this case equality is achieved in a wa
y that harms the better-off people while appearing to benefit no one.
I argue that radical egalitarians should not be daunted by the
levelling-down objection. Drawing on an analysis of the moral emotions of
sympathy and envy\, I provide a number of examples in which levelling-do
wn appears morally permissible and is perhaps even required. This provide
s grounds for a version of radical telic egalitarianism in which levellin
g-down sometimes results in outcomes that are better all-things consi
dered.
UID:20101203T233000Z-3272@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20100921T111254Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/3272-biting-the-bullet-levelli
ng-down-and-radical
LAST-MODIFIED:20101021T160740Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:3272
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Radical egalitarians advoc
ate a moral standard under which people should not only enjoy equal right
s\, liberties\, and opportunities\, but also share approximately equal go
ods. Most philosophers who defend distributive justice reject radical ega
litarianism in favour of a version of the difference principle or the doc
trine of sufficiency. One reason for this rejection is the levelling-down
objection. Radical egalitarianism is a comparative view: the goodness of
a distribution depends partly on how much other people have. This has a
counterintuitive implication. It is possible to achieve equality by level
ling down – instead of improving the lot of the worst off\, levelling d
own would involve taking goods away from people with more until everyone
has an equal share. In this case equality is achieved in a way that harms
the better-off people while appearing to benefit no one. \n \n
I argue that radical egalitarians should not be daunted by the levelling-
down objection. Drawing on an analysis of the moral emotions of sympathy
and envy\, I provide a number of examples in which levelling-down appears
morally permissible and is perhaps even required. This provides grounds
for a version of radical telic egalitarianism in which levelling-down som
etimes results in outcomes that are better all-things considered
. \n
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|staff|student e
vent|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110131T190000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110131T200000
LOCATION:Council Chambers\, Templeton Student Center
SUMMARY:"Analogy as the Core of Cognition" by Douglas Hofstadter (Indiana
University)
DESCRIPTION:Sponsored by the Pamplin Society of \; Lewis &\; Clark
College
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Sponsored by t
he Pamplin Society of \; Lewis &\; Clark College
UID:20110201T030000Z-4201@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110118T142320Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/4201-analogy-as-the-core-of-co
gnition-by-douglas
LAST-MODIFIED:20110128T190815Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/17103_hofstadter.rev.1373936883.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:4201
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/17103_hofstadter.rev.1373936883.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Sponsored by the Pamplin S
ociety of Lewis &\; Clark College
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:collaboration|lecture|open to the public|staff event
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110201T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110201T163000
LOCATION:Pamplin Society Room\, Watzek Library
SUMMARY:"Which is more important in poetry translation: content or form?
A pro-forma reply to Vladimir Nabokov's 'Strong Opinions'" by Douglas Hof
stadter (Indiana University)
UID:20110201T233000Z-4291@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110120T144958Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/4291-which-is-more-important-i
n-poetry-translation
LAST-MODIFIED:20110126T172712Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/17103_hofstadter.rev.1373936883.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:4291
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/17103_hofstadter.rev.1373936883.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:collaboration|lecture|open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110304T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110304T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:"Living Behind the Wall: Plato's Philosopher in an Unjust City" b
y Michelle Jenkins (Whitman College)
DESCRIPTION:Unlike the philosopher in the Kallipolis of the Republic\, th
e philosopher in non-ideal circumstances will live in a city run by unjus
t laws and surrounded by individuals who live guided by false beliefs and
who pursue false goods. In this talk\, I want to think about how Plato's
philosopher would act if faced with these circumstances. My investigatio
n begins with a brief look at Plato's philosopher more generally - who is
he and what does he desire? I argue that\, ultimately\, the philosopher
wants to become like god. But what does it mean to become like god? Figur
ing out the answer to this gets us to the heart of the question of how th
e philosopher in an unjust city will act. I argue that two popular interp
retations - (1) that becoming like god involves withdrawing from the worl
d and (2) that it involves attempting to morally improve the world - are
both incorrect. So\, if both of these interpretations are incorrect\, wha
t does it mean to say that the philosopher wants to become like god? I ar
gue that becoming like god involves modeling ourselves after god's order
and coming to have (godlike) knowledge of what is valuable and not valuab
le. Thus the philosopher\, in aiming to become like god\, will put himsel
f in order and will act so as to maintain that order and preserve his vir
tue. I caution against saying much more than this\, though\, since the de
tails of the philosopher's life will vary quite a bit\, given the wide va
riety of circumstances into which he (or she) may be born. He may be comm
anded by the gods to be a moral exhorter (as was Socrates)\, he may be ob
ligated to share in the rule of his city (as was the philosopher ruler)\,
or lacking any external obligations\, he may choose to live a private li
fe\, doing his best to keep away from the injustice of the majority. With
out knowing the details of the philosopher's life\, we simply cannot say
much about it\, except that it will be a life that is ordered\, virtuous\
, and as much like the god's as a human life can be.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Unlike the ph
ilosopher in the Kallipolis of the Republic\, the philosopher in non-idea
l circumstances will live in a city run by unjust laws and surrounded by
individuals who live guided by false beliefs and who pursue false goods.
In this talk\, I want to think about how Plato's philosopher would act if
faced with these circumstances. My investigation begins with a brief loo
k at Plato's philosopher more generally - who is he and what does he desi
re? I argue that\, ultimately\, the philosopher wants to become like god.
But what does it mean to become like god? Figuring out the answer to thi
s gets us to the heart of the question of how the philosopher in an unjus
t city will act. I argue that two popular interpretations - (1) that beco
ming like god involves withdrawing from the world and (2) that it involve
s attempting to morally improve the world - are both incorrect. So\, if b
oth of these interpretations are incorrect\, what does it mean to say tha
t the philosopher wants to become like god? I argue that becoming like go
d involves modeling ourselves after god's order and coming to have (godli
ke) knowledge of what is valuable and not valuable. Thus the philosopher\
, in aiming to become like god\, will put himself in order and will act s
o as to maintain that order and preserve his virtue. I caution against sa
ying much more than this\, though\, since the details of the philosopher'
s life will vary quite a bit\, given the wide variety of circumstances in
to which he (or she) may be born. He may be commanded by the gods to be a
moral exhorter (as was Socrates)\, he may be obligated to share in the r
ule of his city (as was the philosopher ruler)\, or lacking any external
obligations\, he may choose to live a private life\, doing his best to ke
ep away from the injustice of the majority. Without knowing the details o
f the philosopher's life\, we simply cannot say much about it\, except th
at it will be a life that is ordered\, virtuous\, and as much like the go
d's as a human life can be.
UID:20110304T233000Z-4227@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110119T104221Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/4227-living-behind-the-wall-pl
atos-philosopher-in-an
LAST-MODIFIED:20110221T213410Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/17804_michelle_jenkins.rev.1373936883.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:4227
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/17804_michelle_jenkins.rev.1373936883.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Unlike the philosopher in
the Kallipolis of the Republic\, the philosopher in non-ideal circumstanc
es will live in a city run by unjust laws and surrounded by individuals w
ho live guided by false beliefs and who pursue false goods. In this talk\
, I want to think about how Plato's philosopher would act if faced with t
hese circumstances. My investigation begins with a brief look at Plato's
philosopher more generally - who is he and what does he desire? I argue t
hat\, ultimately\, the philosopher wants to become like god. But what doe
s it mean to become like god? Figuring out the answer to this gets us to
the heart of the question of how the philosopher in an unjust city will a
ct. I argue that two popular interpretations - (1) that becoming like god
involves withdrawing from the world and (2) that it involves attempting
to morally improve the world - are both incorrect. So\, if both of these
interpretations are incorrect\, what does it mean to say that the philoso
pher wants to become like god? I argue that becoming like god involves mo
deling ourselves after god's order and coming to have (godlike) knowledge
of what is valuable and not valuable. Thus the philosopher\, in aiming t
o become like god\, will put himself in order and will act so as to maint
ain that order and preserve his virtue. I caution against saying much mor
e than this\, though\, since the details of the philosopher's life will v
ary quite a bit\, given the wide variety of circumstances into which he (
or she) may be born. He may be commanded by the gods to be a moral exhort
er (as was Socrates)\, he may be obligated to share in the rule of his ci
ty (as was the philosopher ruler)\, or lacking any external obligations\,
he may choose to live a private life\, doing his best to keep away from
the injustice of the majority. Without knowing the details of the philoso
pher's life\, we simply cannot say much about it\, except that it will be
a life that is ordered\, virtuous\, and as much like the god's as a huma
n life can be.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:lecture|open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110311T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110311T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:"Virtue and the Demands of Morality" by Joel Martinez (Lewis &
; Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:J.O. \; Urmson (1958) recognized that merely providing a
criterion of right action is insufficient for capturing common sense mora
lity. \; Providing a criterion of right action helps us give an accou
nt of 1) the permitted (actions that are neither right nor wrong)\, 2) th
e obligatory (actions that are wrong not to do)\, 3) the forbidden (actio
ns that are wrong to do). \; However\, there is another class of acti
ons that forms an important part of common sense morality that cannot be
captured by the standard three-fold deontic classification. \; That i
s\, there are ways of behaving that are neither required nor prohibited\,
but in being laudable they are not merely permissible. \; These are
supererogatory actions\; actions that go above and beyond the call of dut
y. Recently\, there has been a discussion as to whether virtue ethics ca
n capture the common sense notion of supererogation. \;In this paper\
, I argue that there is no compelling reason why virtue ethics ought to g
ive an account of the supererogatory. \; \; The argument that sup
ports the claim that virtue ethics needs to account for the supererogator
y rests on a fundamental confusion about the virtue ethical account of ri
ght action. \; That is\, philosophers who argue that virtue ethics ou
ght to offer a virtue ethical account of supererogation mistakenly take t
he virtue ethical criterion of right action to tell us what our obligatio
ns are. \; \; But\, this is a mistake. It is an easy one to make\
, though\, because so many prominent virtue ethicists have felt comfortab
le using deontic notions. \; In this paper\, I explain why this is a
mistake and point the way to a better and more pure virtue ethical approa
ch to understanding the actions of heroes and saints. \; In the end\,
I think the virtue ethicist should jettison the notion of supererogation
. \; However\, I think this is a small price to pay and it need not t
hreaten the virtue ethical project of conceptualizing common sense morali
ty.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
J.O. \; U
rmson (1958) recognized that merely providing a criterion of right action
is insufficient for capturing common sense morality. \; Providing a
criterion of right action helps us give an account of 1) the permitted (a
ctions that are neither right nor wrong)\, 2) the obligatory (actions tha
t are wrong not to do)\, 3) the forbidden (actions that are wrong to do).
\; However\, there is another class of actions that forms an importa
nt part of common sense morality that cannot be captured by the standard
three-fold deontic classification. \; That is\, there are ways of beh
aving that are neither required nor prohibited\, but in being laudable th
ey are not merely permissible. \; These are supererogatory actions\;
actions that go above and beyond the call of duty.
Recently\
, there has been a discussion as to whether virtue ethics can capture the
common sense notion of supererogation. \;In this paper\, I argue tha
t there is no compelling reason why virtue ethics ought to give an accoun
t of the supererogatory. \; \; The argument that supports the cla
im that virtue ethics needs to account for the supererogatory rests on a
fundamental confusion about the virtue ethical account of right action.&#
160\; That is\, philosophers who argue that virtue ethics ought to offer
a virtue ethical account of supererogation mistakenly take the virtue eth
ical criterion of right action to tell us what our obligations are. \
; \; But\, this is a mistake. It is an easy one to make\, though\, be
cause so many prominent virtue ethicists have felt comfortable using deon
tic notions. \; In this paper\, I explain why this is a mistake and p
oint the way to a better and more pure virtue ethical approach to underst
anding the actions of heroes and saints. \; In the end\, I think the
virtue ethicist should jettison the notion of supererogation. \; Howe
ver\, I think this is a small price to pay and it need not threaten the v
irtue ethical project of conceptualizing common sense morality.
UID:20110311T233000Z-4228@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110119T104426Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/4228-virtue-and-the-demands-of
-morality-by-joel
LAST-MODIFIED:20110310T192814Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/17257_joel.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:4228
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/17257_joel.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:J.O. \; Urmson (1958)
recognized that merely providing a criterion of right action is insuffic
ient for capturing common sense morality. \; Providing a criterion of
right action helps us give an account of 1) the permitted (actions that
are neither right nor wrong)\, 2) the obligatory (actions that are wrong
not to do)\, 3) the forbidden (actions that are wrong to do). \; Howe
ver\, there is another class of actions that forms an important part of c
ommon sense morality that cannot be captured by the standard three-fold d
eontic classification. \; That is\, there are ways of behaving that a
re neither required nor prohibited\, but in being laudable they are not m
erely permissible. \; These are supererogatory actions\; actions that
go above and beyond the call of duty. \n \nRecently\, there ha
s been a discussion as to whether virtue ethics can capture the common se
nse notion of supererogation. \;In this paper\, I argue that there is
no compelling reason why virtue ethics ought to give an account of the s
upererogatory. \; \; The argument that supports the claim that vi
rtue ethics needs to account for the supererogatory rests on a fundamenta
l confusion about the virtue ethical account of right action. \; That
is\, philosophers who argue that virtue ethics ought to offer a virtue e
thical account of supererogation mistakenly take the virtue ethical crite
rion of right action to tell us what our obligations are. \; \; B
ut\, this is a mistake. It is an easy one to make\, though\, because so m
any prominent virtue ethicists have felt comfortable using deontic notion
s. \; In this paper\, I explain why this is a mistake and point the w
ay to a better and more pure virtue ethical approach to understanding the
actions of heroes and saints. \; In the end\, I think the virtue eth
icist should jettison the notion of supererogation. \; However\, I th
ink this is a small price to pay and it need not threaten the virtue ethi
cal project of conceptualizing common sense morality.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:lecture|open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110401T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110401T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:"Moral Intuitionism\, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments" by Mar
k van Roojen (University of Nebraska)
UID:20110401T223000Z-4232@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110119T104934Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/4232-moral-intuitionism-experi
ments-and-skeptical
LAST-MODIFIED:20110330T180328Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:4232
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:lecture|open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110404T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110404T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 102
SUMMARY:"Art\, Self\, and Knowledge: ASK" by Keith Lehrer (University of
Arizona)
UID:20110404T223000Z-4231@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110119T104829Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/4231-art-self-and-knowledge-as
k-by-keith-lehrer
LAST-MODIFIED:20110126T181438Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:4231
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:lecture|open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110412T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110412T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 102
SUMMARY:"Does Eudaimonism Rest on a Mistake?" by Frans Svensson (Uppsala
University)
UID:20110412T223000Z-4230@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110119T104735Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/4230-does-eudaimonism-rest-on-
a-mistake-by-frans
LAST-MODIFIED:20110328T162457Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:4230
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:lecture|open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110415T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110415T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:"What Do You Give a God Who's Already Got Everything? (Benevolenc
e\, Impassibility and Eudaimonism in Plato and Beyond)" by Keith McPartla
nd (Williams College)
UID:20110415T223000Z-4233@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110119T105020Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/4233-what-do-you-give-a-god-wh
os-already-got-everything
LAST-MODIFIED:20110412T215843Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:4233
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:lecture|open to the public
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110902T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110902T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 102
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Socratic Aversion to Suffering Injusticen by Nicholas Smith and J
ames Mire (Lewis & Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:Socrates claims that he would rather that he neither suffer i
njustice\, nor perform it. The notion that someone would have an aversion
to suffering injustice seems so commonsense as to require no justificati
on. Yet if Socrates accepts the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happ
iness ("no evil comes to a good man")\, then it is hard to see why Socrat
es\, being a good man\, would have anything to fear from victimization. T
his paper aims to make these views consistent through a reinterpretation
of several important Socratic positions\, notably the relation between vi
rtue and happiness\, and Socrates' moral psychology.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Socrates claims that he would rather tha
t he neither suffer injustice\, nor perform it. The notion that someone w
ould have an aversion to suffering injustice seems so commonsense as to r
equire no justification. Yet if Socrates accepts the thesis that virtue i
s sufficient for happiness ("no evil comes to a good man")\, then it is h
ard to see why Socrates\, being a good man\, would have anything to fear
from victimization. This paper aims to make these views consistent throug
h a reinterpretation of several important Socratic positions\, notably th
e relation between virtue and happiness\, and Socrates' moral psychology.
UID:20110902T223000Z-6734@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110823T155125Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/6734-socratic-aversion-to-suff
ering-injusticen-by
LAST-MODIFIED:20110823T225239Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:6734
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Socrates claims that he would rather that he neither
suffer injustice\, nor perform it. The notion that someone would have an
aversion to suffering injustice seems so commonsense as to require no ju
stification. Yet if Socrates accepts the thesis that virtue is sufficient
for happiness ("no evil comes to a good man")\, then it is hard to see w
hy Socrates\, being a good man\, would have anything to fear from victimi
zation. This paper aims to make these views consistent through a reinterp
retation of several important Socratic positions\, notably the relation b
etween virtue and happiness\, and Socrates' moral psychology.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|student event
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110923T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110923T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"Gut Reactions" and Abstract Art by Jay Odenbaugh and Levi Tenen
(Lewis & Clark)
DESCRIPTION:It is commonplace to claim that abstract\, non-representation
al \;artworks such as Rothko's No. 14 or Miles Davis' Blue in Green e
xpress \;emotions like sadness. However\, this seems problematic sinc
e \;expression generally requires a person doing the expressing. In t
his \;paper\, we attempt to address this "missing person problem". Fi
rst\, we \;present the problem of "abstract expression" and we articu
late the \;various ways in which the concept of expression is used re
garding \;persons and artworks. Second\, we sketch our best understan
ding of what \;the emotions borrowing from the work of Jesse Prinz an
d Jenefer \;Robinson. Finally\, combining both the conceptual clarifi
cation and \;work on emotion discussed above\, we provide an account
of how emotions \;can be expressed by abstract art.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
It is commonplace to claim that abstrac
t\, non-representational \;artworks such as Rothko's No. 14 or Miles
Davis' Blue in Green express \;emotions like sadness. However\, this
seems problematic since \;expression generally requires a person doin
g the expressing. In this \;paper\, we attempt to address this "missi
ng person problem". First\, we \;present the problem of "abstract exp
ression" and we articulate the \;various ways in which the concept of
expression is used regarding \;persons and artworks. Second\, we ske
tch our best understanding of what \;the emotions borrowing from the
work of Jesse Prinz and Jenefer \;Robinson. Finally\, combining both
the conceptual clarification and \;work on emotion discussed above\,
we provide an account of how emotions \;can be expressed by abstract
art.
UID:20110923T223000Z-7156@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110906T154958Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7156-gut-reactions-and-abstrac
t-art-by-jay-odenbaugh
LAST-MODIFIED:20110917T160422Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7156
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:It is commonplace to claim that abstract\, non-repres
entational \;artworks such as Rothko's No. 14 or Miles Davis' Blue in
Green express \;emotions like sadness. However\, this seems problema
tic since \;expression generally requires a person doing the expressi
ng. In this \;paper\, we attempt to address this "missing person prob
lem". First\, we \;present the problem of "abstract expression" and w
e articulate the \;various ways in which the concept of expression is
used regarding \;persons and artworks. Second\, we sketch our best u
nderstanding of what \;the emotions borrowing from the work of Jesse
Prinz and Jenefer \;Robinson. Finally\, combining both the conceptual
clarification and \;work on emotion discussed above\, we provide an
account of how emotions \;can be expressed by abstract art.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|open to the public|send-to-undergraduate|s
tudent event|student events
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110930T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110930T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102
SUMMARY:German Idealism meets Indian Vedanta: A Comparison of Schelling a
nd Hegel with Sankara and Ramanuja (plus Abhinavagupta)- Katherine Elise
Barhydt and J.M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark)
DESCRIPTION:We compare the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel with th
e Indian Vedānta of Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja\, as well as Abhinavagupt
a's Kaśmir Śaivism. We argue that only Hegel's philosophy does not fail
according to its own standard of success.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
We compare the German Idealism of Schel
ling and Hegel with the Indian Vedānta of Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja\, a
s well as Abhinavagupta's Kaśmir Śaivism. We argue that only Hegel's ph
ilosophy does not fail according to its own standard of success.
UID:20110930T223000Z-7178@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110907T154745Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7178-german-idealism-meets-ind
ian-vedanta-a-comparison
LAST-MODIFIED:20110922T183417Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7178
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:We compare the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel
with the Indian Vedānta of Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja\, as well as Abhi
navagupta's Kaśmir Śaivism. We argue that only Hegel's philosophy does
not fail according to its own standard of success.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111014T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111014T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Superstrong Multimodality: A New Approach to Perceptual Experienc
e- Rebecca Copenhaver and Bryce Dalbey (Lewis & Clark)
DESCRIPTION:We present a taxonomy of approaches and position to studying
perceptual experience. \;Perceptual experience has been studied prim
arily as a unimodal phenomenon: philosophers and cognitive scientists hav
e approached each sense modality as isolated and encapsulated and as havi
ng unique\, proprietary objects. \;In addition\, philosophers and co
gnitive scientists have focused almost exclusively on vision. \;Rece
ntly\, some have begun to study audition\, olfaction\, gustation\, propri
oception and other neglected sense modalities. \;We argue that while
this shift in attention is an advance\, a more radical shift in methodol
ogy is called for: superstrong multimodality. \;On this approach\, t
here are no modally-specific\, distinct\, proprietary\, invariant content
s. \;Rather\, overall perceptual experience is the most basic form o
f content\, and it cannot be specified in modally-specific terms.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
We present a taxonomy of approaches and
position to studying perceptual experience. \;Perceptual experience
has been studied primarily as a unimodal phenomenon: philosophers and co
gnitive scientists have approached each sense modality as isolated and en
capsulated and as having unique\, proprietary objects. \;In addition
\, philosophers and cognitive scientists have focused almost exclusively
on vision. \;Recently\, some have begun to study audition\, olfactio
n\, gustation\, proprioception and other neglected sense modalities. 
0\;We argue that while this shift in attention is an advance\, a more rad
ical shift in methodology is called for: superstrong multimodality.  
\;On this approach\, there are no modally-specific\, distinct\, proprieta
ry\, invariant contents. \;Rather\, overall perceptual experience is
the most basic form of content\, and it cannot be specified in modally-s
pecific terms.
UID:20111014T223000Z-7180@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110907T160455Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7180-superstrong-multimodality
-a-new-approach-to
LAST-MODIFIED:20111012T170649Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7180
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:We present a taxonomy of approaches and position to s
tudying perceptual experience. \;Perceptual experience has been stud
ied primarily as a unimodal phenomenon: philosophers and cognitive scient
ists have approached each sense modality as isolated and encapsulated and
as having unique\, proprietary objects. \;In addition\, philosopher
s and cognitive scientists have focused almost exclusively on vision. 
60\;Recently\, some have begun to study audition\, olfaction\, gustation\
, proprioception and other neglected sense modalities. \;We argue th
at while this shift in attention is an advance\, a more radical shift in
methodology is called for: superstrong multimodality. \;On this appr
oach\, there are no modally-specific\, distinct\, proprietary\, invariant
contents. \;Rather\, overall perceptual experience is the most basi
c form of content\, and it cannot be specified in modally-specific terms.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111021T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111021T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Hume's Sense of Probability- Don Garrett (New York University)
DESCRIPTION:"The imagination\, according to my own confession\, [is] the
ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy." So writes David Hume in
0\;A Treatise of Human Nature \;(T 1.4.4.1). But how can the \;im
agination\, of all things\, be the ultimate judge of systems of philosoph
y? And how can Hume's granting of this august judicial role to a faculty
generally regarded as the source of whimsy and error be reconciled with h
is confidence\, expressed in the Introduction to the \;Treatise\,
0\; \;that he is proposing in his \;own \;philosophy a "compl
ete system" that is built on a "solid foundation" (T Intro. 6-7)? Those a
re the central questions that I propose to address. My answer to the firs
t question will be that the Humean imagination serves as the ultimate jud
ge of systems of philosophy chiefly by being\, through what I will call i
ts \;sense of probability\, the sole judge of \;the \;probabi
lity that they are true. My answer to the second will be that\, on Hume's
view\, a system with sufficient probability of being true\, as judged by
the imagination\, can properly be regarded as well-founded.
\;
I will begin by explaining Hume's general ap
proach to those \;abstract ideas \;that are \;derived from a
sense—that is\, what we would now be likely to call \;response-depe
ndent concepts—and examining the applicability of that general approach
to the specific abstract idea of probability. I will then set out what I
take to be his general approach to \;normative \;ideas and exami
ne the applicability of that approach to the specific abstract idea of pr
obable truth. Combining the results of these two investigations will allo
w us to see his abstract idea of probable truth as a concept that is both
\;response-dependent \;and \;epistemically normative. We wil
l then be in a position to understand the imagination's use of that conce
pt in properly judging systems of philosophy—including\, of course\, Hu
me's own system. I will conclude by drawing several consequences for Hume
an epistemology and its relation to skepticism.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
"The imagination\, ac
cording to my own confession\, [is] the ultimate judge of all systems of
philosophy." So writes David Hume in \;A Treatise of Human Nature
\;(T 1.4.4.1). But how can the \;imagination\, of
all things\, be the ultimate judge of systems of philosophy? And how can
Hume's granting of this august judicial role to a faculty generally regar
ded as the source of whimsy and error be reconciled with his confidence\,
expressed in the Introduction to the \;Treatise\, \;
60\;that he is proposing in his \;own \;philosophy a "co
mplete system" that is built on a "solid foundation" (T Intro. 6-7)? Thos
e are the central questions that I propose to address. My answer to the f
irst question will be that the Humean imagination serves as the ultimate
judge of systems of philosophy chiefly by being\, through what I will cal
l its \;sense of probability\, the sole judge of \;t
he \;probability that they are true. My answer to the s
econd will be that\, on Hume's view\, a system with sufficient probabilit
y of being true\, as judged by the imagination\, can properly be regarded
as well-founded.
\;
I will begin by explaining Hume's general approach to those \;abs
tract ideas \;that are \;derived from a sense—tha
t is\, what we would now be likely to call \;response-dependent c
oncepts—and examining the applicability of that general approach t
o the specific abstract idea of probability. I will then set out what I t
ake to be his general approach to \;normative \;ideas an
d examine the applicability of that approach to the specific abstract ide
a of probable truth. Combining the results of these two investigations wi
ll allow us to see his abstract idea of probable truth as a concept that
is both \;response-dependent \;and \;epistemical
ly normative. We will then be in a position to understand the imagin
ation's use of that concept in properly judging systems of philosophy—i
ncluding\, of course\, Hume's own system. I will conclude by drawing seve
ral consequences for Humean epistemology and its relation to skepticism.
div>
UID:20111021T223000Z-7361@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20110912T090711Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7361-humes-sense-of-probabilit
y-don-garrett-new-york
LAST-MODIFIED:20111010T175648Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
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X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
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X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:"The imagination\, according to my own confession\, [
is] the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy." So writes David Hum
e in \;A Treatise of Human Nature \;(T 1.4.4.1). But how
can the \;imagination\, of all things\, be the ultimate jud
ge of systems of philosophy? And how can Hume's granting of this august j
udicial role to a faculty generally regarded as the source of whimsy and
error be reconciled with his confidence\, expressed in the Introduction t
o the \;Treatise\, \; \;that he is proposing in his&
#160\;own \;philosophy a "complete system" that is built on
a "solid foundation" (T Intro. 6-7)? Those are the central questions that
I propose to address. My answer to the first question will be that the H
umean imagination serves as the ultimate judge of systems of philosophy c
hiefly by being\, through what I will call its \;sense of probabi
lity\, the sole judge of \;the \;probability th
at they are true. My answer to the second will be that\, on Hume's v
iew\, a system with sufficient probability of being true\, as judged by t
he imagination\, can properly be regarded as well-founded. \n \
nI will begin by explaining Hume's general approach to those \;ab
stract ideas \;that are \;derived from a sense—th
at is\, what we would now be likely to call \;response-dependent
concepts—and examining the applicability of that general approach
to the specific abstract idea of probability. I will then set out what I
take to be his general approach to \;normative \;ideas a
nd examine the applicability of that approach to the specific abstract id
ea of probable truth. Combining the results of these two investigations w
ill allow us to see his abstract idea of probable truth as a concept that
is both \;response-dependent \;and \;epistemica
lly normative. We will then be in a position to understand the imagi
nation's use of that concept in properly judging systems of philosophy—
including\, of course\, Hume's own system. I will conclude by drawing sev
eral consequences for Humean epistemology and its relation to skepticism.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|humanities|open to the public|send-to-unde
rgraduate|student event
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111027T180000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111027T203000
LOCATION:Smith Hall\, Albany
GEO:45.451415;-122.668211
SUMMARY:Philosophy Extravaganza: Can animals think?
DESCRIPTION:This fall\, the Philosophy Extravaganza has chosen as its top
ic\, "Can animals think?" Questions of whether animals\, or more generall
y non-humans\, can think have long puzzled philosophers and non-philosoph
ers alike\, and are today of an especially high importance\; for example\
, we all must deal with questions of how non-human thought informs our et
hical views. Please join us for a panel discussion on animal thought\, fe
aturing: Ken Clifton (Biology)\, Becko Copenhaver (Philosophy)\, Erik Nil
sen (Psychology)\, and Kathy Hessler (Animal Law). Refreshments will be p
rovided.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
This fall\, the Philosophy Extravaganza
has chosen as its topic\, "Can animals think?" Questions of whether anim
als\, or more generally non-humans\, can think have long puzzled philosop
hers and non-philosophers alike\, and are today of an especially high imp
ortance\; for example\, we all must deal with questions of how non-human
thought informs our ethical views. Please join us for a panel discussion
on animal thought\, featuring: Ken Clifton (Biology)\, Becko Copenhaver (
Philosophy)\, Erik Nilsen (Psychology)\, and Kathy Hessler (Animal Law).
Refreshments will be provided.
National P
ublic Radio's Philosophy Talk "The Nature of Wilderness" Jay Odenbaugh\,
Associate Professor\, Philosophy Thursday\, April 19\, 7 p.m.
\, Agnes Flanagan Chapel Free and open to the general public
. Advance online registration required.
Philosophy Talk<
/a> \;is radio that celebrates the value of the examined life. E
ach week\, our two host philosophers invite you to join them in conversat
ion on a wide variety of issues ranging from popular culture to our most
deeply-held beliefs about science\, morality\, and the human condition.&#
160\;Philosophy Talk \;challenges listeners to identify and
question their assumptions and to think about things in new ways. We are
dedicated to reasoned conversation driven by human curiosity. \;P
hilosophy Talk \;is accessible\, intellectually stimulating\, an
d most of all\, fun!
UID:20120420T020000Z-10339@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120308T192201Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/10339-philosophy-talk-the-natu
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LAST-MODIFIED:20120413T002426Z
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X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:NPR's Philosophy Talk "The Nature of Wilderness" \nJay Odenbaugh\, Philosoph
y \nThursday\, April 19\, 7 p.m. \nAgnes Flanagan Chapel\nFree and open to the general public. \nAdvance online registration required. \n Philosophy Talk \;is radio th
at celebrates the value of the examined life. Each week\, our two host ph
ilosophers invite you to join them in conversation on a wide variety of i
ssues ranging from popular culture to our most deeply-held beliefs about
science\, morality\, and the human condition. \;Philosophy Talk
em> \;challenges listeners to identify and question their assumptions
and to think about things in new ways. We are dedicated to reasoned conv
ersation driven by human curiosity. \;Philosophy Talk \;
is accessible\, intellectually stimulating\, and most of all\, fun!
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|send-to-undergraduate|student event|s
tudent events|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120419T190000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120419T210000
LOCATION:Agnes Flanagan Chapel
GEO:45.450821;-122.671419
SUMMARY:"The Nature of Wilderness"
DESCRIPTION:Featuring Jay Odenbaugh\, associate professor of philosophy
Thursday\, April 19\, 2012\, 7 p.m.\, Agnes Flanagan Chapel Today we loo
k to the wilderness as an escape\, a beautiful and peaceful reprieve from
the day-to-day activities of our busy lives. We think of wilderness as a
fully natural environment that contrasts sharply with the designed and c
onstructed environments in which we normally move. But does wilderness th
us conceived really exist anymore? What is natural and what is artificial
about wilderness? Should humans be understood as a part of nature or dis
tinct from it? And how should we approach conservation efforts so that we
balance the needs of a growing world population with the need to preserv
e some aspect of the wild in our lives?Details: \;This event is free
and open to the general public. However:We have reached seating capacity
in the Chapel for online reservations as of 4 p.m.\, Friday\, April 13.Th
ose who have registered online have now received tickets for admittance.&
#160\; If you do not have a ticket\, you will not be admitted to the Chap
el. \;If you would like to register for the simulcast of Philosophy T
alk in the \;Gregg Pavilion (adjacent to the Chapel) (https://www.lcl
ark.edu/offices/chapel/agnes_flanagan_chapel/)\, please complete the onli
ne registration \;here. (https://www.lclark.edu/live/forms/343-philos
ophy-talk-online-registration-for-simulcast?preview=1) \;Philosophy
Talk (http://philosophytalk.org/) \;is radio that celebrates the val
ue of the examined life. Each week\, our two host philosophers invite you
to join them in conversation on a wide variety of issues ranging from po
pular culture to our most deeply-held beliefs about science\, morality\,
and the human condition. \;Philosophy Talk \;challenges listeners
to identify and question their assumptions and to think about things in
new ways. We are dedicated to reasoned conversation driven by human curio
sity. \;Philosophy Talk \;is accessible\, intellectually stimulat
ing\, and most of all\, fun! \;Philosophy Talk \;is produced by&#
160\;Ben Manilla Productions\, Inc. (http://bmpaudio.com/) \;on behal
f of Stanford University\, as part of its \;Humanities Outreach Initi
ative (http://humanexperience.stanford.edu/). \;Ken Taylor is the c
urrent Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford Univers
ity. \;He is also director of Stanford's interdisciplinary program i
n Symbolic Systems. His work lies at the intersection of the philosophy o
f language and the philosophy of mind\, with an occasional foray into the
history of philosophy. He is the author of many books and articles\, inc
luding \;Truth and Meaning\, \;Reference and the Rational Mind\,
and the forthcoming \;Referring to the World. \;He is hard at wo
rk on \;his \;magnum opus \;book long in the making called &
#160\;A Natural History of Normativity \; \;in which he reduces a
ll things normative to something merely natural. \;John Perry is Di
stinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Ri
verside\, and Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at
Stanford University. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and S
ciences and a recipient of many honors and awards\, including the Nicod a
nd Humboldt Prizes. A popular lecturer\, in 1990 he was awarded the Dinke
lspiel Award for undergraduate teaching. \; He is the author of over
100 articles and books\, including \;A Dialogue on Personal Identity
and Immortality\, \;Knowledge\, Possibility\, and Consciousness\, an
d \;Reference and Reflexivity. \; He also has the internet's mos
t popular essay on \;procrastination (http://www-csli.stanford.edu/%7
Ejohn/procrastination.html). \;Jay Odenbaugh\, Associate Professor
and Department Chair"Philosophy in its best moments is about instilling i
ntellectual accountability. As William James noted\, "˜a great many peop
le think they are thinking when they are really rearranging their prejudi
ces.' To understand our beliefs and values is important not only for inte
llectual reasons but for deeply practical reasons. Beliefs and values hav
e effects — some beneficial and some not. It thus is of profound import
ance to be responsible for one's view of the world and my teaching is fir
st and foremost an attempt to bring students to understand and respect th
at responsibility." I graduated with a PhD in philosophy from the Univ
ersity of Calgary in 2001. My dissertation was on \;Searching for Pat
terns\, Hunting for Causes: A Philosophical Examination of Mathematical M
odeling in Theoretical Ecology. My research interests include Philosophy
of Biology (especially ecology and evolution)\, Philosophy of Science\, a
nd Environmental Ethics. I have published articles in \;Philosophy of
Science \;and \;Environmental Values.Besides philosophy\, I enjo
y reading about about art and art history\, rock climbing\, hiking\, and
cycling.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Featuring Jay Odenbaugh\, associate professor of philosop
hy
Thursday\, April 19\, 2012\, 7 p.m.\, Agnes Flanagan
Chapel
Today we look to the wilderness as an escape\, a beautifu
l and peaceful reprieve from the day-to-day activities of our busy lives.
We think of wilderness as a fully natural environment that contrasts sha
rply with the designed and constructed environments in which we normally
move. But does wilderness thus conceived really exist anymore? What is na
tural and what is artificial about wilderness? Should humans be understoo
d as a part of nature or distinct from it? And how should we approach con
servation efforts so that we balance the needs of a growing world populat
ion with the need to preserve some aspect of the wild in our lives?
Details: \;
This event is free and
open to the general public. However:
We hav
e reached seating capacity in the Chapel for online reservations as of 4
p.m.\, Friday\, April 13.
Those who have registe
red online have now received tickets for admittance. \; If you do not
have a ticket\, you will not be admitted to the Chapel. \;<
/li>
Philosophy Talk \;is radio that celebrates
the value of the examined life. Each week\, our two host philosophers inv
ite you to join them in conversation on a wide variety of issues ranging
from popular culture to our most deeply-held beliefs about science\, mora
lity\, and the human condition. \;Philosophy Talk \;chal
lenges listeners to identify and question their assumptions and to think
about things in new ways. We are dedicated to reasoned conversation drive
n by human curiosity. \;Philosophy Talk \;is accessible\
, intellectually stimulating\, and most of all\, fun! \;Philosoph
y Talk \;is produced by \;Ben Manilla Productions\, Inc. \;on behalf of Stanfo
rd University\, as part of its \;Humanities Outreach Initiative.
&#
160\;
Ken Taylor is the current
Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University. &#
160\;He is also director of Stanford's interdisciplinary program in Symbo
lic Systems. His work lies at the intersection of the philosophy of langu
age and the philosophy of mind\, with an occasional foray into the histor
y of philosophy. He is the author of many books and articles\, including&
#160\;Truth and Meaning\, \;Reference and
the Rational Mind\, and the forthcoming \;Referring
to the World. \;He is hard at work on \;his \;magnum opus \;book long in the making called \;A Natur
al History of Normativity \; \;in which he reduces all thing
s normative to something merely natural.
\;
John Perry is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
at the University of California at Riverside\, and Henry Waldgrave Stuar
t Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Stanford University. He is a member
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a recipient of many hon
ors and awards\, including the Nicod and Humboldt Prizes. A popular lectu
rer\, in 1990 he was awarded the Dinkelspiel Award for undergraduate teac
hing. \;
He also has the internet's most popular essay on \;procrastination.
\;
Jay Odenbaugh\, Assoc
iate Professor and Department Chair
"Philosophy in its best mo
ments is about instilling intellectual accountability. As William James n
oted\, "˜a great many people think they are thinking when they are reall
y rearranging their prejudices.' To understand our beliefs and values is
important not only for intellectual reasons but for deeply practical reas
ons. Beliefs and values have effects — some beneficial and some not. It
thus is of profound importance to be responsible for one's view of the w
orld and my teaching is first and foremost an attempt to bring students t
o understand and respect that responsibility."
I graduated w
ith a PhD in philosophy from the University of Calgary in 2001. My diss
ertation was on \;Searching for Patterns\, Hunting for Causes: A
Philosophical Examination of Mathematical Modeling in Theoretical Ecology
. My research interests include Philosophy of Biology (especially ec
ology and evolution)\, Philosophy of Science\, and Environmental Ethics.
I have published articles in \;Philosophy of Science \;a
nd \;Environmental Values.Besides philosophy\, I enjoy readi
ng about about art and art history\, rock climbing\, hiking\, and cycling
.
UID:20120420T020000Z-35061@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20150317T092955Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/35061-the-nature-of-wilderness
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20150317T162955Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:35061
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Should humans be understood as a part of nature or di
stinct from it? And how should we approach conservation efforts so that w
e balance the needs of a growing world population with the need to preser
ve some aspect of the wild in our lives?
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120420T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120420T170000
LOCATION:John R. Howard 102
GEO:45.44918;-122.670969
SUMMARY:Honors Thesis Presentation by Davida Grimes "Moral Disagreement\,
Moral Inquiry\, and Moral Problem Solving"
DESCRIPTION:Relativistic treatments of the phenomenon of moral disagreeme
nt have been widely criticized and defended in recent years. There are\,
however\, two closely related phenomena\, namely\, what I call moral inqu
iry\, and moral problem-solving\, that I wish to bring attention to in th
is paper. I argue that just as the Metaethical Relativist must provide an
adequate account of moral disagreement\, he must also make sense of the
phenomena of moral inquiry and moral problem-solving. Both phenomena\, li
ke the problem of moral disagreement\, involve uncertainty about moral an
swers. However\, whereas the problem of disagreement involves two parties
who have apparently opposing moral positions\, moral inquiry involves a
single inquirer's attempts to figure out whether or not something is mora
lly permissible. Moral problem-solving is similar in that it need only in
volve one person\, but different in that the individual is trying to figu
re out what to do when faced with a moral decision. To frame my discussi
on\, I focus on the view of one prominent contemporary metaethical relati
vist\, Jesse Prinz\, as presented in his book "The Emotional Construction
of Morals". I outline Prinz's theory\, explain the phenomena of moral di
sagreement\, moral inquiry\, and moral problem-solving\, and highlight im
portant surface features of each. I argue that there are certain assumpti
ons implicit in the ways we conduct ourselves morally\, and that these as
sumptions are in deep tension with Prinz's view. I then engage with Prinz
's proposed explanations of moral disagreement\, and speculate as to how
he might try to explain the phenomena of moral inquiry\, and moral proble
m-solving in turn. I argue that even if Prinz's attempt to explain away m
oral disagreement succeeds (which I call into doubt)\, Prinz\, and other
metaethical relativists\, have more work to do to resolve the deep tensio
n between relativistic treatments of moral disagreement\, moral problem s
olving\, and moral inquiry and the surface features present in all three
forms of moral discourse.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Relativistic treatments of the phenomen
on of moral disagreement have been widely criticized and defended in rece
nt years. There are\, however\, two closely related phenomena\, namely\,
what I call moral inquiry\, and moral problem-solving\, that I wish to br
ing attention to in this paper. I argue that just as the Metaethical Rela
tivist must provide an adequate account of moral disagreement\, he must a
lso make sense of the phenomena of moral inquiry and moral problem-solvin
g. Both phenomena\, like the problem of moral disagreement\, involve unce
rtainty about moral answers. However\, whereas the problem of disagreemen
t involves two parties who have apparently opposing moral positions\, mor
al inquiry involves a single inquirer's attempts to figure out whether or
not something is morally permissible. Moral problem-solving is similar i
n that it need only involve one person\, but different in that the indivi
dual is trying to figure out what to do when faced with a moral decision.
To frame my discussion\, I focus on the view of one promine
nt contemporary metaethical relativist\, Jesse Prinz\, as presented in hi
s book "The Emotional Construction of Morals". I outline Prinz's theory\,
explain the phenomena of moral disagreement\, moral inquiry\, and moral
problem-solving\, and highlight important surface features of each. I arg
ue that there are certain assumptions implicit in the ways we conduct our
selves morally\, and that these assumptions are in deep tension with Prin
z's view. I then engage with Prinz's proposed explanations of moral disag
reement\, and speculate as to how he might try to explain the phenomena o
f moral inquiry\, and moral problem-solving in turn. I argue that even if
Prinz's attempt to explain away moral disagreement succeeds (which I cal
l into doubt)\, Prinz\, and other metaethical relativists\, have more wor
k to do to resolve the deep tension between relativistic treatments of mo
ral disagreement\, moral problem solving\, and moral inquiry and the surf
ace features present in all three forms of moral discourse.
UID:20120420T223000Z-10786@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120419T160955Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/10786-honors-thesis-presentati
on-by-davida-grimes-moral
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20120420T163840Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,7,674,681/29325_davida2.rev.1373936885.jpg
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X-LIVEWHALE-ID:10786
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,7\,674\,681/29325_davida2.rev.1373936885.jp
g
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Relativistic treatments of the phenomenon of moral di
sagreement have been widely criticized and defended in recent years. Ther
e are\, however\, two closely related phenomena\, namely\, what I call mo
ral inquiry\, and moral problem-solving\, that I wish to bring attention
to in this paper. I argue that just as the Metaethical Relativist must pr
ovide an adequate account of moral disagreement\, he must also make sense
of the phenomena of moral inquiry and moral problem-solving. Both phenom
ena\, like the problem of moral disagreement\, involve uncertainty about
moral answers. However\, whereas the problem of disagreement involves two
parties who have apparently opposing moral positions\, moral inquiry inv
olves a single inquirer's attempts to figure out whether or not something
is morally permissible. Moral problem-solving is similar in that it need
only involve one person\, but different in that the individual is trying
to figure out what to do when faced with a moral decision.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:academic honor|award|humanities|open to the public|send-
to-undergraduate|student event|student events
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120907T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120907T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium: Kaśmir to Prussia\, Round Trip: A Compari
son of Monistic Śaivism and Hegel
DESCRIPTION:Student-Faculty Summer Research Presentation: Kaśmir to Prus
sia\, Round Trip: \; A Comparison of Monistic Śaivism and Hegel"
J.M. Fritzman Sarah Ann Lownstein Meredith Margaret Nelson \; W
e elucidate 9th-12th centuries monistic Kaśmiri Śaivism through \;c
omparisons to contemporary science. We show that Kaśmiri Śaivism can
60\;be transposed into Fichte's philosophy and so set on a trajectory
0\;towards Hegel. While Kaśmiri Śaivism reaches Prussia\, the resources
\;to articulate Hegel's Absolute are in Kaśmir.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Student-Faculty Summer Research Presen
tation: Kaśmir to Prussia\, Round Trip:
\;
A Co
mparison of Monistic Śaivism and Hegel"
J.M. Fritzman
Sarah Ann Lownstein
Meredith Margaret Nelson
&
#160\;
We elucidate 9th-12th centuries monistic Kaśmiri Śaivism
through \;comparisons to contemporary science. We show that Kaśmiri
Śaivism can \;be transposed into Fichte's philosophy and so set on
a trajectory \;towards Hegel. While Kaśmiri Śaivism reaches Prussia
\, the resources \;to articulate Hegel's Absolute are in Kaśmir.
\n The Lewis &\; C
lark College Philosophy Department hosts a regular colloquium series. Dis
tinguished speakers from around the world present on a wide array of phil
osophical topics.\n
\n
\n \n
\n
\n \n
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:alumni|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium
series|presentation|research|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120921T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120921T170000
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium: "Alienation and Eudaimonism"
DESCRIPTION:Many philosophers have objected to modern moral theories on t
he grounds that such theories conceive of morality in a way that brings w
ith it alienation –from one's personal commitments\, from other people\
, from one's sentiments or\, paradoxically\, from morality itself.  \
;The vast majority of philosophers have thought that eudaimonistic moral
theories easily avoid this objection. \;We think eudaimonists cannot
so easily avoid this problem. \;In this paper\, we explain why alie
nation is a problem that should be taken seriously by moral philosophers.
\;We explain how and why eudaimonist theories confront the problem
of alienation. In the end\, we think eudaimonists have the resources for
a strong response to the problem of alienation. \;In the final secti
on of the paper we explain why consequentialists\, and perhaps even deont
ologists\, can benefit from the eudaimonist response to the problem of al
ienation.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Many philosophers have objected to mode
rn moral theories on the grounds that such theories conceive of morality
in a way that brings with it alienation –from one's personal commitment
s\, from other people\, from one's sentiments or\, paradoxically\, from m
orality itself. \;The vast majority of philosophers have thought tha
t eudaimonistic moral theories easily avoid this objection. \;We thi
nk eudaimonists cannot so easily avoid this problem. \;In this paper
\, we explain why alienation is a problem that should be taken seriously
by moral philosophers. \;We explain how and why eudaimonist theories
confront the problem of alienation. In the end\, we think eudaimonists h
ave the resources for a strong response to the problem of alienation. 
60\;In the final section of the paper we explain why consequentialists\,
and perhaps even deontologists\, can benefit from the eudaimonist respons
e to the problem of alienation.
UID:20120921T223000Z-12783@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120905T103542Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12783-philosophy-colloquium-al
ienation-and-eudaimonism
LAST-MODIFIED:20120912T181157Z
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op/1/src_region/30,26,151,147/31651_17343_img_3563_5710d4785a3e9a0acdda99
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eight/80/crop/1/src_region/30\,26\,151\,147/31651_17343_img_3563_5710d478
5a3e9a0acdda99e3e6271a8b.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department
hosts a regular colloquium series. Distinguished speakers from around the
world present on a wide array of philosophical topics.
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121019T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121019T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium: "Cultural Minds: Using Rules to Buttress R
easoning"
DESCRIPTION:Ron Mallon\, Washington University in St. Louis Cultural Min
ds: Using Rules to Buttress Reasoning In the last decade\, much work in
moral psychology has \;contrasted "automatic" responses resulting fro
m phylogenetically \;ancient\, automatic\, emotional\, reflexive part
s of the human mind with \;"reasoned" responses that emerge from the
phylogenetically more recent \;parts of the human mind associated wit
h conscious thought and \;reasoning. Perhaps surprisingly\, much of t
his work has emphasized the \;extent to which our moral lives (and ou
r behavior more generally) are \;driven by processes of the first par
t. \;In this paper I critically respond to this trend suggesting that
\;claims of dominance are not persuasive. I consider especially what
I \;call the "argument from finite resources" for why automatic proc
esses \;must dominate reasoned ones\, and I offer a series of argumen
ts for why \;the human capacity for rule-following can buttress reaso
ning processes \;against the depletion of finite resources. The pictu
re of moral life \;that results is both more rational\, but also more
socially and \;culturally embedded\, than the recent emphasis on aut
omatic processes \;would suggest.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Ron Mallon\, Washington Universi
ty in St. Louis
Cultural Minds: Using Rules to Buttres
s Reasoning
In the last decade\, much work in moral psychology
has \;contrasted "automatic" responses resulting from phylogenetical
ly \;ancient\, automatic\, emotional\, reflexive parts of the human m
ind with \;"reasoned" responses that emerge from the phylogenetically
more recent \;parts of the human mind associated with conscious thou
ght and \;reasoning. Perhaps surprisingly\, much of this work has emp
hasized the \;extent to which our moral lives (and our behavior more
generally) are \;driven by processes of the first part. \;In this
paper I critically respond to this trend suggesting that \;claims of
dominance are not persuasive. I consider especially what I \;call th
e "argument from finite resources" for why automatic processes \;must
dominate reasoned ones\, and I offer a series of arguments for why \
;the human capacity for rule-following can buttress reasoning processes&#
160\;against the depletion of finite resources. The picture of moral life
\;that results is both more rational\, but also more socially and
60\;culturally embedded\, than the recent emphasis on automatic processes
\;would suggest.
UID:20121019T223000Z-12769@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T163020Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12769-philosophy-colloquium-cu
ltural-minds-using-rules
LAST-MODIFIED:20120905T181530Z
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op/1/src_region/0,26,753,779/31650_me.jpeg
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X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12769
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,26\,753\,779/31650_me.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. 503-768-7480
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department
hosts a regular colloquium series. Distinguished speakers from around the
world present on a wide array of philosophical topics.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|
presentation|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121025T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121025T140000
LOCATION:L&\;C Bookstore
SUMMARY:Book Warming: Knowledge\, Ian Evans and Nicholas Smith
DESCRIPTION:Knowledge \; Ian Evans Nick Smith \; Introduct
ions to the theory of knowledge are plentiful\, but none introduce studen
ts to the most recent debates that exercise contemporary philosophers. Ia
n Evans and Nicholas D. Smith aim to change that. Their book guides the r
eader through the standard theories of knowledge while simultaneously usi
ng these as a springboard to introduce current debates. Each chapter conc
ludes with a "Current Trends" section pointing the reader to the best lit
erature dominating current philosophical discussion. These include: the p
uzzle of reasonable disagreement\; the so-called "problem of easy knowled
ge"\; the intellectual virtues\; and new theories in the philosophy of la
nguage relating to knowledge.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Knowledge
\;
Ia
n Evans
Nick Smith
\;
Introductions to th
e theory of knowledge are plentiful\, but none introduce students to the
most recent debates that exercise contemporary philosophers. Ian Evans an
d Nicholas D. Smith aim to change that. Their book guides the reader thro
ugh the standard theories of knowledge while simultaneously using these a
s a springboard to introduce current debates. Each chapter concludes with
a "Current Trends" section pointing the reader to the best literature do
minating current philosophical discussion. These include: the puzzle of r
easonable disagreement\; the so-called "problem of easy knowledge"\; the
intellectual virtues\; and new theories in the philosophy of language rel
ating to knowledge.
UID:20121025T200000Z-12784@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120905T104620Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12784-book-warming-knowledge-i
an-evans-and-nicholas
LAST-MODIFIED:20121024T185032Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,110,406,516/31648_portrait2.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12784
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,110\,406\,516/31648_portrait2.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121025T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121025T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"Revealed Irrationality" by Ian Evans (LC Alum)
DESCRIPTION:Is it possible to believe something\, while simultaneously
and in full consciousness – believing that this belief is unsupported
by your evidence? I say "yes": I believe this about many of my own belie
fs and I bet you do\, too. But several philosophers have argued that this
is precluded by the very nature of belief. The arguments – there are s
everal – have been influential\, but have received little scrutiny in p
rint. In this paper\, I take a hard look and find that none of the argume
nts holds water. Even if you agree with me that _these_ arguments fail\,
you might still find it puzzling how someone could believe that her own b
elief is irrational. The second part of my paper tries to help by making
such a doxastic situation intelligible from the first-person perspective.
What we can call "revealed irrationality" is possible and not as puzzlin
g as it might seem.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Is it possible to believe so
mething\, while simultaneously – and in full consciousness – believin
g that this belief is unsupported by your evidence? I say "yes": I believ
e this about many of my own beliefs and I bet you do\, too. But several p
hilosophers have argued that this is precluded by the very nature of beli
ef. The arguments – there are several – have been influential\, but h
ave received little scrutiny in print. In this paper\, I take a hard look
and find that none of the arguments holds water. Even if you agree with
me that _these_ arguments fail\, you might still find it puzzling how som
eone could believe that her own belief is irrational. The second part of
my paper tries to help by making such a doxastic situation intelligible f
rom the first-person perspective. What we can call "revealed irrationalit
y" is possible and not as puzzling as it might seem.
UID:20121025T223000Z-12770@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T163637Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12770-revealed-irrationality-b
y-ian-evans-lc-alum
LAST-MODIFIED:20121024T190712Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,112,406,518/31648_portrait2.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12770
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,112\,406\,518/31648_portrait2.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Is it possible to believe something\, while simultane
ously – and in full consciousness – believing that this belief is uns
upported by your evidence? I say "yes": I believe this about many of my o
wn beliefs and I bet you do\, too. But several philosophers have argued t
hat this is precluded by the very nature of belief. The arguments – the
re are several – have been influential\, but have received little scrut
iny in print. In this paper\, I take a hard look and find that none of th
e arguments holds water. Even if you agree with me that _these_ arguments
fail\, you might still find it puzzling how someone could believe that h
er own belief is irrational. The second part of my paper tries to help by
making such a doxastic situation intelligible from the first-person pers
pective. What we can call "revealed irrationality" is possible and not as
puzzling as it might seem.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:alumni|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121026T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121026T170000
LOCATION:JR Howard 202
SUMMARY:"Interpreting the Barcan Formula" by Ori Simchen (University of B
ritish Columbia)
DESCRIPTION:"Interpreting the Barcan Formula" by Ori SimchenThe Barcan fo
rmula (BF) is a schema of quantified modal logic that can be paraphrased
as the schematic conditional that if it is possible that there be \;F
then something or other is possibly \;F (e.g. if it is possible that
there be a talking donkey\, then something or other is possibly a talkin
g donkey). It is validated by the most straightforward systems of quantif
ied modal logic. It is also widely considered to pose a threat to a commo
nsensical modal metaphysical view ('actualism') according to which there
are no non-actual things. \;I will show how BF can be cleared of such
a charge by construing it as a bridge principle connecting possibility d
e dicto – or what is generally possible – and possibility de re – w
hat is specifically possible for particular things – while retaining a
Russellian robust sense of reality in modal matters.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
"Interpreting the Barcan Formula" by Or
i Simchen
The Barcan for
mula (BF) is a schema of quantified modal logic that can be paraphrased a
s the schematic conditional that if it is possible that there be \;F
then something or other is possibly \;F (e.g. if it
is possible that there be a talking donkey\, then something or other is
possibly a talking donkey). It is validated by the most straightforward s
ystems of quantified modal logic. It is also widely considered to pose a
threat to a commonsensical modal metaphysical view ('actualism') accordin
g to which there are no non-actual things. \;I will show how BF can b
e cleared of such a charge by construing it as a bridge principle connect
ing possibility de dicto – or what is generally possible – a
nd possibility de re – what is specifically possible for parti
cular things – while retaining a Russellian robust sense of reality in
modal matters.
UID:20121026T223000Z-13678@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20121017T133553Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/13678-interpreting-the-barcan-
formula-by-ori-simchen
LAST-MODIFIED:20121024T200005Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/33196_simchen.rev.1373936887.jpg
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X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/33196_simchen.rev.1373936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Barcan
formula (BF) is a schema of quantified modal logic that can be paraphras
ed as the schematic conditional that if it is possible that there be 
\;F then something or other is possibly \;F (e.g. i
f it is possible that there be a talking donkey\, then something or other
is possibly a talking donkey). It is validated by the most straightforwa
rd systems of quantified modal logic. It is also widely considered to pos
e a threat to a commonsensical modal metaphysical view ('actualism') acco
rding to which there are no non-actual things. \;I will show how BF c
an be cleared of such a charge by construing it as a bridge principle con
necting possibility de dicto – or what is generally possible
and possibility de re – what is specifically possible for p
articular things – while retaining a Russellian robust sense of reality
in modal matters.
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121102T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121102T140000
LOCATION:Lewis &\; Clark Bookstore
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Book Warming: From Kant to Croce: Modern Philosophy in Italy 1800
- 1950
DESCRIPTION:From Kant to Croce: Modern Philosophy in Italy 1800 - 1950 &
#160\; Brian P. Copenhaver Rebecca Copenhaver \; From around 180
0\, shortly before Pasquale Galluppis first book\, until 1950\, just befo
re Benedetto Croce died\, the most formative influences on Italian philos
ophers were Kant and the post-Kantians\, especially Hegel. In many ways\,
the Italian philosophers of this period lived in turbulent but creative
times\, from the Restoration to the Risorgimento and the rise and fall of
Fascism. From Kant to Croce is a comprehensive\, highly readable histor
y of the main currents and major figures of modern Italian philosophy\, d
escribed in a substantial introduction that details the development of th
e discipline during this period. Brian P. Copenhaver and Rebecca Copenhav
er provide the only up-to-date introduction in English to Italys leading
modern philosophers by translating and analysing rare and original texts
and by chronicling the lives and times of the philosophers who wrote them
. Thoroughly documented and highly readable\, From Kant to Croce examines
modern Italian philosophy from the perspective of contemporary analytic
philosophy. \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
From Kant to Croce: Modern Philosophy
in Italy 1800 - 1950
\;
Brian P. Copenhaver
Rebecca Copenhaver
\;
From around 1800\, sh
ortly before Pasquale Galluppis first book\, until 1950\, just before Ben
edetto Croce died\, the most formative influences on Italian philosophers
were Kant and the post-Kantians\, especially Hegel. In many ways\, the I
talian philosophers of this period lived in turbulent but creative times\
, from the Restoration to the Risorgimento and the rise and fall of Fasci
sm.
From Kant to Croce is a comprehensive\, highly readable histo
ry of the main currents and major figures of modern Italian philosophy\,
described in a substantial introduction that details the development of t
he discipline during this period. Brian P. Copenhaver and Rebecca Copenha
ver provide the only up-to-date introduction in English to Italys leading
modern philosophers by translating and analysing rare and original texts
and by chronicling the lives and times of the philosophers who wrote the
m. Thoroughly documented and highly readable\, From Kant to Croce examine
s modern Italian philosophy from the perspective of contemporary analytic
philosophy.
\;
UID:20121102T200000Z-12785@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120905T105122Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12785-book-warming-from-kant-t
o-croce-modern-philosophy
LAST-MODIFIED:20121102T155445Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/96,56,255,215/31643_img_4285.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12785
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/96\,56\,255\,215/31643_img_4285.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121102T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121102T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"Notes from a Nominalist: How to Excavate Philosophy from its Pas
t" by Brian P. Copenhaver
DESCRIPTION:Notes from a Nominalist: How to Excavate Philosophy from its
Past \; Brian P. Copenhaver University of California\, Los Angele
s \; Symphorien Champier's Introduction to Logic and Grammar\, a n
ominalist attack on realism published shortly before 1498\, is a very rar
e book: only two copies are known\, one of them newly discovered. Champie
r chooses a philosophical theory of grammar\, called modism\, as one of h
is targets: why? And he takes most of his ammunition straight from Ockham
's Summa of Logic: again\, why? Ockham had died in 1347\, but Champier me
ans to write an up-to-date guide for undergraduate philosophy students at
the close of the fifteenth century.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Notes from a Nominalist: How to Excava
te Philosophy from its Past
\;
Brian P. Copenhaver
University of California\, Los Angeles
\;
<
div> Symphorien Champier's Introduction to Logic and Grammar\, a nominal
ist attack on realism published shortly before 1498\, is a very rare book
: only two copies are known\, one of them newly discovered. Champier choo
ses a philosophical theory of grammar\, called modism\, as one of his tar
gets: why? And he takes most of his ammunition straight from Ockham's Sum
ma of Logic: again\, why? Ockham had died in 1347\, but Champier means to
write an up-to-date guide for undergraduate philosophy students at the c
lose of the fifteenth century.
UID:20121102T223000Z-12771@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T164400Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12771-notes-from-a-nominalist-
how-to-excavate-philosophy
LAST-MODIFIED:20121024T190925Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/270,14,994,738/31644_bpc_pic_2.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12771
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/270\,14\,994\,738/31644_bpc_pic_2.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE-CAPTION:OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department
hosts a regular colloquium series. \;Distinguished speakers from aro
und the world present on a wide array of philosophical topics.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloqu
ium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121128T180000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121128T203000
LOCATION:Albany
GEO:45.451415;-122.668211
SUMMARY:Philosophy Extravaganza: What do we inherit?
DESCRIPTION:It's time again for the Philosophy Extravaganza! This year we
pose the question\, \;what do we inherit? This includes inheritance
on the levels of individuals and of society. The Extravaganza will take p
lace on \;Wednesday\, 28 November \; from \;6:00 \; to
60\;8:30pm \;in \;Smith Hall \;(in Albany Quadrangle). This s
emester\, our speakers include: Andrew Bernstein\, professor of hi
story\, who \;will revisit a speech he gave just after 9/11 \;on
how many in the media compared the events of 9/11 to the bombing of Pearl
Harbor\, and the ways in which this analogy is disingenuous and dangerou
s Monica Miller\, professor of religious studies\, who will
address the \;role of 'inheritance' as both progress and peril in the
study of African American Religion as it relates to discourse\, identity
and difference and the role of 'faithful unfaithfulness' as strategy of
handling norms and values in the field of study Deborah Heat
h\, professor of anthropology\, who will discuss some of the scientific r
esearch that currently interests her in the area of epigenetics - \;&
#160\;the study of traits inherited biologically through mechanisms other
than genetics - \;as well as the influence of such perspectives on s
cientific research. Jay Odenbaugh\, professor of philosophy\
, \;who plans to \;discuss the \; origins of normative discip
lines\, especially aesthetics and ethics. It loo
ks like it will be a thought-provoking evening\, so please join us this W
ednesday!
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
It's time again for the Phi
losophy Extravaganza! This year we pose the question\, \;what
do we inherit? This includes inheritance on the levels of indiv
iduals and of society. The Extravaganza will take place on \;
Wednesday\, 28 November \; from \;6:00 \; to \;8:30pm \;in \;Smith Hall
\;(in Albany Quadrangle). This semester\, our speakers incl
ude:
Andrew Bernstein\, profess
or of history\, who \;will revisit a speech he gave just after 9/11&#
160\;on how many in the media compared the events of 9/11 to the bombing
of Pearl Harbor\, and the ways in which this analogy is disingenuous and
dangerous
Monica Miller\, professor of religious st
udies\, who will address the \;role of 'inheritance' as both progress
and peril in the study of African American Religion as it relates to dis
course\, identity and difference and the role of 'faithful unfaithfulness
' as strategy of handling norms and values in the field of study
Deborah Heath\, professor of anthropology\, who will discus
s some of the scientific research that currently interests her in the are
a of epigenetics - \; \;the study of traits inherited biologicall
y through mechanisms other than genetics - \;as well as the influence
of such perspectives on scientific research.
Jay O
denbaugh\, professor of philosophy\, \;who plans to \;discuss the \; origins of normative discip
lines\, especially aesthetics and ethics.
It
looks like it will be a thought-provoking evening\, so please join us thi
s Wednesday!
\n This term's Philosophy Extravaganza poses th
e question\, \;what do we inherit? And is on Wednesday\, 28 November \; from \;6:00 \;
strong> to \;8:30pm \;in \;Smith Hal
l \;(in Albany Quadrangle). This semester\, our speakers inc
lude:\n
\n \n \n
\n \n \n
\n \n Andrew Bernstein\, professor of history \
n Monica Miller\, professor of religious studies \n Deborah He
ath\, professor of anthropology \n Jay Odenbaugh\, professor of p
hilosophy \n \;\n
\n \n \n
\n Our speakers plan to discuss an interesting variety of issues\, suc
h as the rhetorical invocations of past events for the interpretation of
current events\, the origins of normative discourses like aesthetics and
ethics\, epigenetics and social perspectives on epigenetic research\, and
religious and cultural legacies in our own society.\n
\n \
n
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121130T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121130T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"Schopenhauer's Transcendental Aesthetic" by Desmond Hogan (Princ
eton University)
DESCRIPTION:Schopenhauer's Transcendental Aesthetic \; Desmond Hog
an Princeton University \; Schopenhauer famously holds that the p
roofs of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic "have such a complete power of c
onviction that its propositions [belong] among the incontestable truths."
This judgment places Schopenhauer outside of a broad historical consensu
s according to which the Transcendental Aesthetic's central argument for
the ideality of space and time is invalid. Schopenhauer offers no explici
t account of this argument\, and the classical commentaries are unmoved b
y his general appraisal. In reconsidering this appraisal\, I first examin
e a valid argument for transcendental idealism from premises Schopenhauer
endorses. While the argument in question invokes a metaphysical premise
Kant rejects\, Schopenhauer correctly attributes a weakened analogue to h
im. A parallel argument from this weaker premise remains valid\, and I su
ggest that the basic materials for the valid argument are contained in th
e Aesthetic. These findings make sense of Schopenhauer's positive apprais
al\; they also call for reconsideration of a dogma of contemporary Kant s
cholarship.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Schopenhauer's Transcendental Aestheti
c
\;
Desmond Hogan
Princeton University<
/h3>
\;
Schopenhauer famously holds that the proofs of
Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic "have such a complete power of convictio
n that its propositions [belong] among the incontestable truths." This ju
dgment places Schopenhauer outside of a broad historical consensus accord
ing to which the Transcendental Aesthetic's central argument for the idea
lity of space and time is invalid. Schopenhauer offers no explicit accoun
t of this argument\, and the classical commentaries are unmoved by his ge
neral appraisal. In reconsidering this appraisal\, I first examine a vali
d argument for transcendental idealism from premises Schopenhauer endorse
s. While the argument in question invokes a metaphysical premise Kant rej
ects\, Schopenhauer correctly attributes a weakened analogue to him. A pa
rallel argument from this weaker premise remains valid\, and I suggest th
at the basic materials for the valid argument are contained in the Aesthe
tic. These findings make sense of Schopenhauer's positive appraisal\; the
y also call for reconsideration of a dogma of contemporary Kant scholarsh
ip.
UID:20121130T233000Z-12773@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T165116Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12773-schopenhauers-transcende
ntal-aesthetic-by-desmond
LAST-MODIFIED:20121029T225645Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,33,139,172/31647_des.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12773
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,33\,139\,172/31647_des.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department
hosts a regular colloquium series. \;Distinguished speakers from aro
und the world present on a wide array of philosophical topics.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121207T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121207T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"Dyadic Truth" by Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Yale University)
DESCRIPTION:Dyadic Truth \; Zoltán Gendler Szabó Yale Universit
y \; Philosophical orthodoxy holds that 'true' is a monadic predic
ate. I think this view is only halfway correct: there is indeed a monadic
truth-predicate in English and other natural languages but this is not t
he fundamental truth-predicate we use. What can be true simpliciter are p
articular mental states (beliefs\, hopes\, wishes\, etc.) a thinker might
be in or particular speech acts (assertions\, denials\, suppositions\, e
tc.) a speaker might perform. These mental states and speech-acts are tru
th-apt because they have propositional contents. But propositions are not
true simpliciter – they are true ofsituations. Thus\, the fundamental
notion of truth is relational. My argument for this claim is simple. Mona
dic truth-predicates are ill-suited for the purposes of semantics. Those
who think semantic explanations are any good must provide adequate paraph
rases for the various relational notions we employ in formulating those e
xplanations. For most non-monadictruth-predicates employed by semanticist
s adequate paraphrases in terms of monadic propositional truth can be giv
en. But when it comes to 'sentence S is true at context c and situation s
' we can only provide a paraphrase in terms of dyadic propositional truth
. Since our best semantics arguably needs this particular truth-predicate
we have good reason to think that propositional truth is dyadic. \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Dyadic Truth
\;
Zoltán Gendler Szabó
Yale University
\;
Philosophical orthodoxy holds that 'true' is a monadic predicate. I thi
nk this view is only halfway correct: there is indeed a monadic truth-pre
dicate in English and other natural languages but this is not the fundame
ntal truth-predicate we use. What can be true simpliciter are particular
mental states (beliefs\, hopes\, wishes\, etc.) a thinker might be in or
particular speech acts (assertions\, denials\, suppositions\, etc.) a spe
aker might perform. These mental states and speech-acts are truth-apt bec
ause they have propositional contents. But propositions are not true simp
liciter – they are true ofsituations. Thus\, the fundamental notion of
truth is relational. My argument for this claim is simple. Monadic truth-
predicates are ill-suited for the purposes of semantics. Those who think
semantic explanations are any good must provide adequate paraphrases for
the various relational notions we employ in formulating those explanation
s. For most non-monadictruth-predicates employed by semanticists adequate
paraphrases in terms of monadic propositional truth can be given. But wh
en it comes to 'sentence S is true at context c and situation s' we can o
nly provide a paraphrase in terms of dyadic propositional truth. Since ou
r best semantics arguably needs this particular truth-predicate we have g
ood reason to think that propositional truth is dyadic. \;
UID:20121207T233000Z-12772@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T164806Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12772-dyadic-truth-by-zoltan-g
endler-szabo-yale
LAST-MODIFIED:20121120T210153Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/8,29,128,149/31646_3e761fecea90200636d41634167434b41716b4
2.jpeg
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X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12772
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
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167434b41716b42.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department
hosts a regular colloquium series. Distinguished speakers from around the
world present on a wide array of philosophical topics.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130125T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130125T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Convergence on Divergence: How to be a Relativistic Moral Realist
" William Rottschaefer (Lewis & Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:William Rottschaefer\, Lewis &\; Clark College Convergenc
e on Divergence: How to be a Relativistic Moral Realist Urging that she
meet her own methodological standards\, Doris and Plakias have challenged
the scientifically minded moral realist to address the long-standing pro
blem of moral disagreement. I use a gene-culture co-evolutionary account
of one of their showcase problem cases\, the difference between honor and
non-honor cultures\, to argue not only that significant moral disagreeme
nt – and the moral relativism it seems to imply – pose no awkwardness
for moral realism\, but also that a properly scientifically based natura
listic moral realism explains it\, indeed\, provides tools for justifying
it. In doing so\, I show how to be a relativistic moral realist. \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
William Rottschaefer\, Lewis &\; Cl
ark College
Convergence on Divergence: How to be a Relativistic
Moral Realist
Urging that s
he meet her own methodological standards\, Doris and Plakias have challen
ged the scientifically minded moral realist to address the long-standing
problem of moral disagreement. I use a gene-culture co-evolutionary accou
nt of one of their showcase problem cases\, the difference between honor
and non-honor cultures\, to argue not only that significant moral disagre
ement – and the moral relativism it seems to imply – pose no awkwardn
ess for moral realism\, but also that a properly scientifically based nat
uralistic moral realism explains it\, indeed\, provides tools for justify
ing it. In doing so\, I show how to be a relativistic moral realist. 
\;
UID:20130125T233000Z-12774@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T165553Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12774-convergence-on-divergenc
e-how-to-be-a-relativistic
LAST-MODIFIED:20130124T172535Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,13,185,198/32789_bill_2.rev.1373936886.jpg
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eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,13\,185\,198/32789_bill_2.rev.1373936886.jp
g
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Urging that she meet her own methodological standards
\, Doris and Plakias have challenged the scientifically minded moral real
ist to address the long-standing problem of moral disagreement. I use a g
ene-culture co-evolutionary account of one of their showcase problem case
s\, the difference between honor and non-honor cultures\, to argue not on
ly that significant moral disagreement – and the moral relativism it se
ems to imply – pose no awkwardness for moral realism\, but also that a
properly scientifically based naturalistic moral realism explains it\, in
deed\, provides tools for justifying it. In doing so\, I show how to be a
relativistic moral realist.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130208T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130208T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"Semantic Externalism: Ignoring Twin-Earth and Doing Naturalistic
Philosophy" by Richard Boyd (Cornell University)
DESCRIPTION:Semantic externalists maintain that the semantic content of o
ur beliefs and other propositional attitudes are determined by environmen
tal or social factors. \; What they mean by this is not just the comm
onplace and uncontroversial idea that environmental and social factors ar
e important causes of our beliefs and other propositional attitudes. 
\; That's uncontroversial. \; What they have in mind is a controversi
al idea about what\, for example\, makes a belief that the Eifel Tower is
in Paris a belief about the Eifel Tower. \; There are different vari
eties of externalism but most would maintain that a person's belief could
not count as a belief about the Eifel Tower unless that person was causa
lly connected (however indirectly) in the right way with the actual Eifel
Tower. \; Similarly many externalists have maintained that linguisti
c and conceptual norms in a person's community constrain what belief cont
ents can be properly attributed to her. \; I'll defend semantic exter
nalism as an empirical claim about human cognitive psychology\, albeit a
claim that only a philosopher would dream up. \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Semantic externalists maintain that the
semantic content of our beliefs and other propositional attitudes are de
termined by environmental or social factors. \; What they mean by thi
s is not just the commonplace and uncontroversial idea that environmental
and social factors are important causes of our beliefs and other proposi
tional attitudes. \; That's uncontroversial. \; What they have in
mind is a controversial idea about what\, for example\, makes a belief t
hat the Eifel Tower is in Paris a belief about the Eifel Tower.&
#160\; There are different varieties of externalism but most would mainta
in that a person's belief could not count as a belief about the Eifel Tow
er unless that person was causally connected (however indirectly) in the
right way with the actual Eifel Tower. \; Similarly many externalists
have maintained that linguistic and conceptual norms in a person's commu
nity constrain what belief contents can be properly attributed to her.
60\; I'll defend semantic externalism as an empirical claim about human c
ognitive psychology\, albeit a claim that only a philosopher would dream
up.
\;
UID:20130208T233000Z-12775@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T165823Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12775-semantic-externalism-ign
oring-twin-earth-and-doing
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20130131T193436Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/1,0,177,176/34873__main_image_richard-boyd-large.rev.1373
936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12775
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X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/1\,0\,177\,176/34873__main_image_richard-boyd-
large.rev.1373936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Semantic externalists maintain that the semantic cont
ent of our beliefs and other propositional attitudes are determined by en
vironmental or social factors. \; What they mean by this is not just
the commonplace and uncontroversial idea that environmental and social fa
ctors are important causes of our beliefs and other propositional attitud
es. \; That's uncontroversial. \; What they have in mind is a con
troversial idea about what\, for example\, makes a belief that the Eifel
Tower is in Paris a belief about the Eifel Tower. \; There a
re different varieties of externalism but most would maintain that a pers
on's belief could not count as a belief about the Eifel Tower unless that
person was causally connected (however indirectly) in the right way with
the actual Eifel Tower. \; Similarly many externalists have maintain
ed that linguistic and conceptual norms in a person's community constrain
what belief contents can be properly attributed to her. \; I'll defe
nd semantic externalism as an empirical claim about human cognitive psych
ology\, albeit a claim that only a philosopher would dream up.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130301T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130301T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"Kant's Cosmopolitan Conception of Philosophy and the Methodology
of the "Critique of Pure Reason" by Pierre Keller (University of Califor
nia\, Riverside)
DESCRIPTION: \;I argue for a novel reading of Kant's critical enterpr
ise and of Kant's Copernican Revolution\, but especially of the First Cri
tique. In the process\, I explain why Kant devotes the second half of the
First Critique to what he calls the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. I
interpret the First Critique as a critical defense of what Kant calls th
e world\, cosmic or cosmopolitan conception of philosophy against the pre
tensions of academic philosophy. This event is open to the public.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
\;I argue for a novel reading of K
ant's critical enterprise and of Kant's Copernican Revolution\, but espec
ially of the First Critique. In the process\, I explain why Kant devotes
the second half of the First Critique to what he calls the Transcendental
Doctrine of Method. I interpret the First Critique as a critical defense
of what Kant calls the world\, cosmic or cosmopolitan conception of phil
osophy against the pretensions of academic philosophy.
This event
is open to the public.
UID:20130301T233000Z-12776@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T170145Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12776-kants-cosmopolitan-conce
ption-of-philosophy-and
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20130226T192503Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,40,160,200/34874_pierrekeller.rev.1373936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12776
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,40\,160\,200/34874_pierrekeller.rev.1373936
887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:I argue for a novel reading of Kant's critical enterp
rise and of Kant's Copernican Revolution\, but especially of the First Cr
itique. In the process\, I explain why Kant devotes the second half of th
e First Critique to what he calls the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.
I interpret the First Critique as a critical defense of what Kant calls t
he world\, cosmic or cosmopolitan conception of philosophy against the pr
etensions of academic philosophy. \n \nThis event is open to th
e public.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130308T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130308T170000
LOCATION:JR Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Representationalism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness by Bryc
e Dalbey (Lewis & Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:Representationalism in the philosophy of mind holds that ever
y conscious mental state is a representational mental state. Some philoso
phers claim that representationalism can solve the hard problem of consci
ousness. The idea is that if conscious mental states are representational
and we understand the conditions required for mental representation\, th
en we can also understand the conditions required for conscious experienc
e. However\, I argue that the possibility of spectrum inversion - the pos
sibility that\, say\, what it is like for you when you see a lime is phen
omenally identical with what it is like for me when I see a strawberry an
d vice versa - prevents the representationalist from offering such a solu
tion. Given spectrum inversion\, representationalist theories of consciou
sness must confront the same issues as functionalist theories\, and are t
herefore in no special position to solve the hard problem. This event is
open to the public
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Re
presentationalism in the philosophy of mind holds that every conscious me
ntal state is a representational mental state. Some philosophers claim th
at representationalism can solve the hard problem of consciousness. The i
dea is that if conscious mental states are representational and we unders
tand the conditions required for mental representation\, then we can also
understand the conditions required for conscious experience. However\, I
argue that the possibility of spectrum inversion - the possibility that\
, say\, what it is like for you when you see a lime is phenomenally ident
ical with what it is like for me when I see a strawberry and vice versa -
prevents the representationalist from offering such a solution. Given sp
ectrum inversion\, representationalist theories of consciousness must con
front the same issues as functionalist theories\, and are therefore in no
special position to solve the hard problem.
This event is
open to the public
UID:20130308T233000Z-16934@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130305T094803Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/16934-representationalism-and-
the-hard-problem-of
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20130305T201714Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,79,435,514/36116_a_gavagai_2.rev.1373936888.jpg
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X-LIVEWHALE-ID:16934
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,79\,435\,514/36116_a_gavagai_2.rev.13739368
88.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Representationalism in the philosophy of mind holds t
hat every conscious mental state is a representational mental state. Some
philosophers claim that representationalism can solve the hard problem o
f consciousness. The idea is that if conscious mental states are represen
tational and we understand the conditions required for mental representat
ion\, then we can also understand the conditions required for conscious e
xperience. However\, I argue that the possibility of spectrum inversion -
the possibility that\, say\, what it is like for you when you see a lime
is phenomenally identical with what it is like for me when I see a straw
berry and vice versa - prevents the representationalist from offering suc
h a solution. Given spectrum inversion\, representationalist theories of
consciousness must confront the same issues as functionalist theories\, a
nd are therefore in no special position to solve the hard problem.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloqu
ium series|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130315T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130315T163000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"The 'Quality' of Employment Law Rights" by Jeffrey Jones (Lewis
& Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:CANCELLED AND WILL BE RESCHEDULED FOR A LATER DATE. KEEP AN E
YE OUT FOR THE NEW DATE AND TIME WHICH WILL BE POSTED SOON. \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
CANCELLED AND WILL BE RESCHEDULED FOR A
LATER DATE. KEEP AN EYE OUT FOR THE NEW DATE AND TIME WHICH WILL BE POST
ED SOON.
\;
UID:20130315T223000Z-12777@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T170453Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12777-the-quality-of-employmen
t-law-rights-by-jeffrey
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20130314T184749Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,23,180,203/34875_7790_jones_b2e9d988f82a26b14152a61554a
3d26a.rev.1373936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12777
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,23\,180\,203/34875_7790_jones_b2e9d988f82a2
6b14152a61554a3d26a.rev.1373936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:CANCELLED AND WILL BE RESCHEDULED FOR A LATER DATE. K
EEP AN EYE OUT FOR THE NEW DATE AND TIME WHICH WILL BE POSTED SOON.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|law|lecture|open to the public|philos
ophy colloquium series|presentation|send-to-law|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130405T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130405T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"What is the Scope of Aesthetic Experience?" Nicholas Silins (Cor
nell University)
DESCRIPTION:In the first half of the talk\, I examine: (Blindspot): you
only experience a part of a work of art if you attend to it. I critically
examine support for Blindspot one might draw from psychology literature
on "inattentional blindness". I also discuss whether some artistic practi
ce presupposes that Blindspot is false. In the second half of the talk\,
I examine: (Surface): if you can't tell two works of art or experiences
of art apart\, then they have the same value for you. Surface applies to
experiences as well as works of art and other entities. I review how one
might support Surface\, and then reject Surface in light of psychology l
iterature on "change blindness".
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In the first half of the talk\, I exami
ne:
(Blindspot): you only experience a part of a work of art if y
ou attend to it. I critically examine support for Blindspot one might dra
w from psychology literature on "inattentional blindness". I also discuss
whether some artistic practice presupposes that Blindspot is false.
<
p> In the second half of the talk\, I examine:
(Surface): if you
can't tell two works of art or experiences of art apart\, then they have
the same value for you. Surface applies to experiences as well as works
of art and other entities. I review how one might support Surface\, and t
hen reject Surface in light of psychology literature on "change blindness
".
UID:20130405T223000Z-12778@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20120904T170750Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12778-what-is-the-scope-of-aes
thetic-experience-nicholas
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20130131T214439Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,7,130,137/35115_nicholas_silins.rev.1373936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12778
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,7\,130\,137/35115_nicholas_silins.rev.13739
36887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:In the first half of the talk\, I examine: \n \n(Blindspot): you only experience a part of a work of art if you atte
nd to it. \nI critically examine support for Blindspot one might dra
w from psychology literature on "inattentional blindness". I also discuss
whether some artistic practice presupposes that Blindspot is false. \n \nIn the second half of the talk\, I examine: \n \n(Su
rface): if you can't tell two works of art or experiences of art apart\,
then they have the same value for you. \; Surface applies to experien
ces as well as works of art and other entities. I review how one might su
pport Surface\, and then reject Surface in light of psychology literature
on "change blindness".
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130411T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130411T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 102
SUMMARY:"Evolutionary Theory as Methodological Anesthesia: Methodological
and Philosophical Lessons from "Evolutionary Psychology"" Dick Boyd (Lew
is & Clark College and Cornell University)
DESCRIPTION:According to mainstream 'evolutionary psychology' evolutionar
y theory makes an important methodological contribution to human social p
sychology. \;Plausible evolutionary scenarios regarding early human
social behavior are said to provide a methodologically independent source
of insights\, identifying some psychological theories as those 'predicte
d' or otherwise especially supported by evolutionary theory. \;In pr
actice the theories so identified are reductionist or nativist theories w
hich minimize the role of social structures and of learning in explaining
human social behaviors. In fact\, there is significant methodological i
ndependence between evolutionary scenarios and psychological theories but
that independence guarantees that such scenarios do not favor reductioni
st or nativist theories over theories that emphasize the role of learning
and of social structures (or vice versa). \; So\, in practice\, appe
als to evolutionary theory function as a sort of methodological anesthesi
a\, directing psychologists' attention away from scientifically important
alternatives to reductionist or nativist theories. \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
According to mainstream 'evolutionary p
sychology' evolutionary theory makes an important methodological contribu
tion to human social psychology. \;Plausible evolutionary scenarios
regarding early human social behavior are said to provide a methodologica
lly independent source of insights\, identifying some psychological theor
ies as those 'predicted' or otherwise especially supported by evolutionar
y theory. \;In practice the theories so identified are reductionist
or nativist theories which minimize the role of social structures and of
learning in explaining human social behaviors.
In fact\, there is
significant methodological independence between evolutionary scenarios a
nd psychological theories but that independence guarantees that such scen
arios do not favor reductionist or nativist theories over theories that e
mphasize the role of learning and of social structures (or vice versa).&#
160\; So\, in practice\, appeals to evolutionary theory function as a sor
t of methodological anesthesia\, directing psychologists' attention away
from scientifically important alternatives to reductionist or nativist th
eories.
\;
UID:20130411T223000Z-16990@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130308T142358Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/16990-evolutionary-theory-as-m
ethodological-anesthesia
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20130314T183018Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/34873__main_image_richard-boyd-large.rev.1373936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:16990
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/34873__main_image_richard-boyd-large.rev.1373936887.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:According to mainstream 'evolutionary psychology' evo
lutionary theory makes an important methodological contribution to human
social psychology. \;Plausible evolutionary scenarios regarding earl
y human social behavior are said to provide a methodologically independen
t source of insights\, identifying some psychological theories as those '
predicted' or otherwise especially supported by evolutionary theory. 
0\;In practice the theories so identified are reductionist or nativist th
eories which minimize the role of social structures and of learning in ex
plaining human social behaviors. \; \n \nIn fact\, there i
s significant methodological independence between evolutionary scenarios
and psychological theories but that independence guarantees that such sce
narios do not favor reductionist or nativist theories over theories that
emphasize the role of learning and of social structures (or vice versa).&
#160\; So\, in practice\, appeals to evolutionary theory function as a so
rt of methodological anesthesia\, directing psychologists' attention away
from scientifically important alternatives to reductionist or nativist t
heories. \;
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-graduate|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130412T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130412T163000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:The 'Quality' of Employment Law Rights by Jeffrey Jones (Lewis &a
mp; Clark College Law School)
DESCRIPTION:Employment law scholars are unanimous in their disappointment
with U. S. employment law and the protections provided to employees. A f
ew conservative and libertarian thinkers seek to further deregulate emplo
yment laws – that group will always be there. The majority of employmen
t law scholars are searching for ways to provide employees with greater l
egal protection\; protections they believe are required to approximate wh
at might be called legal justice or fairness in work relationships. What
is missing from the latter group's scholarship is any clear moral or theo
retical basis for mandating greater protection of employees. The law as i
t is certainly does not help. The U. S. has made clear it rejects the not
ion that employment rights are also human or even constitutional rights.
Worse still\, within the common law\, employment protections regularly gi
ve way to other common law interests such as contracts and property. What
is needed is an account of the interests at stake in employment and a sh
owing that such interests are somehow fundamental rights that deserve gre
ater priority in the American legal landscape. This work in progress look
s at several ways to raise the value or moral quality of employment right
s.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Employment law scholars are unanimous i
n their disappointment with U. S. employment law and the protections prov
ided to employees. A few conservative and libertarian thinkers seek to fu
rther deregulate employment laws – that group will always be there. The
majority of employment law scholars are searching for ways to provide em
ployees with greater legal protection\; protections they believe are requ
ired to approximate what might be called legal justice or fairness in wor
k relationships. What is missing from the latter group's scholarship is a
ny clear moral or theoretical basis for mandating greater protection of e
mployees. The law as it is certainly does not help. The U. S. has made cl
ear it rejects the notion that employment rights are also human or even c
onstitutional rights. Worse still\, within the common law\, employment pr
otections regularly give way to other common law interests such as contra
cts and property. What is needed is an account of the interests at stake
in employment and a showing that such interests are somehow fundamental r
ights that deserve greater priority in the American legal landscape. This
work in progress looks at several ways to raise the value or moral quali
ty of employment rights.
UID:20130412T223000Z-17222@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130319T102637Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/17222-the-quality-of-employmen
t-law-rights-by-jeffrey
LAST-MODIFIED:20130409T160908Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/36574_jeff_jones.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:17222
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/36574_jeff_jones.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Employment law scholars are unanimous in their disapp
ointment with U. S. employment law and the protections provided to employ
ees. A few conservative and libertarian thinkers seek to further deregula
te employment laws – that group will always be there. The majority of e
mployment law scholars are searching for ways to provide employees with g
reater legal protection\; protections they believe are required to approx
imate what might be called legal justice or fairness in work relationship
s. What is missing from the latter group's scholarship is any clear moral
or theoretical basis for mandating greater protection of employees. The
law as it is certainly does not help. The U. S. has made clear it rejects
the notion that employment rights are also human or even constitutional
rights. Worse still\, within the common law\, employment protections regu
larly give way to other common law interests such as contracts and proper
ty. What is needed is an account of the interests at stake in employment
and a showing that such interests are somehow fundamental rights that des
erve greater priority in the American legal landscape. This work in progr
ess looks at several ways to raise the value or moral quality of employme
nt rights.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-graduate|send-to-law|send-to-unde
rgraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130426T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130426T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Natural kinds and ceteris paratis generalizations: In praise of h
unches Christopher Boyd (UC Irvine) and Dick Boyd (Lewis & Clark Coll
ege\, Cornell University)
DESCRIPTION:Traditional philosophy of science focuses on 'laws' and gener
alizations that are true\, or approximately true\, or true ceteris paribu
s and on highly reliable patterns of scientific inference. \; Kinds o
r categories are said to be 'natural kinds' just in case they figure in s
uch laws\, generalizations or inference patterns. \; Examples from th
e inferential architecture of synthetic chemistry illustrate the need for
a broader philosophical conception encompassing the roles of generalizat
ions that are true ceteris paratis (true if you fiddle things right)\, of
inferences that rely on informed hunches that are true saepe satis  
\;(true often enough)\, and of natural kinds appropriate for such general
izations and inferences. \;NOTE: The speakers promise to make this
talk accessible both to philosophers and to chemists. This event is open
to the public
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Traditional philosophy of science focus
es on 'laws' and generalizations that are true\, or approximately true\,
or true ceteris paribus and on highly reliable patterns of scien
tific inference. \; Kinds or categories are said to be 'natural kinds
' just in case they figure in such laws\, generalizations or inference pa
tterns. \; Examples from the inferential architecture of synthetic ch
emistry illustrate the need for a broader philosophical conception encomp
assing the roles of generalizations that are true ceteris par
atis (true if you fiddle things right)\, of inferences that
rely on informed hunches that are true saepe satis 
0\;(true often enough)\, and of natural kinds appropriate for su
ch generalizations and inferences.
\;
NOTE: The speakers promise to make this talk accessible both to philosop
hers and to chemists.
This event is open to the public
UID:20130426T223000Z-16991@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130308T142955Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/16991-natural-kinds-and-ceteri
s-paratis-generalizations
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20130401T182420Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,0,150,150/36918_christopherboyd.rev.1373936888.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:16991
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,0\,150\,150/36918_christopherboyd.rev.13739
36888.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph
ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Traditional philosophy of science focuses on 'laws' a
nd generalizations that are true\, or approximately true\, or true ce
teris paribus and on highly reliable patterns of scientific inferenc
e. \; Kinds or categories are said to be 'natural kinds' just in case
they figure in such laws\, generalizations or inference patterns. \;
Examples from the inferential architecture of synthetic chemistry illust
rate the need for a broader philosophical conception encompassing the rol
es of generalizations that are true ceteris paratis (true if you fiddle things right)\, of inferences that rely on infor
med hunches that are true saepe satis \;(t
rue often enough)\, and of natural kinds appropriate for such generalizat
ions and inferences.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy
colloquium series|presentation|send-to-graduate|send-to-undergraduate
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130927T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130927T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium Series: Language\, the Parent of Thought: H
egel and Language\, According to Vernon\, McCumber\, and Forster
DESCRIPTION:By co-authors Samantha Park Alibrando\, J. M. Fritzman\, Sara
h Marchand Lomas\, and McKenzie Judith Southworth: Hegelian dialectics h
as three moments\, as everyone knows\, except when it has more. \;Ou
r paper has four. \;We read Hegel on language through critiques of t
he interpretations given by Jim Vernon\, John McCumber—followed by an e
xcursus linking monistic Kaśmiri Śaivism's mantras with Hegel's mechani
cal memory—and Michael N. Forster. \; \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
By co-authors Samantha Park Alibrando\,
J. M. Fritzman\, Sarah Marchand Lomas\, and McKenzie Judith Southworth:<
/p>
Hegelian dialectics has three moments\, as everyone knows\, excep
t when it has more. \;Our paper has four. \;We read Hegel on la
nguage through critiques of the interpretations given by Jim Vernon\, Joh
n McCumber—followed by an excursus linking monistic Kaśmiri Śaivism's
mantras with Hegel's mechanical memory—and Michael N. Forster. \;
\;
UID:20130927T223000Z-20465@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130918T135551Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20465-philosophy-colloquium-se
ries-language-the-parent
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20130918T210608Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/0,41,403,444/41022_hegelglasses.rev.1379537629.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20465
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,41\,403\,444/41022_hegelglasses.rev.1379537
629.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi \n503-768-7450 \nJRHH 224
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:By co-authors Samantha Park Alibrando\, J. M. Fritzma
n\, Sarah Marchand Lomas\, and McKenzie Judith Southworth: \n \
nHegelian dialectics has three moments\, as everyone knows\, except when
it has more. \;Our paper has four. \;We read Hegel on language
through critiques of the interpretations given by Jim Vernon\, John McCum
ber—followed by an excursus linking monistic Kaśmiri Śaivism's mantra
s with Hegel's mechanical memory—and Michael N. Forster.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|presenta
tion|send-to-undergraduate|staff|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131018T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131018T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:Hume on Homogeneity\, The Mind Body Problem and Emergent Properti
es by William Uzgalis (Oregon State University)
DESCRIPTION:In the Clarke Collins Correspondence of 1707-08 an important
part of the debate involves what has come to be called the Homogeneity Pr
inciple. \; That Principle says in effect that the properties of matt
er such as extension\, bulk\, figure and shape can only produce propertie
s of the same kind – hence homogeneity. Because they can only cause pro
perties of the same kind\, they cannot produce either the properties of l
ife or mental properties\, properties of a different kind. \;In part
what this means is that that there are no real emergent properties\, suc
h as life or mind arising from matter. \; This was one of the main pi
llars of dualism and in the Correspondence Samuel Clarke\, the dualist\,
maintains the principle while Anthony Collins\, the materialist\, denies
it. Scholars are in some disagreement about how well Collins does in show
ing that real\, emergent properties – the properties of life and mind
arise from material properties. \; However\, Hume in his chapter o
n the immateriality of the soul in his Treatise of Human Nature\, while r
ejecting substance claims from both sides\, refutes dualist arguments fro
m the Homogeneity Principle on the basis of his new theory of causality t
hus destroying one of the main props of dualism. \; He thus bolsters
materialist solutions to the mind body problem and the reality of emergen
t properties. \; \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In the Clarke Collins Correspondence of
1707-08 an important part of the debate involves what has come to be cal
led the Homogeneity Principle. \; That Principle says in effect that
the properties of matter such as extension\, bulk\, figure and shape can
only produce properties of the same kind – hence homogeneity. Because t
hey can only cause properties of the same kind\, they cannot produce eith
er the properties of life or mental properties\, properties of a differen
t kind. \;In part what this means is that that there are no real eme
rgent properties\, such as life or mind arising from matter. \; This
was one of the main pillars of dualism and in the Correspondence Samuel C
larke\, the dualist\, maintains the principle while Anthony Collins\, the
materialist\, denies it. Scholars are in some disagreement about how wel
l Collins does in showing that real\, emergent properties – the propert
ies of life and mind – arise from material properties. \; However\,
Hume in his chapter on the immateriality of the soul in his Treatise
of Human Nature\, while rejecting substance claims from both sides\
, refutes dualist arguments from the Homogeneity Principle on the basis o
f his new theory of causality thus destroying one of the main props of du
alism. \; He thus bolsters materialist solutions to the mind body pro
blem and the reality of emergent properties. \;
\;
UID:20131018T223000Z-20619@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130925T163119Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20619-hume-on-homogeneity-the-
mind-body-problem-and
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20131015T175236Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20619
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:In the Clarke Collins Correspondence of 1707-08 an im
portant part of the debate involves what has come to be called the Homoge
neity Principle. \; That Principle says in effect that the properties
of matter such as extension\, bulk\, figure and shape can only produce p
roperties of the same kind – hence homogeneity. Because they can only c
ause properties of the same kind\, they cannot produce either the propert
ies of life or mental properties\, properties of a different kind.  \
;In part what this means is that that there are no real emergent properti
es\, such as life or mind arising from matter. \; This was one of the
main pillars of dualism and in the Correspondence Samuel Clarke\, the du
alist\, maintains the principle while Anthony Collins\, the materialist\,
denies it. Scholars are in some disagreement about how well Collins does
in showing that real\, emergent properties – the properties of life an
d mind – arise from material properties. \; However\, Hume in his c
hapter on the immateriality of the soul in his Treatise of Human Natu
re\, while rejecting substance claims from both sides\, refutes dual
ist arguments from the Homogeneity Principle on the basis of his new theo
ry of causality thus destroying one of the main props of dualism. \;
He thus bolsters materialist solutions to the mind body problem and the r
eality of emergent properties.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:alumni|faculty event|faculty|humanities|philosophy collo
quium series|send-to-graduate|send-to-law|send-to-undergraduate|staff eve
nt|staff|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131022T184500
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131022T194500
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 259
SUMMARY:Philosophy Department: Meet Your Major
DESCRIPTION:Unsure about your major? Come hear from the Philosophy Depart
ment about why their major is the most exciting around! Already declared?
Learn from faculty and upperclassmen about what's coming up. \;To
RSVP\, please click here:
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Unsure about your major? Come hear from
the Philosophy Department about why their major is the most exciting aro
und! Already declared? Learn from faculty and upperclassmen about what's
coming up.
UID:20131023T014500Z-20986@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20131009T141331Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20986-philosophy-department-me
et-your-major
LAST-MODIFIED:20131015T180756Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20986
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Unsure about your major? Come hear from the Philosoph
y Department about why their major is the most exciting around! Already d
eclared? Learn from faculty and upperclassmen about what's coming up. \n \n<
strong>To RSVP\, please click here:
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:FAQ|humanities|send-to-undergraduate|student event|stude
nt events|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131025T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131025T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:Adaptation as the heart of Environmental Ethics for the Anthropoc
ene
DESCRIPTION:Please join us for a talk by Allen Thompson (http://people.or
egonstate.edu/%7Ethompsoa/web/home.html) \;from Oregon State Universi
ty. \; In this paper I outline a broad understanding of adaptation
to environmental change\, regardless of cause\, and argue that such a co
ncept must have a key role in any environmental ethic suitable to the eme
rging Anthropocene epoch. Since it's inception\, the preservation of natu
re\, either for its intrinsic or instrumental value\, has provided the ce
ntral normative orientation for environmental ethics. On my view\, the fu
ture of environmental ethics – in light not only of climate change but
also other radical anthropogenic environmental changes – will focus mor
e and more on normative questions about adapting our humanity\, both indi
vidually and collectively – to the conditions of life on Earth for whic
h we\, as humanity\, are causally \;responsible. My thesis is that th
e future of environmental ethics will be about living well at the end of
nature\, about adapting ourselves and the rest of life to the world that
we are \;morally \;responsible for. \; \;
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Please join us for a talk by Allen Thompson \;from Oregon State University.
\;
In this pap
er I outline a broad understanding of adaptation to environmental change\
, regardless of cause\, and argue that such a concept must have a key rol
e in any environmental ethic suitable to the emerging Anthropocene epoch.
Since it's inception\, the preservation of nature\, either for its intri
nsic or instrumental value\, has provided the central normative orientati
on for environmental ethics. On my view\, the future of environmental eth
ics – in light not only of climate change but also other radical anthro
pogenic environmental changes – will focus more and more on normative q
uestions about adapting our humanity\, both individually and collectively
– to the conditions of life on Earth for which we\, as humanity\, are
causally \;responsible. My thesis is that the future of environmental
ethics will be about living well at the end of nature\, about adapting o
urselves and the rest of life to the world that we are \;morally 
\;responsible for. \;
\;
UID:20131025T223000Z-20620@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130925T163449Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20620-adaptation-as-the-heart-
of-environmental-ethics
LAST-MODIFIED:20131021T230413Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20620
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Please join us for a talk by Allen Thompson \;from O
regon State University. \n \nIn this paper I outline a broad un
derstanding of adaptation to environmental change\, regardless of cause\,
and argue that such a concept must have a key role in any environmental
ethic suitable to the emerging Anthropocene epoch. Since it's inception\,
the preservation of nature\, either for its intrinsic or instrumental va
lue\, has provided the central normative orientation for environmental et
hics. On my view\, the future of environmental ethics – in light not on
ly of climate change but also other radical anthropogenic environmental c
hanges – will focus more and more on normative questions about adapting
our humanity\, both individually and collectively – to the conditions
of life on Earth for which we\, as humanity\, are causally \;responsi
ble. My thesis is that the future of environmental ethics will be about l
iving well at the end of nature\, about adapting ourselves and the rest o
f life to the world that we are \;morally \;responsible for. 
\; \n
\n \n
\n \n
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131108T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131108T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 132
SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium Series: Ephraim Glick (St. Andrews Universi
ty)
DESCRIPTION:PLEASE \; NOTE ROOM CHANGE TO JRHH 132 \; Please j
oin us for a talk by Ephraim Glick (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Eeg35/A
bout.html) \;from St. Andrews University. "What is a Singular Propos
ition?" On one view\, for a proposition to be singular is for it to have
an object as a constituent. On another view\, a singular proposition is
one that is ontologically dependent on an object. A variety of other acco
unts appear in the literature\, but rarely accompanied by a careful compa
rison with rivals or even by an explanation of why the account captures t
he background ideas that motivate drawing a distinction between singular
and general propositions in the first place. Indeed\, it is often unclear
exactly what the background ideas are which would help us gauge the succ
ess of an account of singularity. My project in this paper is to clarify
the motivation for the singular / general distinction and advocate a simp
le analysis of that distinction. The idea will be to give explanatory pri
ority to singular thoughts\, rather than explaining singular thoughts as
thoughts whose contents are singular propositions. I will argue that ther
e is no promising independent account of what it is for a proposition to
be singular. Extant accounts either fail to respect the basic motivations
for the notion of singularity\, leave the explanation of singularity ins
ufficiently clear\, or rely on commitments to the metaphysics of proposit
ions in an undesirable way.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
PLEASE \; NOTE ROOM CHANGE TO
JRHH 132
\;
Please join us for a talk by <
a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Eeg35/About.html">Ephraim Glick
\;from St. Andrews University.
"What is a Singular Prop
osition?"
On one view\, for a proposition to be singular is
for it to have an object as a constituent. On another view\, a singular p
roposition is one that is ontologically dependent on an object. A variety
of other accounts appear in the literature\, but rarely accompanied by a
careful comparison with rivals or even by an explanation of why the acco
unt captures the background ideas that motivate drawing a distinction bet
ween singular and general propositions in the first place. Indeed\, it is
often unclear exactly what the background ideas are which would help us
gauge the success of an account of singularity. My project in this paper
is to clarify the motivation for the singular / general distinction and a
dvocate a simple analysis of that distinction. The idea will be to give e
xplanatory priority to singular thoughts\, rather than explaining singula
r thoughts as thoughts whose contents are singular propositions. I will a
rgue that there is no promising independent account of what it is for a p
roposition to be singular. Extant accounts either fail to respect the bas
ic motivations for the notion of singularity\, leave the explanation of s
ingularity insufficiently clear\, or rely on commitments to the metaphysi
cs of propositions in an undesirable way.
\n PLEASE
0\; NOTE ROOM CHANGE TO JRHH 132 \n \n Please join
us for a talk by Ephraim Glick \;from St. Andrews University. \n \n
"What is a Singular Proposition?" \n \n On one view\, for a
proposition to be singular is for it to have an object as a constituent.
On another view\, a singular proposition is one that is ontologically dep
endent on an object. A variety of other accounts appear in the literature
\, but rarely accompanied by a careful comparison with rivals or even by
an explanation of why the account captures the background ideas that moti
vate drawing a distinction between singular and general propositions in t
he first place. Indeed\, it is often unclear exactly what the background
ideas are which would help us gauge the success of an account of singular
ity. My project in this paper is to clarify the motivation for the singul
ar / general distinction and advocate a simple analysis of that distincti
on. The idea will be to give explanatory priority to singular thoughts\,
rather than explaining singular thoughts as thoughts whose contents are s
ingular propositions. I will argue that there is no promising independent
account of what it is for a proposition to be singular. Extant accounts
either fail to respect the basic motivations for the notion of singularit
y\, leave the explanation of singularity insufficiently clear\, or rely o
n commitments to the metaphysics of propositions in an undesirable way.\n
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:philosophy colloquium series|send-to-law|send-to-undergr
aduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131122T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131122T170000
LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Felicity and Fidelity by Nellie Weiland (California State Univers
ity Long Beach)
DESCRIPTION:In this talk I will describe a variety of real-world reportin
g practices\; I call them cases of 'low-fidelity same-saying'. They are d
escribed as 'real-world' because they track the ways that speakers actual
ly use expressions like 'said that' in messy\, theoretically unstable way
s. They are 'lo-fi' because their content (a) often lacks propositional a
nd locutionary fidelity to the original utterance\; and (b) their reporte
d content is derived from contextual artifacts alongside the original lin
guistic content. Then I will suggesta metaphysics of language around this
phenomenon. I will briefly outline the implications for direct quotation
\, linguistic content outside of reporting practices\, and a deflationary
speaker- and token-based metaphysics of language.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In this talk I will describe a variety
of real-world reporting practices\; I call them cases of 'low-fidelity sa
me-saying'. They are described as 'real-world' because they track the way
s that speakers actually use expressions like 'said that' in messy\, theo
retically unstable ways. They are 'lo-fi' because their content (a) often
lacks propositional and locutionary fidelity to the original utterance\;
and (b) their reported content is derived from contextual artifacts alon
gside the original linguistic content. Then I will suggesta meta
physics of language around this phenomenon. I will briefly outline the im
plications for direct quotation\, linguistic content outside of reporting
practices\, and a deflationary speaker- and token-based metaphysics of l
anguage.
UID:20131122T233000Z-20621@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130925T163852Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20621-felicity-and-fidelity-by
-nellie-weiland-california
LAST-MODIFIED:20131113T185502Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/42423_nellie_wieland.rev.1384368630.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20621
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/42423_nellie_wieland.rev.1384368630.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:In this talk I will describe a variety of real-world
reporting practices\; I call them cases of 'low-fidelity same-saying'. Th
ey are described as 'real-world' because they track the ways that speaker
s actually use expressions like 'said that' in messy\, theoretically unst
able ways. They are 'lo-fi' because their content (a) often lacks proposi
tional and locutionary fidelity to the original utterance\; and (b) their
reported content is derived from contextual artifacts alongside the orig
inal linguistic content. Then I will suggesta metaphysics of lan
guage around this phenomenon. I will briefly outline the implications for
direct quotation\, linguistic content outside of reporting practices\, a
nd a deflationary speaker- and token-based metaphysics of language.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|open to the public|philosophy colloquium s
eries|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131213T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131213T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Finding Wisdom in Plato's Euthydemus by Rusty Jones (Harvard Univ
ersity)
DESCRIPTION:Please join us for a talk by Rusty Jones (http://www.fas.harv
ard.edu/~phildept/jones.html) \;from Harvard University. \; Find
ing Wisdom in Plato's \;Euthydemus \; My aim in this talk is two
fold: \; First\, I clarify the \;aporia \;(the confused impas
se) of \;Euthydemus \;288-92\, showing exactly what gives rise to
it and then showing a way out of it. \; The effect is to undermine t
he standard view that Plato's motivation for constructing this section of
the dialogue is to repudiate the craft analogy. \; This\, in turn\,
indicates that wisdom actively \;produces eudaimonia \;(human wel
l-being)\, rather than simply \;constituting eudaimonia. \; Secon
d\, and more briefly\, I engage in a more speculative piece of interpreta
tion\, suggesting that all this gives us some resources for getting clear
er on the nature of Platonic \;eudaimonia. \; In particular\, I'l
l argue that the conventional goods (such as health\, influence\, and goo
d looks) are (i) \;genuine\, though \;conditional\, goods\, (ii)
at least sometimes \;final \;goods\, and so (iii) are \;compo
nents \;of \;eudaimonia\, rather than mere conditions for \;e
udaimonia.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Please join us for a talk by Rusty Jones \;fro
m Harvard University. \; Finding Wisdom in Plato's \;Euthydemus&#
160\;
My aim in this talk is twofold: \; First\, I clari
fy the \;aporia \;(the confused impasse) of \;Eu
thydemus \;288-92\, showing exactly what gives rise to it and th
en showing a way out of it. \; The effect is to undermine th
e standard view that Plato's motivation for constructing this section of
the dialogue is to repudiate the craft analogy. \; This\, in turn\, i
ndicates that wisdom actively \;produces eudaimonia \;(h
uman well-being)\, rather than simply \;constituting eudaimonia
em>. \; Second\, and more briefly\, I engage in a more speculative pi
ece of interpretation\, suggesting that all this gives us some resources
for getting clearer on the nature of Platonic \;eudaimonia.&
#160\; In particular\, I'll argue that the conventional goods (such as he
alth\, influence\, and good looks) are (i) \;genuine\, thoug
h \;conditional\, goods\, (ii) at least sometimes \;
final \;goods\, and so (iii) are \;components \
;of \;eudaimonia\, rather than mere conditions for \;eudaimonia.
UID:20131213T233000Z-21288@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20131025T101208Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/21288-finding-wisdom-in-platos
-euthydemus-by-rusty-jones
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20131113T185320Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/42405_soc_euthydemus.rev.1384363937.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:21288
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/42405_soc_euthydemus.rev.1384363937.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Please join us for a talk by Rusty Jones \;from Harvard Univ
ersity titled Finding Wisdom in Plato's \;Euthydemus. \n \nMy aim in this talk is twofold: \; First\,
I clarify the \;aporia \;(the confused impasse) of \
;Euthydemus \;288-92\, showing exactly what gives rise to it
and then showing a way out of it. \; The effect is to under
mine the standard view that Plato's motivation for constructing this sect
ion of the dialogue is to repudiate the craft analogy. \; This\, in t
urn\, indicates that wisdom actively \;produces eudaimonia \;
(human well-being)\, rather than simply \;constituting eudai
monia. \; Second\, and more briefly\, I engage in a more specula
tive piece of interpretation\, suggesting that all this gives us some res
ources for getting clearer on the nature of Platonic \;eudaimonia
. \; In particular\, I'll argue that the conventional goods (suc
h as health\, influence\, and good looks) are (i) \;genuine\
, though \;conditional\, goods\, (ii) at least sometimes
0\;final \;goods\, and so (iii) are \;components \;of \;eudaimonia\, rather than mere conditions for
60\;eudaimonia.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll
oquium series|student event
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140131T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140131T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Values and Climate Science: Who Needs A Consensus Anyway? by Kris
ten Intemann (Montana State University)
DESCRIPTION:There has been much concern about the problem of "manufacture
d doubt\," where powerful corporations and think-tanks appear to have fun
ded research aimed at generating doubt about climate change and stall reg
ulatory policies (Michaels 2008\; Oreskes and Conway 2010\; Brulle 2013).
\;In response to climate skeptics\, scientists and science studies
scholars have emphasized the existence of a scientific consensus about an
thropogenic climate change (Oreskes 2004\; Lichter 2008\; Doran and Zimme
rman 2009\; Cook et al. 2013). \;Moreover\, the IPCC has adopted pra
ctices aimed at consensus-building (van der Sluijs 2008). \;I argue
that the focus being placed on consensus is problematic for several inter
related reasons. \;First\, consensus strategies neglect the ways tha
t values play a role in scientific decision-making and (as a result) can
require agreement about\, or masking of\, the underlying values at stake
which is problematic. \;In particular\, it gives disproportionate po
wer to scientists in endorsing particular values that may neglect the int
erests of some stakeholders. Second\, insofar as the public becomes aware
that reasonable disagreements (particularly about the values involved) e
xist\, such strategies undermine rather than increase public trust in cli
mate scientists. \;Finally\, such strategies reinforce the false ass
umption that consensus (or lack of disagreement) is necessary for rationa
l public policy decisions. \; Implications are considered for how we
might more successfully address climate skepticism and build public trus
t in climate science.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
There has been much concern about the
problem of "manufactured doubt\," where powerful corporations and think-
tanks appear to have funded research aimed at generating doubt about clim
ate change and stall regulatory policies (Michaels 2008\; Oreskes and Con
way 2010\; Brulle 2013). \;In response to climate skeptics\, scienti
sts and science studies scholars have emphasized the existence of a scien
tific consensus about anthropogenic climate change (Oreskes 2004\; Lichte
r 2008\; Doran and Zimmerman 2009\; Cook et al. 2013). \;Moreover\,
the IPCC has adopted practices aimed at consensus-building (van der Sluij
s 2008). \;I argue that the focus being placed on consensus is probl
ematic for several interrelated reasons. \;First\, consensus strateg
ies neglect the ways that values play a role in scientific decision-makin
g and (as a result) can require agreement about\, or masking of\, the und
erlying values at stake which is problematic. \;In particular\, it g
ives disproportionate power to scientists in endorsing particular values
that may neglect the interests of some stakeholders. Second\, insofar as
the public becomes aware that reasonable disagreements (particularly abou
t the values involved) exist\, such strategies undermine rather than incr
ease public trust in climate scientists. \;Finally\, such strategies
reinforce the false assumption that consensus (or lack of disagreement)
is necessary for rational public policy decisions. \; Implications a
re considered for how we might more successfully address climate skeptici
sm and build public trust in climate science.
UID:20140131T233000Z-20622@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130925T164122Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20622-values-and-climate-scien
ce-who-needs-a-consensus
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140131T170840Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/43257_kristen_intemann.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20622
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/43257_kristen_intemann.jpeg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:There has been much concern about the problem of "man
ufactured doubt\," where powerful corporations and think-tanks appear to
have funded research aimed at generating doubt about climate change and s
tall regulatory policies (Michaels 2008\; Oreskes and Conway 2010\; Brull
e 2013). \;In response to climate skeptics\, scientists and science
studies scholars have emphasized the existence of a scientific consensus
about anthropogenic climate change (Oreskes 2004\; Lichter 2008\; Doran a
nd Zimmerman 2009\; Cook et al. 2013). \;Moreover\, the IPCC has ado
pted practices aimed at consensus-building (van der Sluijs 2008). \;
I argue that the focus being placed on consensus is problematic for sever
al interrelated reasons. \;First\, consensus strategies neglect the
ways that values play a role in scientific decision-making and (as a resu
lt) can require agreement about\, or masking of\, the underlying values a
t stake which is problematic. \;In particular\, it gives disproporti
onate power to scientists in endorsing particular values that may neglect
the interests of some stakeholders. Second\, insofar as the public becom
es aware that reasonable disagreements (particularly about the values inv
olved) exist\, such strategies undermine rather than increase public trus
t in climate scientists. \;Finally\, such strategies reinforce the f
alse assumption that consensus (or lack of disagreement) is necessary for
rational public policy decisions. \; Implications are considered fo
r how we might more successfully address climate skepticism and build pub
lic trust in climate science.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll
oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140226T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140226T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"Metaphysical Contention over the Ontological Status of Species"
by Matthew Slater (Bucknell University)
DESCRIPTION:When I close my hand into a fist\, have I created a new objec
t or merely rearranged some previously existing things? Is a sheet of pap
er with letters written on its two sides one object or two? Do holes exis
t? Such questions — seriously addressed by many philosophers — are of
ten cited as examples of the excesses of speculative metaphysics. Philoso
phers of science have argued that the only way to make metaphysics an int
ellectually respectable enterprise is to "naturalize" it. But it is not a
t all straightforward to say what naturalized metaphysics amounts to. If
it means only maintaining a sort of vague "science-friendliness"\, then i
t will not rule out much\; if it means (as Ladyman and Ross hold) limitin
g its scope to very specific unification projects in science\, then it ap
pears unduly restrictive. A popular (and initially plausible) happy mediu
m suggests that metaphysics should \;defer \;to science on all ma
tters — for after all\, while the former is speculative and a priori\,
the latter is empirical and (as these things go) secure. I will use the c
ase study of the attempt to provide a metaphysics of species — a paradi
gm topic for naturalized metaphysics — to argue that this proposal also
fails. I will then make some suggestions for how to best approach the na
turalistic project.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
When I close my hand into a fist\, have
I created a new object or merely rearranged some previously existing thi
ngs? Is a sheet of paper with letters written on its two sides one object
or two? Do holes exist? Such questions — seriously addressed by many p
hilosophers — are often cited as examples of the excesses of speculativ
e metaphysics. Philosophers of science have argued that the only way to m
ake metaphysics an intellectually respectable enterprise is to "naturaliz
e" it. But it is not at all straightforward to say what naturalized metap
hysics amounts to. If it means only maintaining a sort of vague "science-
friendliness"\, then it will not rule out much\; if it means (as Ladyman
and Ross hold) limiting its scope to very specific unification projects i
n science\, then it appears unduly restrictive. A popular (and initially
plausible) happy medium suggests that metaphysics should \;defer<
/em> \;to science on all matters — for after all\, while the former
is speculative and a priori\, the latter is empirical and (as these thin
gs go) secure. I will use the case study of the attempt to provide a meta
physics of species — a paradigm topic for naturalized metaphysics — t
o argue that this proposal also fails. I will then make some suggestions
for how to best approach the naturalistic project.
UID:20140226T233000Z-20623@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130925T164524Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20623-metaphysical-contention-
over-the-ontological
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140224T230516Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/5,0,195,190/43748_matthewslater285.rev.1392227536.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20623
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/5\,0\,195\,190/43748_matthewslater285.rev.1392
227536.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:When I close my hand into a fist\, have I created a n
ew object or merely rearranged some previously existing things? Is a shee
t of paper with letters written on its two sides one object or two? Do ho
les exist? Such questions — seriously addressed by many philosophers
are often cited as examples of the excesses of speculative metaphysics.
Philosophers of science have argued that the only way to make metaphysic
s an intellectually respectable enterprise is to "naturalize" it. But it
is not at all straightforward to say what naturalized metaphysics amounts
to. If it means only maintaining a sort of vague "science-friendliness"\
, then it will not rule out much\; if it means (as Ladyman and Ross hold)
limiting its scope to very specific unification projects in science\, th
en it appears unduly restrictive. A popular (and initially plausible) hap
py medium suggests that metaphysics should \;defer \;to
science on all matters — for after all\, while the former is speculativ
e and a priori\, the latter is empirical and (as these things go) secure.
I will use the case study of the attempt to provide a metaphysics of spe
cies — a paradigm topic for naturalized metaphysics — to argue that t
his proposal also fails. I will then make some suggestions for how to bes
t approach the naturalistic project.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll
oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140307T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140307T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"What Linguistic Determinism can Teach Us about Embodied Cognitio
n" by Lawrence Shapiro (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
DESCRIPTION:A line of research within embodied cognition seeks to show th
at an organism's body is a determinant of its conceptual capacities. Comp
arison of this claim of \;body determinism \;to linguistic determ
inism bears interesting results. Just as Slobin's (1996) idea of \;th
inking for speaking \;challenges the main thesis of linguistic determ
inism\, so too the possibility of \;thinking for acting \;raises
difficulties for the proponent of body determinism. However\, recent stud
ies suggest that the body may\, after all\, have a determining role in co
gnitive processes of sentence comprehension.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
A line of research within embodied cogn
ition seeks to show that an organism's body is a determinant of its conce
ptual capacities. Comparison of this claim of \;body determinism 
\;to linguistic determinism bears interesting results. Just as Slobin's (
1996) idea of \;thinking for speaking \;challenges the main thesi
s of linguistic determinism\, so too the possibility of \;thinking fo
r acting \;raises difficulties for the proponent of body determinism.
However\, recent studies suggest that the body may\, after all\, have a
determining role in cognitive processes of sentence comprehension.
UID:20140307T233000Z-25184@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20140228T121018Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25184-what-linguistic-determin
ism-can-teach-us-about
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140228T201018Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/44241_shapeimage_3.rev.1393618145.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25184
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/44241_shapeimage_3.rev.1393618145.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:A line of research within embodied cognition seeks to
show that an organism's body is a determinant of its conceptual capaciti
es. Comparison of this claim of \;body determinism \;to linguisti
c determinism bears interesting results. Just as Slobin's (1996) idea of&
#160\;thinking for speaking \;challenges the main thesis of linguisti
c determinism\, so too the possibility of \;thinking for acting \
;raises difficulties for the proponent of body determinism. However\, rec
ent studies suggest that the body may\, after all\, have a determining ro
le in cognitive processes of sentence comprehension.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll
oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140314T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140314T170000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:"Responsibility from the Outside In: Shaping the Moral Ecology Ar
ound Implicit Bias" by Daniel Kelly (Purdue University)
DESCRIPTION:The main claim I aim to defend is that people can be responsi
ble for actions that are influenced by implicit biases they do not know t
hey have\, and that they would disavow if they were made aware of. My def
ense of that claim will involve framing the issue in terms of kinds of co
ntrol-based and knowledge based exculpating conditions commonly taken to
excuse actions\, laying out the core features of implicit biases\, and co
nsidering whether anything about the character or operation of implicit b
iases themselves satisfies those conditions\, or guarantees that actions
influenced by them should be excused. I formulate and reject several argu
ments that suggest a positive answer. I then present a thought experiment
designed to support my central claim\, and pump the intuition that not a
ll of the knowledge relevant to moral responsibility and exculpation need
be "in the head" of the agent whose actions are being evaluated. Finally
\, I comment on some general features of my approach and the questions th
at it raises.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
The main claim I aim to defend is that
people can be responsible for actions that are influenced by implicit bia
ses they do not know they have\, and that they would disavow if they were
made aware of. My defense of that claim will involve framing the issue i
n terms of kinds of control-based and knowledge based exculpating conditi
ons commonly taken to excuse actions\, laying out the core features of im
plicit biases\, and considering whether anything about the character or o
peration of implicit biases themselves satisfies those conditions\, or gu
arantees that actions influenced by them should be excused. I formulate a
nd reject several arguments that suggest a positive answer. I then presen
t a thought experiment designed to support my central claim\, and pump th
e intuition that not all of the knowledge relevant to moral responsibilit
y and exculpation need be "in the head" of the agent whose actions are be
ing evaluated. Finally\, I comment on some general features of my approac
h and the questions that it raises.
UID:20140314T223000Z-20624@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20130925T164817Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20624-responsibility-from-the-
outside-in-shaping-the
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140314T161831Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20624
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The main claim I aim to defend is that people can be
responsible for actions that are influenced by implicit biases they do no
t know they have\, and that they would disavow if they were made aware of
. My defense of that claim will involve framing the issue in terms of kin
ds of control-based and knowledge based exculpating conditions commonly t
aken to excuse actions\, laying out the core features of implicit biases\
, and considering whether anything about the character or operation of im
plicit biases themselves satisfies those conditions\, or guarantees that
actions influenced by them should be excused. I formulate and reject seve
ral arguments that suggest a positive answer. I then present a thought ex
periment designed to support my central claim\, and pump the intuition th
at not all of the knowledge relevant to moral responsibility and exculpat
ion need be "in the head" of the agent whose actions are being evaluated.
Finally\, I comment on some general features of my approach and the ques
tions that it raises.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll
oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140321T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140321T163000
LOCATION:JRHH 202
SUMMARY:"How Research on Symbiosis Should Transform Our Understanding of
Adaptation" by Frédéric Bouchard (Université de Montréal)
DESCRIPTION:Evolutionary Biology has relied ever increasingly on the mode
ling of population dynamics. Most have taken for granted that we all agre
e on what is a population. Recent work has re-examined this perceived con
sensus. I will argue that there are good reasons to restrict the term pop
ulation to collections of related replicators and interactors\, and that
if this is correct\, many existing models in population biology exclude b
y definition many genuine evolving biological individuals such as symbiot
ic communities. We will examine how symbiotic associations transform our
understanding of adaptation and biological individuality.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Evolutionary Biology has relied ever in
creasingly on the modeling of population dynamics. Most have taken for gr
anted that we all agree on what is a population. Recent work has re-exami
ned this perceived consensus. I will argue that there are good reasons to
restrict the term population to collections of related replicators and i
nteractors\, and that if this is correct\, many existing models in popula
tion biology exclude by definition many genuine evolving biological indiv
iduals such as symbiotic communities. We will examine how symbiotic assoc
iations transform our understanding of adaptation and biological individu
ality.
UID:20140321T223000Z-24328@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20140130T085022Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/24328-how-research-on-symbiosi
s-should-transform-our
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140319T211109Z
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:24328
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Evolutionary Biology has relied ever increasingly on
the modeling of population dynamics. Most have taken for granted that we
all agree on what is a population. Recent work has re-examined this perce
ived consensus. I will argue that there are good reasons to restrict the
term population to collections of related replicators and interactors\, a
nd that if this is correct\, many existing models in population biology e
xclude by definition many genuine evolving biological individuals such as
symbiotic communities. We will examine how symbiotic associations transf
orm our understanding of adaptation and biological individuality.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll
oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T150000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T162500
LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion
GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575
SUMMARY:"Legends of the Sperm" by Scott Gilbert (Swarthmore College)
DESCRIPTION:Accounts of fertilization are narratives of origins. Since th
e discovery of fertilization in the 1870s\, these narratives have often r
eflected the idea that the sperm and egg are the respective microscopic e
mbodiments of that which is masculine and that which is feminine. The sci
entific discoveries of the interactions between the sperm and egg often b
ecome enmeshed in socially constructed stories\, wherein the sperm and eg
g becoming surrogates for men and women. This has skewed the way that we
think about our bodily origins\, emphasizing differences between the game
tes and focusing on masculine agency. Recently\, fertilization narratives
have begun to include the idea of DNA as the secular analogue of soul. T
he notion that our DNA is our essence and the basis of our behaviors is d
elivered to us daily by advertisements\, news reports\, and visual cultur
e. These ideas play important\, but often unacknowledged\, roles in the a
bortion and stem cell debates. Analyzing fertilization stories allows us
to propose a critical realism wherein being socially constructed does not
necessarily mean being wrong and where controls are needed to rein in so
cial myths as well as alternative scientific explanations.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Accounts of fertilization are narrative
s of origins. Since the discovery of fertilization in the 1870s\, these n
arratives have often reflected the idea that the sperm and egg are the re
spective microscopic embodiments of that which is masculine and that whic
h is feminine. The scientific discoveries of the interactions between the
sperm and egg often become enmeshed in socially constructed stories\, wh
erein the sperm and egg becoming surrogates for men and women. This has s
kewed the way that we think about our bodily origins\, emphasizing differ
ences between the gametes and focusing on masculine agency. Recently\, fe
rtilization narratives have begun to include the idea of DNA as the secul
ar analogue of soul. The notion that our DNA is our essence and the basis
of our behaviors is delivered to us daily by advertisements\, news repor
ts\, and visual culture. These ideas play important\, but often unacknowl
edged\, roles in the abortion and stem cell debates. Analyzing fertilizat
ion stories allows us to propose a critical realism wherein being sociall
y constructed does not necessarily mean being wrong and where controls ar
e needed to rein in social myths as well as alternative scientific explan
ations.
UID:20140403T220000Z-25699@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20140321T141331Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25699-legends-of-the-sperm-by-
scott-gilbert-swarthmore
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140401T234848Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/31,0,344,313/44749_scott_gilbert_0.rev.1395436297.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25699
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/31\,0\,344\,313/44749_scott_gilbert_0.rev.1395
436297.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Accounts of fertilization are narratives of origins.
Since the discovery of fertilization in the 1870s\, these narratives have
often reflected the idea that the sperm and egg are the respective micro
scopic embodiments of that which is masculine and that which is feminine.
The scientific discoveries of the interactions between the sperm and egg
often become enmeshed in socially constructed stories\, wherein the sper
m and egg becoming surrogates for men and women. This has skewed the way
that we think about our bodily origins\, emphasizing differences between
the gametes and focusing on masculine agency. Recently\, fertilization na
rratives have begun to include the idea of DNA as the secular analogue of
soul. The notion that our DNA is our essence and the basis of our behavi
ors is delivered to us daily by advertisements\, news reports\, and visua
l culture. These ideas play important\, but often unacknowledged\, roles
in the abortion and stem cell debates. Analyzing fertilization stories al
lows us to propose a critical realism wherein being socially constructed
does not necessarily mean being wrong and where controls are needed to re
in in social myths as well as alternative scientific explanations.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|open to the public|phil
osophy colloquium series|science|send-to-undergraduate|student event|stud
ent
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T163500
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T180000
LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion
GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575
SUMMARY:"Nothing in Ethics Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution??
by Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis & Clark College)
DESCRIPTION:Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\, along with other phil
osophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\, the \;natural goo
dness approach\, that claims moral evaluations are\, or are on a par with
\, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically\, an
organism's flourishing is characterized by how well they function as spe
cified by the species to which they belong. In this essay\, I first sketc
h the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second\, I argue that c
ritics who claim that this sort of approach is inconsistent with evolutio
nary biology due to its species essentialism are incorrect. Third\, I con
sider the prospects of understanding ethical normativity as a species of
biological teleology claiming that this would be incompatible with our co
nsidered moral judgments. Fourth\, after presenting gene-culture coevolut
ion theory\, I argue that the only way of reconciling naturalism and norm
ativity in accordance with the natural goodness approach requires amendin
g the selected effects function account to include cultural evolution. Ho
wever\, this approach\, though not biologically reductionistic\, still ge
nerates claims incompatible with our considered moral judgments. Finally\
, I end with a discussion of methodology and revisionistic moral theories
.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\,
along with other philosophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\,
the \;natural goodness approach\, that claims moral evaluat
ions are\, or are on a par with\, teleological claims made in the biologi
cal sciences. Specifically\, an organism's flourishing is characterized b
y how well they function as specified by the species to which they belong
. In this essay\, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness ap
proach. Second\, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approac
h is inconsistent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentiali
sm are incorrect. Third\, I consider the prospects of understanding ethic
al normativity as a species of biological teleology claiming that this wo
uld be incompatible with our considered moral judgments. Fourth\, after p
resenting gene-culture coevolution theory\, I argue that the only way of
reconciling naturalism and normativity in accordance with the natural goo
dness approach requires amending the selected effects function account to
include cultural evolution. However\, this approach\, though not biologi
cally reductionistic\, still generates claims incompatible with our consi
dered moral judgments. Finally\, I end with a discussion of methodology a
nd revisionistic moral theories.
UID:20140403T233500Z-25994@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20140331T113941Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25994-nothing-in-ethics-makes-
sense-except-in-the-light
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140401T235020Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/44880_jay_odenbaugh.rev.1396291353.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25994
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/44880_jay_odenbaugh.rev.1396291353.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\, along with ot
her philosophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\, the \;natural goodness approach\, that claims moral evaluations are\, or
are on a par with\, teleological claims made in the biological sciences.
Specifically\, an organism's flourishing is characterized by how well the
y function as specified by the species to which they belong. In this essa
y\, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second
\, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approach is inconsist
ent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentialism are incorre
ct. Third\, I consider the prospects of understanding ethical normativity
as a species of biological teleology claiming that this would be incompa
tible with our considered moral judgments. Fourth\, after presenting gene
-culture coevolution theory\, I argue that the only way of reconciling na
turalism and normativity in accordance with the natural goodness approach
requires amending the selected effects function account to include cultu
ral evolution. However\, this approach\, though not biologically reductio
nistic\, still generates claims incompatible with our considered moral ju
dgments. Finally\, I end with a discussion of methodology and revisionist
ic moral theories.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|humanities|philosophy c
olloquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student|symposia
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T090000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T102500
LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion
GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575
SUMMARY:"Science—For Better or Worse\, a Source of Ignorance as well as
Knowledge" by Janet A. Kourany (University of Notre Dame)
DESCRIPTION:Science is gendered in a variety of ways. One is the way scie
nce has produced knowledge of men at the same time that it has produced i
gnorance of women. Until the end of the twentieth century\, for example\,
archaeology investigated men's contributions to the great turning points
of human evolution while it ignored the contributions of women\, and thi
s left the impression that still persists today that men are the great in
novators and controllers of human destiny\, not women. A second way in wh
ich science is gendered also concerns the balance of knowledge and ignora
nce produced by science\, but this time it concerns the way science somet
imes persists in producing knowledge when it might more usefully refrain
that is\, when it might more usefully maintain ignorance. For example\,
for centuries it was claimed that women are intellectually inferior to m
en\, and for centuries the basis for such inferiority was sought in biolo
gy and later also in psychology. And now\, even after centuries of such r
esearch\, scientists are still seeking to determine whether women are the
intellectual equals of men. Meanwhile\, studies have documented the harm
done to women and girls by the publication of much of this research. So\
, the question arises whether such cognitive differences research should
still continue\, or whether ignorance would be preferable. I shall argue
that an acceptable balance of scientifically produced knowledge and igno
rance regarding women and men should reflect societal needs for gender eq
uality as well as the need for freedom of research and the intrinsic valu
e of knowledge. And I shall argue that this will also best meet the deman
ds of objectivity.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Science is gendered in a variety of way
s. One is the way science has produced knowledge of men at the same time
that it has produced ignorance of women. Until the end of the twentieth c
entury\, for example\, archaeology investigated men's contributions to th
e great turning points of human evolution while it ignored the contributi
ons of women\, and this left the impression that still persists today tha
t men are the great innovators and controllers of human destiny\, not wom
en. A second way in which science is gendered also concerns the balance o
f knowledge and ignorance produced by science\, but this time it concerns
the way science sometimes persists in producing knowledge when it might
more usefully refrain—that is\, when it might more usefully maintain ig
norance. For example\, for centuries it was claimed that women are intell
ectually inferior to men\, and for centuries the basis for such inferiori
ty was sought in biology and later also in psychology. And now\, even aft
er centuries of such research\, scientists are still seeking to determine
whether women are the intellectual equals of men. Meanwhile\, studies ha
ve documented the harm done to women and girls by the publication of much
of this research. So\, the question arises whether such cognitive differ
ences research should still continue\, or whether ignorance would be pref
erable.
I shall argue that an acceptable balance of scientif
ically produced knowledge and ignorance regarding women and men should re
flect societal needs for gender equality as well as the need for freedom
of research and the intrinsic value of knowledge. And I shall argue that
this will also best meet the demands of objectivity.
UID:20140404T160000Z-25695@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20140321T130901Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25695-sciencefor-better-or-wor
se-a-source-of-ignorance
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140401T234928Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/51,73,346,368/44748_kourany.rev.1395432456.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25695
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/51\,73\,346\,368/44748_kourany.rev.1395432456.
jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Science is gendered in a variety of ways. One is the
way science has produced knowledge of men at the same time that it has pr
oduced ignorance of women. Until the end of the twentieth century\, for e
xample\, archaeology investigated men's contributions to the great turnin
g points of human evolution while it ignored the contributions of women\,
and this left the impression that still persists today that men are the
great innovators and controllers of human destiny\, not women. A second w
ay in which science is gendered also concerns the balance of knowledge an
d ignorance produced by science\, but this time it concerns the way scien
ce sometimes persists in producing knowledge when it might more usefully
refrain—that is\, when it might more usefully maintain ignorance. For e
xample\, for centuries it was claimed that women are intellectually infer
ior to men\, and for centuries the basis for such inferiority was sought
in biology and later also in psychology. And now\, even after centuries o
f such research\, scientists are still seeking to determine whether women
are the intellectual equals of men. Meanwhile\, studies have documented
the harm done to women and girls by the publication of much of this resea
rch. So\, the question arises whether such cognitive differences research
should still continue\, or whether ignorance would be preferable. \
n \nI shall argue that an acceptable balance of scientifically produ
ced knowledge and ignorance regarding women and men should reflect societ
al needs for gender equality as well as the need for freedom of research
and the intrinsic value of knowledge. And I shall argue that this will al
so best meet the demands of objectivity.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|open to the public|phil
osophy colloquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T103500
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T120000
LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion
GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575
SUMMARY:"Biological Reality and the Problem of Biological Races" by Quays
hawn Spencer (University of San Francisco)
DESCRIPTION:Since Noah Rosenberg et al.'s (2002) discovery of human popul
ation structure that looks racial\, philosophers have been scrambling to
understand what these results mean for the nature and reality of race.
60\; Although there have been many objections to interpreting any level o
f human population structure as racial\, for the purposes of this talk\,
I will focus on one specific objection: that biological races must be obj
ectively real. \; In my talk\, I will debunk this view by arguing tha
t biologically real entities can reasonably be understood as what I call
'genuine biological entities'\, which are not necessarily objectively rea
l. \; After introducing the theory\, I will motivate it with examples
from the history of biology. \; Finally\, I will return to the origi
nal problem and show that all human populations are biologically real des
pite not being objectively real. \; I leave it as an open question as
to whether any human populations are races.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Since Noah Rosenberg et al.'s (2002) di
scovery of human population structure that looks racial\, philosophers ha
ve been scrambling to understand what these results mean for the nature a
nd reality of race. \; Although there have been many objections to in
terpreting any level of human population structure as racial\, for the pu
rposes of this talk\, I will focus on one specific objection: that biolog
ical races must be objectively real. \; In my talk\, I will debunk th
is view by arguing that biologically real entities can reasonably be unde
rstood as what I call 'genuine biological entities'\, which are not neces
sarily objectively real. \; After introducing the theory\, I will mot
ivate it with examples from the history of biology. \; Finally\, I wi
ll return to the original problem and show that all human populations are
biologically real despite not being objectively real. \; I leave it
as an open question as to whether any human populations are races.
UID:20140404T173500Z-25777@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20140329T174239Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25777-biological-reality-and-t
he-problem-of-biological
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140331T172737Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/44867_quashawn_spencer.rev.1396140045.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25777
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/44867_quashawn_spencer.rev.1396140045.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Since Noah Rosenberg et al.'s (2002) discovery of hum
an population structure that looks racial\, philosophers have been scramb
ling to understand what these results mean for the nature and reality of
race. \; Although there have been many objections to interpreting any
level of human population structure as racial\, for the purposes of this
talk\, I will focus on one specific objection: that biological races mus
t be objectively real. \; In my talk\, I will debunk this view by arg
uing that biologically real entities can reasonably be understood as what
I call 'genuine biological entities'\, which are not necessarily objecti
vely real. \; After introducing the theory\, I will motivate it with
examples from the history of biology. \; Finally\, I will return to t
he original problem and show that all human populations are biologically
real despite not being objectively real. \; I leave it as an open que
stion as to whether any human populations are races.
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|open to the public|phil
osophy colloquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T131000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T142500
LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion
GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575
SUMMARY:"Morton's Skulls\, Gould's Statistics\, and the Objectivity of Da
ta" by Jonathan Kaplan (Oregon State University)
DESCRIPTION:In 2011\, Lewis et al published a paper arguing that Gould's
criticisms of Morton's analyses of skull volumes were\, broadly\, mistake
n. Gould had argued that the average differences in the volumes of skulls
between the 'races' reported by Morton were the result of Morton's uncon
scious biases\; Gould further argued that more appropriate methods showed
no average volume differences of any significance. Lewis et al counter t
hat in fact Morton's analysis is to be preferred\, and Gould's analysis i
nappropriate and biased. But both Gould and Lewis et al are mistaken\; bo
th attempt\, somewhat foolishly\, \;to analyze data that cannot spea
k to the questions it is supposed to. In the end\, arguments about the be
st statistical techniques to deploy serve only to obscure the poverty of
the data. While it is possible to accurately measure the skulls that Mort
on happened to collect\, and both Gould and Lewis et al believe\, in the
end\, that Morton did so\, there is no appropriate way to use those skull
s to answer any of the plausibly interesting questions about the 'populat
ions' from which those skulls were drawn (often stolen). Followed by a p
anel discussion with: Jay Odenbaugh\, Lewis &\; Clark College Janet
Kourany\, University of Notre Dame Scott Gilbert\, Swarthmore College J
onathan Kaplan\, Oregon State University Quayshawn Spencer\, University
of San Francisco
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In 2011\, Lewis et al published a paper
arguing that Gould's criticisms of Morton's analyses of skull volumes we
re\, broadly\, mistaken. Gould had argued that the average differences in
the volumes of skulls between the 'races' reported by Morton were the re
sult of Morton's unconscious biases\; Gould further argued that more appr
opriate methods showed no average volume differences of any significance.
Lewis et al counter that in fact Morton's analysis is to be preferred\,
and Gould's analysis inappropriate and biased. But both Gould and Lewis e
t al are mistaken\; both attempt\, somewhat foolishly\, \;to analyze
data that cannot speak to the questions it is supposed to. In the end\,
arguments about the best statistical techniques to deploy serve only to o
bscure the poverty of the data. While it is possible to accurately measur
e the skulls that Morton happened to collect\, and both Gould and Lewis e
t al believe\, in the end\, that Morton did so\, there is no appropriate
way to use those skulls to answer any of the plausibly interesting questi
ons about the 'populations' from which those skulls were drawn (often sto
len).
Followed by a panel discussion with:
Jay Odenbaugh\
, Lewis &\; Clark College Janet Kourany\, University of Notre D
ame Scott Gilbert\, Swarthmore College Jonathan Kaplan\, Or
egon State University Quayshawn Spencer\, University of San Franci
sco
UID:20140404T201000Z-25693@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20140321T124617Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25693-mortons-skulls-goulds-st
atistics-and-the
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140402T172413Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr
op/1/src_region/6,0,338,333/44746_jonathan2.rev.1395431291.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25693
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h
eight/80/crop/1/src_region/6\,0\,338\,333/44746_jonathan2.rev.1395431291.
jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:In 2011\, Lewis et al published a paper arguing that
Gould's criticisms of Morton's analyses of skull volumes were\, broadly\,
mistaken. Gould had argued that the average differences in the volumes o
f skulls between the 'races' reported by Morton were the result of Morton
's unconscious biases\; Gould further argued that more appropriate method
s showed no average volume differences of any significance. Lewis et al c
ounter that in fact Morton's analysis is to be preferred\, and Gould's an
alysis inappropriate and biased. But both Gould and Lewis et al are mista
ken\; both attempt\, somewhat foolishly\, \;to analyze data that can
not speak to the questions it is supposed to. In the end\, arguments abou
t the best statistical techniques to deploy serve only to obscure the pov
erty of the data. While it is possible to accurately measure the skulls t
hat Morton happened to collect\, and both Gould and Lewis et al believe\,
in the end\, that Morton did so\, there is no appropriate way to use tho
se skulls to answer any of the plausibly interesting questions about the
'populations' from which those skulls were drawn (often stolen). \n<
br />\nFollowed by a panel discussion\, with: \n
\n Jay Odenbaugh
\, Lewis &\; Clark College \n Janet Kourany\, University of Notr
e Dame \n Scott Gilbert\, Swarthmore College \n Jonathan Kapl
an\, Oregon State University \n Quayshawn Spencer\, University of S
an Francisco\n
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|open to the public|phil
osophy colloquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140426T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140426T160000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:Festival of Scholars
DESCRIPTION:It is our pleasure to invite you to the first Festival of Sch
olars\, an opportunity for student-scholars and artists to present their
research and art\, while also learning from one another. We have set asid
e Saturday\, April 26\, 2014\, 1:00-4:00 pm\, for this exciting event\, w
hich is sponsored by a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Sched
uled are performances of original compositions\, an exhibition of origina
l art\, a play produced and performed by students\, and research presenta
tions in a variety of fields\, including international affairs\, politica
l science\, religious studies\, environmental studies\, chemistry\, mathe
matics\, computer science\, and many more. Click here (https://college.lc
lark.edu/festivalofscholars/schedule/) for the full program. Opening int
roduction and library presentation at Smith Hall at 1 pm.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
It is our pleasure to invite you to the
first Festival of Scholars\, an opportunity for student-scholars and art
ists to present their research and art\, while also learning from one ano
ther. We have set aside Saturday\, April 26\, 2014\, 1:00-4:00 pm
\, for this exciting event\, which is sponsored by a grant from
the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
Scheduled are performances of or
iginal compositions\, an exhibition of original art\, a play produced and
performed by students\, and research presentations in a variety of field
s\, including international affairs\, political science\, religious studi
es\, environmental studies\, chemistry\, mathematics\, computer science\,
and many more. Click here for the full program.
Opening introductio
n and library presentation at Smith Hall at 1 pm.
UID:20140426T200000Z-26472@college.lclark.edu
DTSTAMP:20140421T082641Z
URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/26472-festival-of-scholars
CATEGORIES:Open to the Public
LAST-MODIFIED:20140421T152641Z
ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/558/width/80/height/80/c
rop/1/45438_div-a2-1110-0011.rev.1397848053.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events
X-LIVEWHALE-ID:26472
X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles
X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/558/width/80/
height/80/crop/1/45438_div-a2-1110-0011.rev.1397848053.jpg
X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:It is our pleasure to invite you to the first Festiva
l of Scholars\, an opportunity for student-scholars and artists to presen
t their research and art\, while also learning from one another.
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR