BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Lewis & Clark//NONSGML v1.0//EN X-WR-CALNAME:Lewis & Clark Events BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20090308T100000 RDATE:20090308T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20091101T090000 RDATE:20091101T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20100314T100000 RDATE:20100314T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20101107T090000 RDATE:20101107T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20110313T100000 RDATE:20110313T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20111106T090000 RDATE:20111106T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20120311T100000 RDATE:20120311T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20121104T090000 RDATE:20121104T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20130310T100000 RDATE:20130310T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20131103T090000 RDATE:20131103T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20140309T100000 RDATE:20140309T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20141102T090000 RDATE:20141102T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20150308T100000 RDATE:20150308T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20151101T090000 RDATE:20151101T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20091105T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20091105T163000 LOCATION:Albany Quadrangle\, Smith Hall SUMMARY:Two Cheers for Affirmative Action DESCRIPTION:David Boonin\, associate professor of philosophy at the Unive rsity of Colorado at Boulder\, will offer a talk titled\, "Two Cheers for Affirmative Action." Boonin's primary area of teaching and research is applied ethics\, including the moral status of animals\, our obligations to future generations\, euthanasia and same-sex marriage. His current boo k examines race\, focusing on slave reparations and affirmative action\, as well as hate speech codes\, hate crime laws and racial profiling. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
David Boonin\, associate professor of p hilosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder\, will offer a talk ti tled\, "Two Cheers for Affirmative Action."
Boonin's primary area of teaching and research is applied ethics\, including the moral status of animals\, our obligations to future generations\, euthanasia and same- sex marriage. His current book examines race\, focusing on slave reparati ons and affirmative action\, as well as hate speech codes\, hate crime la ws and racial profiling.
UID:20091105T233000Z-471@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20091029T110915Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/471-two-cheers-for-affirmative -action LAST-MODIFIED:20091029T181925Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/7468_7433_affirmative_action_ca03de2c62f89e1292294fbbdfe85615.rev.13 73936888.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:471 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/7468_7433_affirmative_action_ca03de2c62f89e1292294fbbdfe8 5615.rev.1373936888.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE-CAPTION:11/05/2009\, 3:30pm\, Albany Quadrangle\, Smith Hall X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:David Boonin\, associate professor of philosophy at t he University of Colorado at Boulder\, will offer a talk titled\, "Two Ch eers for Affirmative Action." X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:diversity|lecture|open to the public END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100219T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100219T163000 LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202 SUMMARY:Immortality by John Martin Fischer (University of California Rive rside) DESCRIPTION:I discuss various objections to the idea that embodied immort ality could be desirable for human beings. I argue against the "immortali ty curmudgeons"\, such as Heidegger and Bernard Williams\, that such immo rtality could conceivably be attractive to human beings. THIS EVENT IS F REE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:I discuss various objections to the ide a that embodied immortality could be desirable for human beings. I argue against the "immortality curmudgeons"\, such as Heidegger and Bernard Wil liams\, that such immortality could conceivably be attractive to human be ings.
THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
UID:20100219T233000Z-1170@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20100203T094848Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1170-immortality-by-john-marti n-fischer-university-of LAST-MODIFIED:20100216T190323Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:1170 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:I discuss various objections to the idea that embodie d immortality could be desirable for human beings. I argue against the "i mmortality curmudgeons"\, such as Heidegger and Bernard Williams\, that s uch immortality could conceivably be attractive to human beings.A common view in psychology and philoso phy holds that strictly speaking we see very little – strictly speaking \, we see only facing surface features like color\, boundaries and illumi nation. \; Everything else is filled in by the mind. \; For examp le\, we don't have visual experiences of three-dimensional tomatoes.  \; Rather we have visual experiences of a two-dimensional field colored a nd illuminated a certain way. \; I think that this view is wrong\, bu t surprisingly persistent. \; I will dragoon two historical figures\, George Berkeley and Thomas Reid\, to do my arguing for me\, and to illus trate how this putatively common sense view is a piece of theory and a pr oduct of history.
THIS EVEN IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
UID:20100226T113000Z-1278@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20100222T085254Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1278-berkeley-and-reid-on-acqu ired-perception-by LAST-MODIFIED:20100222T171950Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/9605_tomato_plant-625.rev.1373936888.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:1278 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/9605_tomato_plant-625.rev.1373936888.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE-CAPTION:Caption... X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:\n A common view in psychology and philosophy hol ds that strictly speaking we see very little – we see only facing surfa ce features like color\, boundaries and illumination. \; Everything e lse is filled in by the mind. \; I think that this view is wrong. 0\; I use George Berkeley and Thomas Reid to illustrate how this putative ly common sense view is a piece of theory and a product of history.\n
\n\n THIS EVEN IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.\n
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|open to the public|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100305T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100305T163000 LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202 SUMMARY:Plato on Ignorance as a Cognitive Power by Nick Smith (Lewis & ; Clark College) DESCRIPTION:In Book V of Plato's Republic\, Plato has Socrates distinguis h between three distinct cognitive powers (dunameis): knowledge (episteme )\, opinion (doxa)\, and ignorance (agnosia). Powers\, Socrates goes on t o explain\, are distinguished in virtue of what they are related to and w hat they accomplish (477d1). In this section of the dialogue\, the second of these two differentiae is not invoked again\; instead\, all of the di stinctions Socrates makes here are made in terms of the different objects to which the powers are related. Knowledge\, we are told\, is related to what is (to on)\; ignorance is related to what is not (to me on)\; opini on is related to what both is and is not.Scholars have attended almost en tirely to the distinction between knowledge and opinion\, and for good re ason: It is clear that this distinction is the primary one that Plato wis hes to explicate here\, as it is in terms of this distinction that the im portant difference between the philosopher rulers and ordinary rulers wil l be drawn. The distinctions between knowledge and ignorance and opinion and ignorance are only very briefly mentioned\, and ignorance itself rema ins almost wholly unexplained. In this paper\, I discuss the role of ign orance in Plato's epistemology. My analysis is novel in four ways: First\ , other scholars have attended almost exclusively to the roles assigned t o knowledge and opinion in this passage\, and have neglected to explain w hether – and if so\, how – their analyses could explicate what Plato has Socrates say about ignorance. \; Secondly\, I argue that we shoul d not understand the analysis as an intensional one: cognitive powers are not objects to which they are related\, as scholars have generally suppo sed. The relationship of the powers to objects\, rather\, is a nomologica l one. \; Thirdly\, I argue that what is produced by the cognitive po wers are what we would call conceptualizations (or conceptions) of the en tities to which they are said to be related (epi). Finally\, I argue that the case of ignorance makes clear that the "is" in Plato's analysis of t he relata of each cognitive power must be understood neither veridically (where "is" means "is true")\, nor existentially (where "is" means "exist s")\, but \; \; predicatively (wherewhere "is" means "is F\," whe re F is the name of a Platonic Form). THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:S
cholars have attended almost entirely to the distinction between knowledg
e and opinion\, and for good reason: It is clear that this distinction is
the primary one that Plato wishes to explicate here\, as it is in terms
of this distinction that the important difference between the philosopher
rulers and ordinary rulers will be drawn. The distinctions between knowl
edge and ignorance and opinion and ignorance are only very briefly mentio
ned\, and ignorance itself remains almost wholly unexplained.
In this paper\, I discuss the role of ignorance in Plato's epistemology
. My analysis is novel in four ways: First\, other scholars have attended
almost exclusively to the roles assigned to knowledge and opinion in thi
s passage\, and have neglected to explain whether – and if so\, how –
their analyses could explicate what Plato has Socrates say about ignoran
ce. \; Secondly\, I argue that we should not understand the analysis
as an intensional one: cognitive powers are not objects to which they are
related\, as scholars have generally supposed. The relationship of the p
owers to objects\, rather\, is a nomological one. \; Thirdly\, I argu
e that what is produced by the cognitive powers are what we would call co
nceptualizations (or conceptions) of the entities to which they are said
to be related (epi). Finally\, I argue that the case of ignorance makes c
lear that the "is" in Plato's analysis of the relata of each cognitive po
wer must be understood neither veridically (where "is" means "is true")\,
nor existentially (where "is" means "exists")\, but \; \; predic
atively (wherewhere "is" means "is F\," where F is the name of a Platonic
Form).
THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
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span style="font-family: Garamond\;">
\;THIS EVENT IS FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.
UID:20100409T223000Z-1395@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20100304T101939Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1395-skilled-movement-and-embo died-cognition-by-john LAST-MODIFIED:20100310T193633Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:1395 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100415T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100415T163000 LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 302 SUMMARY:When Things Fall Apart: On The Insufficiency Of Virtue For Happin ess by Emily Long (Lewis & Clark College) DESCRIPTION:In the early dialogues\, it is unclear whether Socrates thoug ht virtue sufficient for happiness. In two passages in the Euthydemus\, S ocrates appears to contradict himself on the topic of non-moral goods\, a nd whether they can contribute to\, or are required for\, one's happiness . In this paper I investigate four perspectives on what Socrates thought was virtue's relation to happiness\, and more specifically whether the ha ppiness of a virtuous person is static or eliminable. If a virtuous agent is stricken with a debilitating disease or physically constrained from c ommitting virtuous acts — can they still be genuinely happy? However\, the most salient reading of Socrates' account is one that does not invoke a logical connection between virtue and happiness\, but rather a nomolog ical one — and in this paper I hope to show why this is supported by th e text. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Click here to download Ha nnah's paper
UID:20100416T000000Z-1549@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20100407T101320Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/1549-the-racist-and-the-existe ntialist-a-testimonial LAST-MODIFIED:20100407T175229Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:1549 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:academic honor|open to the public|staff event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100423T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20100423T163000 LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202 SUMMARY:Conscientiousness and Harmony by Rachana Kamtekar (University of Arizona) DESCRIPTION:This paper has two goals. The first goal is to argue that Pla to's Republic gives two accounts of virtue's relation to happiness – a weaker relationship\, according to which the virtuous person is always ha ppier than the vicious person\, and a stronger relationship\, according t o which virtue is sufficient for happiness – because he does not know t he nature of the soul-parts and the limits of their capabilities. His not knowing this results in his not knowing whether reason rules in the virt uous person's soul by force or by command-and-consent. The second goal is to argue that the features of the Republic's soul that are responsible f or raising the question whether soul-parts can be harmoniously integrated or not – viz.\, the agent-like nature of the parts\, including their i ndependence and the different parts' duplication of reasoning and desider ative capacities – is turning out to be corroborated by contemporary co gnitive science. This ought to make Plato's approach to the relationship between virtue and happiness particularly interesting to us. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
happiness particularly interesting to us.
In this talk\, I explore ho
w these issues generalize to the epistemic domain. On the one hand\, ther
e seems to be some form of incoherence in the idea that evaluations of re
asonability in belief are open to luck\, though this is arguably the defi
ning claim of a thoroughgoing externalism in epistemology. On the other h
and\, our concept of reasonable belief may be immune to luck only under a
version of access internalism so strict as to have external world skepti
cism as a consequence. Thus\, there is a genuine threat that Nagel's dile
mma is robust in the epistemic domain.
I close by offering a
n explanation for these striking affinities. The problems of moral and ep
istemic luck are particular manifestations of more fundamental problem—
the problem of evaluative luck. Though our evaluative concepts are hetero
geneous and many of them remain unproblematically applicable on the basis
of good or bad fortune\, our concept of reasonability—applicable to bo
th choice and belief—remains immune to luck.
\;
UID:20101015T223000Z-3268@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20100921T105920Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/3268-reason-and-evaluative-luc k-by-eddie-cushman-lewis LAST-MODIFIED:20130128T190256Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:3268 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:In his classic paper "Mora l Luck\," Nagel argues that a dilemma is embedded in our common moral tho ught. On the one hand\, there appears to be a deep form of incoherence in the thought that moral evaluations are applicable to an individual as a result of good or bad luck—that is\, by virtue of factors that lie outs ide her control. On the other hand\, if we deny that moral evaluations ca n apply to an individual by virtue of factors that lie outside of her con trol\, then morality appears to evaporate. We are never suitable objects of moral evaluation.Come find out about how philosophy prepare s you for law school\, about how law school differs from philosophy\, and about what careers you might seek with a law degree.
UID:20101028T223000Z-3546@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20101021T111851Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/3546-so-you-think-you-want-to- go-to-law-school-from LAST-MODIFIED:20101021T182128Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:3546 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Come find out about how ph ilosophy prepares you for law school\, about how law school differs from philosophy\, and about what careers you might seek with a law degree. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:law|people|Portland|student event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101105T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20101105T163000 LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 202 SUMMARY:"Virtue Ethics" and the Problem of Advising Fools by Eric Brown ( University of Washington at St. Louis) DESCRIPTION:"Virtue ethics" tells us to do what the virtuous person would do in our circumstances. But if we are not virtuous—if we are "fools" then the virtuous person would not be in our circumstances. What\, then \, can virtue theory say to advise a fool about what to do? I quickly sug gest reasons to be pessimistic about recent approaches to this problem\, and then I turn to the ancients' eudaimonism for a more a fresh alternati ve. The ancient Socratics\, including especially the Stoics\, counsel not causally promoting one's virtue or trying to follow "v-rules" but approx imating virtue. I argue that Stoic psychopathology offers considerable he lp in making sense of how fools might approximate virtue and how advisers might use Socratic eudaimonism's conception of virtue to guide fools to the best action in their circumstances. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
In this paper\, we briefly explain some of
the more common objections to particularism. \; We articulate a prob
lem for the particularist\, what we call "the application problem\," that
has not been discussed in the literature. \; In addition\, we consid
er how some prominent particularists might respond. \; We conclude by
spelling out some lessons we have learned from investigating particulari
sm.
I argue that radical egalitarians should not be daunted by the
levelling-down objection. Drawing on an analysis of the moral emotions of
sympathy and envy\, I provide a number of examples in which levelling-do
wn appears morally permissible and is perhaps even required. This provide
s grounds for a version of radical telic egalitarianism in which levellin
g-down sometimes results in outcomes that are better all-things consi
dered.
Recently\
, there has been a discussion as to whether virtue ethics can capture the
common sense notion of supererogation. \;In this paper\, I argue tha
t there is no compelling reason why virtue ethics ought to give an accoun
t of the supererogatory. \; \; The argument that supports the cla
im that virtue ethics needs to account for the supererogatory rests on a
fundamental confusion about the virtue ethical account of right action.&#
160\; That is\, philosophers who argue that virtue ethics ought to offer
a virtue ethical account of supererogation mistakenly take the virtue eth
ical criterion of right action to tell us what our obligations are. \
; \; But\, this is a mistake. It is an easy one to make\, though\, be
cause so many prominent virtue ethicists have felt comfortable using deon
tic notions. \; In this paper\, I explain why this is a mistake and p
oint the way to a better and more pure virtue ethical approach to underst
anding the actions of heroes and saints. \; In the end\, I think the
virtue ethicist should jettison the notion of supererogation. \; Howe
ver\, I think this is a small price to pay and it need not threaten the v
irtue ethical project of conceptualizing common sense morality.
Socrates claims that he would rather tha t he neither suffer injustice\, nor perform it. The notion that someone w ould have an aversion to suffering injustice seems so commonsense as to r equire no justification. Yet if Socrates accepts the thesis that virtue i s sufficient for happiness ("no evil comes to a good man")\, then it is h ard to see why Socrates\, being a good man\, would have anything to fear from victimization. This paper aims to make these views consistent throug h a reinterpretation of several important Socratic positions\, notably th e relation between virtue and happiness\, and Socrates' moral psychology.
UID:20110902T223000Z-6734@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20110823T155125Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/6734-socratic-aversion-to-suff ering-injusticen-by LAST-MODIFIED:20110823T225239Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:6734 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Socrates claims that he would rather that he neither suffer injustice\, nor perform it. The notion that someone would have an aversion to suffering injustice seems so commonsense as to require no ju stification. Yet if Socrates accepts the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness ("no evil comes to a good man")\, then it is hard to see w hy Socrates\, being a good man\, would have anything to fear from victimi zation. This paper aims to make these views consistent through a reinterp retation of several important Socratic positions\, notably the relation b etween virtue and happiness\, and Socrates' moral psychology. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|student event END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110923T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110923T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:"Gut Reactions" and Abstract Art by Jay Odenbaugh and Levi Tenen (Lewis & Clark) DESCRIPTION:It is commonplace to claim that abstract\, non-representation al \;artworks such as Rothko's No. 14 or Miles Davis' Blue in Green e xpress \;emotions like sadness. However\, this seems problematic sinc e \;expression generally requires a person doing the expressing. In t his \;paper\, we attempt to address this "missing person problem". Fi rst\, we \;present the problem of "abstract expression" and we articu late the \;various ways in which the concept of expression is used re garding \;persons and artworks. Second\, we sketch our best understan ding of what \;the emotions borrowing from the work of Jesse Prinz an d Jenefer \;Robinson. Finally\, combining both the conceptual clarifi cation and \;work on emotion discussed above\, we provide an account of how emotions \;can be expressed by abstract art. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:It is commonplace to claim that abstrac t\, non-representational \;artworks such as Rothko's No. 14 or Miles Davis' Blue in Green express \;emotions like sadness. However\, this seems problematic since \;expression generally requires a person doin g the expressing. In this \;paper\, we attempt to address this "missi ng person problem". First\, we \;present the problem of "abstract exp ression" and we articulate the \;various ways in which the concept of expression is used regarding \;persons and artworks. Second\, we ske tch our best understanding of what \;the emotions borrowing from the work of Jesse Prinz and Jenefer \;Robinson. Finally\, combining both the conceptual clarification and \;work on emotion discussed above\, we provide an account of how emotions \;can be expressed by abstract art.
UID:20110923T223000Z-7156@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20110906T154958Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7156-gut-reactions-and-abstrac t-art-by-jay-odenbaugh LAST-MODIFIED:20110917T160422Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7156 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:It is commonplace to claim that abstract\, non-repres entational \;artworks such as Rothko's No. 14 or Miles Davis' Blue in Green express \;emotions like sadness. However\, this seems problema tic since \;expression generally requires a person doing the expressi ng. In this \;paper\, we attempt to address this "missing person prob lem". First\, we \;present the problem of "abstract expression" and w e articulate the \;various ways in which the concept of expression is used regarding \;persons and artworks. Second\, we sketch our best u nderstanding of what \;the emotions borrowing from the work of Jesse Prinz and Jenefer \;Robinson. Finally\, combining both the conceptual clarification and \;work on emotion discussed above\, we provide an account of how emotions \;can be expressed by abstract art. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|open to the public|send-to-undergraduate|s tudent event|student events END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110930T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20110930T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102 SUMMARY:German Idealism meets Indian Vedanta: A Comparison of Schelling a nd Hegel with Sankara and Ramanuja (plus Abhinavagupta)- Katherine Elise Barhydt and J.M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark) DESCRIPTION:We compare the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel with th e Indian Vedānta of Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja\, as well as Abhinavagupt a's Kaśmir Śaivism. We argue that only Hegel's philosophy does not fail according to its own standard of success. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:We compare the German Idealism of Schel ling and Hegel with the Indian Vedānta of Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja\, a s well as Abhinavagupta's Kaśmir Śaivism. We argue that only Hegel's ph ilosophy does not fail according to its own standard of success.
UID:20110930T223000Z-7178@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20110907T154745Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7178-german-idealism-meets-ind ian-vedanta-a-comparison LAST-MODIFIED:20110922T183417Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7178 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:We compare the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel with the Indian Vedānta of Śaṅkarā and Rāmānuja\, as well as Abhi navagupta's Kaśmir Śaivism. We argue that only Hegel's philosophy does not fail according to its own standard of success. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111014T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111014T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:Superstrong Multimodality: A New Approach to Perceptual Experienc e- Rebecca Copenhaver and Bryce Dalbey (Lewis & Clark) DESCRIPTION:We present a taxonomy of approaches and position to studying perceptual experience. \;Perceptual experience has been studied prim arily as a unimodal phenomenon: philosophers and cognitive scientists hav e approached each sense modality as isolated and encapsulated and as havi ng unique\, proprietary objects. \;In addition\, philosophers and co gnitive scientists have focused almost exclusively on vision. \;Rece ntly\, some have begun to study audition\, olfaction\, gustation\, propri oception and other neglected sense modalities. \;We argue that while this shift in attention is an advance\, a more radical shift in methodol ogy is called for: superstrong multimodality. \;On this approach\, t here are no modally-specific\, distinct\, proprietary\, invariant content s. \;Rather\, overall perceptual experience is the most basic form o f content\, and it cannot be specified in modally-specific terms. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:We present a taxonomy of approaches and position to studying perceptual experience. \;Perceptual experience has been studied primarily as a unimodal phenomenon: philosophers and co gnitive scientists have approached each sense modality as isolated and en capsulated and as having unique\, proprietary objects. \;In addition \, philosophers and cognitive scientists have focused almost exclusively on vision. \;Recently\, some have begun to study audition\, olfactio n\, gustation\, proprioception and other neglected sense modalities.  0\;We argue that while this shift in attention is an advance\, a more rad ical shift in methodology is called for: superstrong multimodality.   \;On this approach\, there are no modally-specific\, distinct\, proprieta ry\, invariant contents. \;Rather\, overall perceptual experience is the most basic form of content\, and it cannot be specified in modally-s pecific terms.
UID:20111014T223000Z-7180@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20110907T160455Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7180-superstrong-multimodality -a-new-approach-to LAST-MODIFIED:20111012T170649Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7180 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:We present a taxonomy of approaches and position to s tudying perceptual experience. \;Perceptual experience has been stud ied primarily as a unimodal phenomenon: philosophers and cognitive scient ists have approached each sense modality as isolated and encapsulated and as having unique\, proprietary objects. \;In addition\, philosopher s and cognitive scientists have focused almost exclusively on vision.  60\;Recently\, some have begun to study audition\, olfaction\, gustation\ , proprioception and other neglected sense modalities. \;We argue th at while this shift in attention is an advance\, a more radical shift in methodology is called for: superstrong multimodality. \;On this appr oach\, there are no modally-specific\, distinct\, proprietary\, invariant contents. \;Rather\, overall perceptual experience is the most basi c form of content\, and it cannot be specified in modally-specific terms. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111021T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111021T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:Hume's Sense of Probability- Don Garrett (New York University) DESCRIPTION:"The imagination\, according to my own confession\, [is] the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy." So writes David Hume in 0\;A Treatise of Human Nature \;(T 1.4.4.1). But how can the \;im agination\, of all things\, be the ultimate judge of systems of philosoph y? And how can Hume's granting of this august judicial role to a faculty generally regarded as the source of whimsy and error be reconciled with h is confidence\, expressed in the Introduction to the \;Treatise\, 0\; \;that he is proposing in his \;own \;philosophy a "compl ete system" that is built on a "solid foundation" (T Intro. 6-7)? Those a re the central questions that I propose to address. My answer to the firs t question will be that the Humean imagination serves as the ultimate jud ge of systems of philosophy chiefly by being\, through what I will call i ts \;sense of probability\, the sole judge of \;the \;probabi lity that they are true. My answer to the second will be that\, on Hume's view\, a system with sufficient probability of being true\, as judged by the imagination\, can properly be regarded as well-founded. \; I will begin by explaining Hume's general ap proach to those \;abstract ideas \;that are \;derived from a sense—that is\, what we would now be likely to call \;response-depe ndent concepts—and examining the applicability of that general approach to the specific abstract idea of probability. I will then set out what I take to be his general approach to \;normative \;ideas and exami ne the applicability of that approach to the specific abstract idea of pr obable truth. Combining the results of these two investigations will allo w us to see his abstract idea of probable truth as a concept that is both \;response-dependent \;and \;epistemically normative. We wil l then be in a position to understand the imagination's use of that conce pt in properly judging systems of philosophy—including\, of course\, Hu me's own system. I will conclude by drawing several consequences for Hume an epistemology and its relation to skepticism. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:"The imagination\, ac cording to my own confession\, [is] the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy." So writes David Hume in \;A Treatise of Human Nature \;(T 1.4.4.1). But how can the \;imagination\, of all things\, be the ultimate judge of systems of philosophy? And how can Hume's granting of this august judicial role to a faculty generally regar ded as the source of whimsy and error be reconciled with his confidence\, expressed in the Introduction to the \;Treatise\, \; 60\;that he is proposing in his \;own \;philosophy a "co mplete system" that is built on a "solid foundation" (T Intro. 6-7)? Thos e are the central questions that I propose to address. My answer to the f irst question will be that the Humean imagination serves as the ultimate judge of systems of philosophy chiefly by being\, through what I will cal l its \;sense of probability\, the sole judge of \;t he \;probability that they are true. My answer to the s econd will be that\, on Hume's view\, a system with sufficient probabilit y of being true\, as judged by the imagination\, can properly be regarded as well-founded.
\;
I will begin by explaining Hume's general approach to those \;abs tract ideas \;that are \;derived from a sense—tha t is\, what we would now be likely to call \;response-dependent c oncepts—and examining the applicability of that general approach t o the specific abstract idea of probability. I will then set out what I t ake to be his general approach to \;normative \;ideas an d examine the applicability of that approach to the specific abstract ide a of probable truth. Combining the results of these two investigations wi ll allow us to see his abstract idea of probable truth as a concept that is both \;response-dependent \;and \;epistemical ly normative. We will then be in a position to understand the imagin ation's use of that concept in properly judging systems of philosophy—i ncluding\, of course\, Hume's own system. I will conclude by drawing seve ral consequences for Humean epistemology and its relation to skepticism.
This fall\, the Philosophy Extravaganza has chosen as its topic\, "Can animals think?" Questions of whether anim als\, or more generally non-humans\, can think have long puzzled philosop hers and non-philosophers alike\, and are today of an especially high imp ortance\; for example\, we all must deal with questions of how non-human thought informs our ethical views. Please join us for a panel discussion on animal thought\, featuring: Ken Clifton (Biology)\, Becko Copenhaver ( Philosophy)\, Erik Nilsen (Psychology)\, and Kathy Hessler (Animal Law). Refreshments will be provided.
UID:20111028T010000Z-7185@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20110908T092632Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7185-philosophy-extravaganza-c an-animals-think LAST-MODIFIED:20111024T231611Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/25094_dog.rev.1373936884.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7185 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/25094_dog.rev.1373936884.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:This fall\, the Philosophy Extravaganza has chosen as its topic\, "Can animals think?" Questions of whether animals\, or more generally non-humans\, can think have long puzzled philosophers and non-p hilosophers alike\, and are today of an especially high importance\; for example\, we all must deal with questions of how non-human thought inform s our ethical views. Please join us for a panel discussion on animal thou ght\, featuring: Ken Clifton (Biology)\, Becko Copenhaver (Philosophy)\, Erik Nilsen (Psychology)\, and Kathy Hessler (Animal Law). Refreshments w ill be provided. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:open to the public|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111104T133000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111104T143000 LOCATION:Council Chambers GEO:45.44918;-122.670969 SUMMARY:Relativism about the Normative by Paul Boghossian (New York Unive rsity) UID:20111104T203000Z-7362@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20110912T091846Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7362-relativism-about-the-norm ative-by-paul-boghossian LAST-MODIFIED:20111102T223949Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/23548_photo3.rev.1373936883.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7362 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/23548_photo3.rev.1373936883.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:This is in conjunction with the Northwest Philosophy Conference< /a>.Advocates of cognitive extension argue that the human mind super-sizes itself by embodying \;itself in a body\, embedding \;itself in an epistemic environment and uniting itself with both in extended \;cognitive agency. \; Call this the 3E-ness thesis. \; In this paper\, I propose a strong version of 3E-ness\, WE-ness: In some instances super-sizing resul ts in the creation of a plural subject\, a WE. \; I outline the ontol ogical lineaments of WE-ness\, distinguishing it from other forms of situ ated cognition\, and suggest a bio-cultural model of its origin based on a biological model of the emergence of multi-cellular life from single- c elled life. \; I then examine recent findings and theories in develop mental psychology concerning we-intentionality and its features of normat ive and supra-personal intentionality. \; Developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello has argued that we-intentionality has played a central role in the social/cultural achievements that distinguish humans from the ir primate cousins. \; Drawing on these findings\, I argue that we-in tentionality and its consequences suggest WE-ness for their bases. \; I then lay out an argument for the existence of WE-ness based on a bio-c ultural account of its origin and maintenance\, indicating how we-intenti onality might play in a role in those processes. \; Finally\, I exami ne three major objections to the extended mind thesis that also raise pro blems for WE-ness.
UID:20111118T233000Z-7363@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20110912T092036Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7363-the-extended-mind-and-we- ness-how-far-can-it LAST-MODIFIED:20111020T153629Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7363 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Advocates of cognitive extension argue that the human mind super-sizes itself by embodying \;itself in a body\, < em>embedding \;itself in an epistemic environment and uniting it self with both in extended \;cognitive agency. \; Call t his the 3E-ness thesis. \; In this paper\, I propose a strong version of 3E-ness\, WE-ness: In some instances super-sizing results in the crea tion of a plural subject\, a WE. \; I outline the ontological lineame nts of WE-ness\, distinguishing it from other forms of situated cognition \, and suggest a bio-cultural model of its origin based on a biological m odel of the emergence of multi-cellular life from single- celled life. 60\; I then examine recent findings and theories in developmental psychol ogy concerning we-intentionality and its features of normative and supra- personal intentionality. \; Developmental psychologist Michael Tomase llo has argued that we-intentionality has played a central role in the so cial/cultural achievements that distinguish humans from their primate cou sins. \; Drawing on these findings\, I argue that we-intentionality a nd its consequences suggest WE-ness for their bases. \; I then lay ou t an argument for the existence of WE-ness based on a bio-cultural accoun t of its origin and maintenance\, indicating how we-intentionality might play in a role in those processes. \; Finally\, I examine three major objections to the extended mind thesis that also raise problems for WE-n ess. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|humanities|open to the public|send-to-unde rgraduate|student event END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111202T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20111202T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 102 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:Knowing Better by Sruthi Rothenfluch (Pacific University) DESCRIPTION:Epistemic contextualists draw analogies between 'knows' and o ther context-sensitive expressions in order to show that the semantics th ey attribute to 'knows' is not unique\, but rather applies to a particula r class of expressions of which 'knows' is a member. \; The trend wit h respect to such identification is to classify 'knows' as a non-gradable context-sensitive expression\, such as 'sufficiently tall'. \; Here\ , I will argue\, however\, that such an analysis is mistaken\, as proposi tional knowledge ascriptions are \;gradable. \; I will argue that there are certain high-standard contexts in which 'S knows that p' \ ;is true if and only if S knows why p\, \;which thereby explains the epistemic demands of such contexts. \; \;Knowledge-why comes in d ifferent degrees. \; Propositional knowledge ascriptions\, then\, can come in different strengths under certain circumstances. \; Therefor e\, 'knows' must be identified with gradable \;context-sensitive expr essions\, which include members such as 'tall' and 'rich'. \; X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Epistemic contextualists draw analogies between 'knows' and other context-sensitive expressions in order to show that the semantics they attribute to 'knows' is not unique\, but rather applies to a particular class of expressions of which 'knows' is a member . \; The trend with respect to such identification is to classify 'kn ows' as a non-gradable context-sensitive expression\, such as 'sufficient ly tall'. \; Here\, I will argue\, however\, that such an analysis is mistaken\, as propositional knowledge ascriptions are \;gra dable. \; I will argue that there are certain high-standard contexts in which 'S knows that p' \;is true if and only if S knows w hy p\, \;which thereby explains the epistemic demands of suc h contexts. \; \;Knowledge-why comes in different degree s. \; Propositional knowledge ascriptions\, then\, can come in differ ent strengths under certain circumstances. \; Therefore\, 'knows' mus t be identified with gradable \;context-sensitive expression s\, which include members such as 'tall' and 'rich'. \;
UID:20111202T233000Z-7364@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20110912T092155Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/7364-knowing-better-by-sruthi- rothenfluch-pacific LAST-MODIFIED:20111128T171238Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:7364 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Epistemic contextualists draw analogies between 'know s' and other context-sensitive expressions in order to show that the sema ntics they attribute to 'knows' is not unique\, but rather applies to a p articular class of expressions of which 'knows' is a member. \; The t rend with respect to such identification is to classify 'knows' as a non- gradable context-sensitive expression\, such as 'sufficiently tall'.  \; Here\, I will argue\, however\, that such an analysis is mistaken\, as propositional knowledge ascriptions are \;gradable. \; I will argue that there are certain high-standard contexts in which 'S kn ows that p' \;is true if and only if S knows why p\, \;which thereby explains the epistemic demands of such contexts . \; \;Knowledge-why comes in different degrees. \; Prop ositional knowledge ascriptions\, then\, can come in different strengths under certain circumstances. \; Therefore\, 'knows' must be identifie d with gradable \;context-sensitive expressions\, which incl ude members such as 'tall' and 'rich'. \; X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|humanities|open to the public|send-to-unde rgraduate|student events END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120120T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120120T163000 LOCATION:JRHH 102 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:"Counterfactualism" Troy Cross (Reed College) DESCRIPTION:I show that the debate about whether fundamental properties a re "dispositional" or "categorical" rests on the assumption that property P = property P' if all possible instances of P are instances of P'. Sinc e proponents of Humean Supervenience typically accept that assumption\, a long with categoricalism\, it follows that I will am arguing that Humean Supervenience\, in its familiar guise\, is incoherent. \; Following that negative project\, I will sketch a metaphysics of properties accordi ng to which they are neutral with respect to the dispositional/categorica l divide. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html: I show that the debate about whether fu
ndamental properties are "dispositional" or "categorical" rests on the as
sumption that property P = property P' if all possible instances of P are
instances of P'. Since proponents of Humean Supervenience typically acce
pt that assumption\, along with categoricalism\, it follows that I will a
m
arguing that Humean Supervenience\, in its familiar guise\, is i
ncoherent. \; Following that negative project\, I will sketch a metap
hysics of properties according to which they are neutral with respect to
the dispositional/categorical divide.
It's pretty much standard to see contemporary philosophical approaches in the humanities as falling into two antagonistic camps with philosophers in the analytic tradition arraye d against philosophers\, literary theorists\, critical theorists\, femini st theorists\, etc. who deploy postmodern intellectual resources. \;& #160\;In particular there appear to be deep disagreements between the two approaches with respect to such issues as objective knowledge\, expertis e and authority\, correspondence truth and essentialism. \; \;Amo ng positions advocated in the analytic tradition scientific realism stand s in sharpest apparent contrast to postmodern conceptions.
In fact\, however\, consistently developed realist philosophy of science ra tifies almost all of the prevailing postmodernist ideas about the \;& #160\;socially and historically situated\, irreducibly political\, and no n-foundational aspects of scientific knowledge and confirms about scienti fic "natural kinds" that they are all social constructions and that many are open textured\, historically situated\, relationally and historically defined\, (and thus) non-eternal\, and non-intrinsic. \; \;It re mains nevertheless consistently committed to correspondence truth\, to th e reality of natural kinds\, and to the real\, albeit socially and histor ically contingent\, possibility of objective knowledge.
Moreo ver\, the politically and socially critical functions of postmodern ideas about science are ill-served by self-defeating postmodern relativism. 60\; \;Those important critical functions are better served by a soph isticated\, historically and politically informed\, realist approach whic h is not compromised by relativism.
What can I do with a philosophy PhD?<
br /> How many years does it take?
What kind of transcript would
I need?
How do I prepare to apply?
Can I take time off befo
re going?
Get answers to these questions and more. All philo
sophy majors and those considering a major in philosophy welcome\, first-
year and sophomore students especially encouraged. \;
Lead by Adonica De Vault \;
\;
What careers does philosophy prepare you for?
writer (David Foster Wallace)
journalist (Juan Williams)
actor (Steve Martin)
business (George Soros)
law (David So
uter)
politics (Al Gore)
rock star (Kim Thayil)
arti
st (Robert Motherwell)
peacemaker (Aung Sun Suu Kyi)
comedi
an (Ricky Gervais)
filmmaker (Ethan Cohen)
game show host (
Alex Trebeck)
…and many\, many more. \;
What can I do with a law degree?
How many years does it take?
How do I prepare for the LSAT?
What can I expect in law school?
Professor Jeff Jones (L
ewis &\; Clark Law \;School\, philosophy PhD) and Meredi
th \;Price (Lewis &\; Clark alum and current \;<
em>Lewis &\; Clark law student) will answer \;these quest
ions and more.
National P
ublic Radio's Philosophy Talk
"The Nature of Wilderness"
Jay Odenbaugh\,
Associate Professor\, Philosophy
Thursday\, April 19\, 7 p.m.
\, Agnes Flanagan Chapel
Free and open to the general public
.
Advance online registration required.
Philosophy Talk<
/a> \;is radio that celebrates the value of the examined life. E
ach week\, our two host philosophers invite you to join them in conversat
ion on a wide variety of issues ranging from popular culture to our most
deeply-held beliefs about science\, morality\, and the human condition.&#
160\;Philosophy Talk \;challenges listeners to identify and
question their assumptions and to think about things in new ways. We are
dedicated to reasoned conversation driven by human curiosity. \;P
hilosophy Talk \;is accessible\, intellectually stimulating\, an
d most of all\, fun!
Today we look to the wilderness as an escape\, a beautifu l and peaceful reprieve from the day-to-day activities of our busy lives. We think of wilderness as a fully natural environment that contrasts sha rply with the designed and constructed environments in which we normally move. But does wilderness thus conceived really exist anymore? What is na tural and what is artificial about wilderness? Should humans be understoo d as a part of nature or distinct from it? And how should we approach con servation efforts so that we balance the needs of a growing world populat ion with the need to preserve some aspect of the wild in our lives?
\;
Philosophy Talk \;is radio that celebrates
the value of the examined life. Each week\, our two host philosophers inv
ite you to join them in conversation on a wide variety of issues ranging
from popular culture to our most deeply-held beliefs about science\, mora
lity\, and the human condition. \;Philosophy Talk \;chal
lenges listeners to identify and question their assumptions and to think
about things in new ways. We are dedicated to reasoned conversation drive
n by human curiosity. \;Philosophy Talk \;is accessible\
, intellectually stimulating\, and most of all\, fun! \;Philosoph
y Talk \;is produced by \;Ben Manilla Productions\, Inc. \;on behalf of Stanfo
rd University\, as part of its \;Humanities Outreach Initiative.
&# 160\;
Ken Taylor is the current Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University. &# 160\;He is also director of Stanford's interdisciplinary program in Symbo lic Systems. His work lies at the intersection of the philosophy of langu age and the philosophy of mind\, with an occasional foray into the histor y of philosophy. He is the author of many books and articles\, including& #160\;Truth and Meaning\, \;Reference and the Rational Mind\, and the forthcoming \;Referring to the World. \;He is hard at work on \;his \;magnum opus \;book long in the making called \;A Natur al History of Normativity \; \;in which he reduces all thing s normative to something merely natural.
\;
John Perry is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Riverside\, and Henry Waldgrave Stuar t Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Stanford University. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a recipient of many hon ors and awards\, including the Nicod and Humboldt Prizes. A popular lectu rer\, in 1990 he was awarded the Dinkelspiel Award for undergraduate teac hing. \;
He is the author of over 100 articles and books\, in cluding \;A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality\, \;Knowledge\, Possibility\, and Consciousness< /a>\, and \;Reference and Reflexivity. \;
He also has the internet's most popular essay on \;procrastination.
\;
"Philosophy in its best mo ments is about instilling intellectual accountability. As William James n oted\, "˜a great many people think they are thinking when they are reall y rearranging their prejudices.' To understand our beliefs and values is important not only for intellectual reasons but for deeply practical reas ons. Beliefs and values have effects — some beneficial and some not. It thus is of profound importance to be responsible for one's view of the w orld and my teaching is first and foremost an attempt to bring students t o understand and respect that responsibility."
I graduated w ith a PhD in philosophy from the University of Calgary in 2001. My diss ertation was on \;Searching for Patterns\, Hunting for Causes: A Philosophical Examination of Mathematical Modeling in Theoretical Ecology . My research interests include Philosophy of Biology (especially ec ology and evolution)\, Philosophy of Science\, and Environmental Ethics. I have published articles in \;Philosophy of Science \;a nd \;Environmental Values.Besides philosophy\, I enjoy readi ng about about art and art history\, rock climbing\, hiking\, and cycling .
UID:20120420T020000Z-35061@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20150317T092955Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/35061-the-nature-of-wilderness CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20150317T162955Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:35061 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Should humans be understood as a part of nature or di stinct from it? And how should we approach conservation efforts so that w e balance the needs of a growing world population with the need to preser ve some aspect of the wild in our lives? END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120420T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20120420T170000 LOCATION:John R. Howard 102 GEO:45.44918;-122.670969 SUMMARY:Honors Thesis Presentation by Davida Grimes "Moral Disagreement\, Moral Inquiry\, and Moral Problem Solving" DESCRIPTION:Relativistic treatments of the phenomenon of moral disagreeme nt have been widely criticized and defended in recent years. There are\, however\, two closely related phenomena\, namely\, what I call moral inqu iry\, and moral problem-solving\, that I wish to bring attention to in th is paper. I argue that just as the Metaethical Relativist must provide an adequate account of moral disagreement\, he must also make sense of the phenomena of moral inquiry and moral problem-solving. Both phenomena\, li ke the problem of moral disagreement\, involve uncertainty about moral an swers. However\, whereas the problem of disagreement involves two parties who have apparently opposing moral positions\, moral inquiry involves a single inquirer's attempts to figure out whether or not something is mora lly permissible. Moral problem-solving is similar in that it need only in volve one person\, but different in that the individual is trying to figu re out what to do when faced with a moral decision. To frame my discussi on\, I focus on the view of one prominent contemporary metaethical relati vist\, Jesse Prinz\, as presented in his book "The Emotional Construction of Morals". I outline Prinz's theory\, explain the phenomena of moral di sagreement\, moral inquiry\, and moral problem-solving\, and highlight im portant surface features of each. I argue that there are certain assumpti ons implicit in the ways we conduct ourselves morally\, and that these as sumptions are in deep tension with Prinz's view. I then engage with Prinz 's proposed explanations of moral disagreement\, and speculate as to how he might try to explain the phenomena of moral inquiry\, and moral proble m-solving in turn. I argue that even if Prinz's attempt to explain away m oral disagreement succeeds (which I call into doubt)\, Prinz\, and other metaethical relativists\, have more work to do to resolve the deep tensio n between relativistic treatments of moral disagreement\, moral problem s olving\, and moral inquiry and the surface features present in all three forms of moral discourse. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html: Relativistic treatments of the phenomen
on of moral disagreement have been widely criticized and defended in rece
nt years. There are\, however\, two closely related phenomena\, namely\,
what I call moral inquiry\, and moral problem-solving\, that I wish to br
ing attention to in this paper. I argue that just as the Metaethical Rela
tivist must provide an adequate account of moral disagreement\, he must a
lso make sense of the phenomena of moral inquiry and moral problem-solvin
g. Both phenomena\, like the problem of moral disagreement\, involve unce
rtainty about moral answers. However\, whereas the problem of disagreemen
t involves two parties who have apparently opposing moral positions\, mor
al inquiry involves a single inquirer's attempts to figure out whether or
not something is morally permissible. Moral problem-solving is similar i
n that it need only involve one person\, but different in that the indivi
dual is trying to figure out what to do when faced with a moral decision.
To frame my discussion\, I focus on the view of one promine
nt contemporary metaethical relativist\, Jesse Prinz\, as presented in hi
s book "The Emotional Construction of Morals". I outline Prinz's theory\,
explain the phenomena of moral disagreement\, moral inquiry\, and moral
problem-solving\, and highlight important surface features of each. I arg
ue that there are certain assumptions implicit in the ways we conduct our
selves morally\, and that these assumptions are in deep tension with Prin
z's view. I then engage with Prinz's proposed explanations of moral disag
reement\, and speculate as to how he might try to explain the phenomena o
f moral inquiry\, and moral problem-solving in turn. I argue that even if
Prinz's attempt to explain away moral disagreement succeeds (which I cal
l into doubt)\, Prinz\, and other metaethical relativists\, have more wor
k to do to resolve the deep tension between relativistic treatments of mo
ral disagreement\, moral problem solving\, and moral inquiry and the surf
ace features present in all three forms of moral discourse.
& #160\;
We elucidate 9th-12th centuries monistic Kaśmiri Śaivism through \;comparisons to contemporary science. We show that Kaśmiri Śaivism can \;be transposed into Fichte's philosophy and so set on a trajectory \;towards Hegel. While Kaśmiri Śaivism reaches Prussia \, the resources \;to articulate Hegel's Absolute are in Kaśmir.
UID:20120907T223000Z-12768@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T161645Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12768-philosophy-colloquium-ka mir-to-prussia-round-trip LAST-MODIFIED:20120905T174312Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/278,0,1376,1099/31638_flowers.rev.1373936885.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12768 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/278\,0\,1376\,1099/31638_flowers.rev.137393688 5.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Many philosophers have objected to mode rn moral theories on the grounds that such theories conceive of morality in a way that brings with it alienation –from one's personal commitment s\, from other people\, from one's sentiments or\, paradoxically\, from m orality itself. \;The vast majority of philosophers have thought tha t eudaimonistic moral theories easily avoid this objection. \;We thi nk eudaimonists cannot so easily avoid this problem. \;In this paper \, we explain why alienation is a problem that should be taken seriously by moral philosophers. \;We explain how and why eudaimonist theories confront the problem of alienation. In the end\, we think eudaimonists h ave the resources for a strong response to the problem of alienation.  60\;In the final section of the paper we explain why consequentialists\, and perhaps even deontologists\, can benefit from the eudaimonist respons e to the problem of alienation.
UID:20120921T223000Z-12783@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120905T103542Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12783-philosophy-colloquium-al ienation-and-eudaimonism LAST-MODIFIED:20120912T181157Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/30,26,151,147/31651_17343_img_3563_5710d4785a3e9a0acdda99 e3e6271a8b.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12783 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/30\,26\,151\,147/31651_17343_img_3563_5710d478 5a3e9a0acdda99e3e6271a8b.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department hosts a regular colloquium series. Distinguished speakers from around the world present on a wide array of philosophical topics. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121019T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121019T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium: "Cultural Minds: Using Rules to Buttress R easoning" DESCRIPTION:Ron Mallon\, Washington University in St. Louis Cultural Min ds: Using Rules to Buttress Reasoning In the last decade\, much work in moral psychology has \;contrasted "automatic" responses resulting fro m phylogenetically \;ancient\, automatic\, emotional\, reflexive part s of the human mind with \;"reasoned" responses that emerge from the phylogenetically more recent \;parts of the human mind associated wit h conscious thought and \;reasoning. Perhaps surprisingly\, much of t his work has emphasized the \;extent to which our moral lives (and ou r behavior more generally) are \;driven by processes of the first par t. \;In this paper I critically respond to this trend suggesting that \;claims of dominance are not persuasive. I consider especially what I \;call the "argument from finite resources" for why automatic proc esses \;must dominate reasoned ones\, and I offer a series of argumen ts for why \;the human capacity for rule-following can buttress reaso ning processes \;against the depletion of finite resources. The pictu re of moral life \;that results is both more rational\, but also more socially and \;culturally embedded\, than the recent emphasis on aut omatic processes \;would suggest. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\;
\;
Introductions to th e theory of knowledge are plentiful\, but none introduce students to the most recent debates that exercise contemporary philosophers. Ian Evans an d Nicholas D. Smith aim to change that. Their book guides the reader thro ugh the standard theories of knowledge while simultaneously using these a s a springboard to introduce current debates. Each chapter concludes with a "Current Trends" section pointing the reader to the best literature do minating current philosophical discussion. These include: the puzzle of r easonable disagreement\; the so-called "problem of easy knowledge"\; the intellectual virtues\; and new theories in the philosophy of language rel ating to knowledge.
UID:20121025T200000Z-12784@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120905T104620Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12784-book-warming-knowledge-i an-evans-and-nicholas LAST-MODIFIED:20121024T185032Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/0,110,406,516/31648_portrait2.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12784 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,110\,406\,516/31648_portrait2.jpeg END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121025T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121025T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:"Revealed Irrationality" by Ian Evans (LC Alum) DESCRIPTION:Is it possible to believe something\, while simultaneously and in full consciousness – believing that this belief is unsupported by your evidence? I say "yes": I believe this about many of my own belie fs and I bet you do\, too. But several philosophers have argued that this is precluded by the very nature of belief. The arguments – there are s everal – have been influential\, but have received little scrutiny in p rint. In this paper\, I take a hard look and find that none of the argume nts holds water. Even if you agree with me that _these_ arguments fail\, you might still find it puzzling how someone could believe that her own b elief is irrational. The second part of my paper tries to help by making such a doxastic situation intelligible from the first-person perspective. What we can call "revealed irrationality" is possible and not as puzzlin g as it might seem. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Is it possible to believe so mething\, while simultaneously – and in full consciousness – believin g that this belief is unsupported by your evidence? I say "yes": I believ e this about many of my own beliefs and I bet you do\, too. But several p hilosophers have argued that this is precluded by the very nature of beli ef. The arguments – there are several – have been influential\, but h ave received little scrutiny in print. In this paper\, I take a hard look and find that none of the arguments holds water. Even if you agree with me that _these_ arguments fail\, you might still find it puzzling how som eone could believe that her own belief is irrational. The second part of my paper tries to help by making such a doxastic situation intelligible f rom the first-person perspective. What we can call "revealed irrationalit y" is possible and not as puzzling as it might seem.
UID:20121025T223000Z-12770@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T163637Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12770-revealed-irrationality-b y-ian-evans-lc-alum LAST-MODIFIED:20121024T190712Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/0,112,406,518/31648_portrait2.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12770 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,112\,406\,518/31648_portrait2.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Is it possible to believe something\, while simultane ously – and in full consciousness – believing that this belief is uns upported by your evidence? I say "yes": I believe this about many of my o wn beliefs and I bet you do\, too. But several philosophers have argued t hat this is precluded by the very nature of belief. The arguments – the re are several – have been influential\, but have received little scrut iny in print. In this paper\, I take a hard look and find that none of th e arguments holds water. Even if you agree with me that _these_ arguments fail\, you might still find it puzzling how someone could believe that h er own belief is irrational. The second part of my paper tries to help by making such a doxastic situation intelligible from the first-person pers pective. What we can call "revealed irrationality" is possible and not as puzzling as it might seem. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:alumni|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121026T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121026T170000 LOCATION:JR Howard 202 SUMMARY:"Interpreting the Barcan Formula" by Ori Simchen (University of B ritish Columbia) DESCRIPTION:"Interpreting the Barcan Formula" by Ori SimchenThe Barcan fo rmula (BF) is a schema of quantified modal logic that can be paraphrased as the schematic conditional that if it is possible that there be \;F then something or other is possibly \;F (e.g. if it is possible that there be a talking donkey\, then something or other is possibly a talkin g donkey). It is validated by the most straightforward systems of quantif ied modal logic. It is also widely considered to pose a threat to a commo nsensical modal metaphysical view ('actualism') according to which there are no non-actual things. \;I will show how BF can be cleared of such a charge by construing it as a bridge principle connecting possibility d e dicto – or what is generally possible – and possibility de re – w hat is specifically possible for particular things – while retaining a Russellian robust sense of reality in modal matters. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:"Interpreting the Barcan Formula" by Or i Simchen
The Barcan for
mula (BF) is a schema of quantified modal logic that can be paraphrased a
s the schematic conditional that if it is possible that there be \;
From around 1800\, sh ortly before Pasquale Galluppis first book\, until 1950\, just before Ben edetto Croce died\, the most formative influences on Italian philosophers were Kant and the post-Kantians\, especially Hegel. In many ways\, the I talian philosophers of this period lived in turbulent but creative times\ , from the Restoration to the Risorgimento and the rise and fall of Fasci sm.
From Kant to Croce is a comprehensive\, highly readable histo ry of the main currents and major figures of modern Italian philosophy\, described in a substantial introduction that details the development of t he discipline during this period. Brian P. Copenhaver and Rebecca Copenha ver provide the only up-to-date introduction in English to Italys leading modern philosophers by translating and analysing rare and original texts and by chronicling the lives and times of the philosophers who wrote the m. Thoroughly documented and highly readable\, From Kant to Croce examine s modern Italian philosophy from the perspective of contemporary analytic philosophy.
\;
\;
Schopenhauer famously holds that the proofs of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic "have such a complete power of convictio n that its propositions [belong] among the incontestable truths." This ju dgment places Schopenhauer outside of a broad historical consensus accord ing to which the Transcendental Aesthetic's central argument for the idea lity of space and time is invalid. Schopenhauer offers no explicit accoun t of this argument\, and the classical commentaries are unmoved by his ge neral appraisal. In reconsidering this appraisal\, I first examine a vali d argument for transcendental idealism from premises Schopenhauer endorse s. While the argument in question invokes a metaphysical premise Kant rej ects\, Schopenhauer correctly attributes a weakened analogue to him. A pa rallel argument from this weaker premise remains valid\, and I suggest th at the basic materials for the valid argument are contained in the Aesthe tic. These findings make sense of Schopenhauer's positive appraisal\; the y also call for reconsideration of a dogma of contemporary Kant scholarsh ip.
UID:20121130T233000Z-12773@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T165116Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12773-schopenhauers-transcende ntal-aesthetic-by-desmond LAST-MODIFIED:20121029T225645Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/0,33,139,172/31647_des.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12773 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,33\,139\,172/31647_des.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department hosts a regular colloquium series. \;Distinguished speakers from aro und the world present on a wide array of philosophical topics. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121207T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121207T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:"Dyadic Truth" by Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Yale University) DESCRIPTION:Dyadic Truth \; Zoltán Gendler Szabó Yale Universit y \; Philosophical orthodoxy holds that 'true' is a monadic predic ate. I think this view is only halfway correct: there is indeed a monadic truth-predicate in English and other natural languages but this is not t he fundamental truth-predicate we use. What can be true simpliciter are p articular mental states (beliefs\, hopes\, wishes\, etc.) a thinker might be in or particular speech acts (assertions\, denials\, suppositions\, e tc.) a speaker might perform. These mental states and speech-acts are tru th-apt because they have propositional contents. But propositions are not true simpliciter – they are true ofsituations. Thus\, the fundamental notion of truth is relational. My argument for this claim is simple. Mona dic truth-predicates are ill-suited for the purposes of semantics. Those who think semantic explanations are any good must provide adequate paraph rases for the various relational notions we employ in formulating those e xplanations. For most non-monadictruth-predicates employed by semanticist s adequate paraphrases in terms of monadic propositional truth can be giv en. But when it comes to 'sentence S is true at context c and situation s ' we can only provide a paraphrase in terms of dyadic propositional truth . Since our best semantics arguably needs this particular truth-predicate we have good reason to think that propositional truth is dyadic. \; X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\;
\;
Philosophical orthodoxy holds that 'true' is a monadic predicate. I thi nk this view is only halfway correct: there is indeed a monadic truth-pre dicate in English and other natural languages but this is not the fundame ntal truth-predicate we use. What can be true simpliciter are particular mental states (beliefs\, hopes\, wishes\, etc.) a thinker might be in or particular speech acts (assertions\, denials\, suppositions\, etc.) a spe aker might perform. These mental states and speech-acts are truth-apt bec ause they have propositional contents. But propositions are not true simp liciter – they are true ofsituations. Thus\, the fundamental notion of truth is relational. My argument for this claim is simple. Monadic truth- predicates are ill-suited for the purposes of semantics. Those who think semantic explanations are any good must provide adequate paraphrases for the various relational notions we employ in formulating those explanation s. For most non-monadictruth-predicates employed by semanticists adequate paraphrases in terms of monadic propositional truth can be given. But wh en it comes to 'sentence S is true at context c and situation s' we can o nly provide a paraphrase in terms of dyadic propositional truth. Since ou r best semantics arguably needs this particular truth-predicate we have g ood reason to think that propositional truth is dyadic. \;
UID:20121207T233000Z-12772@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T164806Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12772-dyadic-truth-by-zoltan-g endler-szabo-yale LAST-MODIFIED:20121120T210153Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/8,29,128,149/31646_3e761fecea90200636d41634167434b41716b4 2.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12772 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/8\,29\,128\,149/31646_3e761fecea90200636d41634 167434b41716b42.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department hosts a regular colloquium series. Distinguished speakers from around the world present on a wide array of philosophical topics. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130125T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130125T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:Convergence on Divergence: How to be a Relativistic Moral Realist " William Rottschaefer (Lewis & Clark College) DESCRIPTION:William Rottschaefer\, Lewis &\; Clark College Convergenc e on Divergence: How to be a Relativistic Moral Realist Urging that she meet her own methodological standards\, Doris and Plakias have challenged the scientifically minded moral realist to address the long-standing pro blem of moral disagreement. I use a gene-culture co-evolutionary account of one of their showcase problem cases\, the difference between honor and non-honor cultures\, to argue not only that significant moral disagreeme nt – and the moral relativism it seems to imply – pose no awkwardness for moral realism\, but also that a properly scientifically based natura listic moral realism explains it\, indeed\, provides tools for justifying it. In doing so\, I show how to be a relativistic moral realist. \; X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Semantic externalists maintain that the semantic content of our beliefs and other propositional attitudes are de termined by environmental or social factors. \; What they mean by thi s is not just the commonplace and uncontroversial idea that environmental and social factors are important causes of our beliefs and other proposi tional attitudes. \; That's uncontroversial. \; What they have in mind is a controversial idea about what\, for example\, makes a belief t hat the Eifel Tower is in Paris a belief about the Eifel Tower.& #160\; There are different varieties of externalism but most would mainta in that a person's belief could not count as a belief about the Eifel Tow er unless that person was causally connected (however indirectly) in the right way with the actual Eifel Tower. \; Similarly many externalists have maintained that linguistic and conceptual norms in a person's commu nity constrain what belief contents can be properly attributed to her. 60\; I'll defend semantic externalism as an empirical claim about human c ognitive psychology\, albeit a claim that only a philosopher would dream up.
\;
UID:20130208T233000Z-12775@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T165823Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12775-semantic-externalism-ign oring-twin-earth-and-doing CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20130131T193436Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/1,0,177,176/34873__main_image_richard-boyd-large.rev.1373 936887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12775 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/1\,0\,177\,176/34873__main_image_richard-boyd- large.rev.1373936887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Semantic externalists maintain that the semantic cont ent of our beliefs and other propositional attitudes are determined by en vironmental or social factors. \; What they mean by this is not just the commonplace and uncontroversial idea that environmental and social fa ctors are important causes of our beliefs and other propositional attitud es. \; That's uncontroversial. \; What they have in mind is a con troversial idea about what\, for example\, makes a belief that the Eifel Tower is in Paris a belief about the Eifel Tower. \; There a re different varieties of externalism but most would maintain that a pers on's belief could not count as a belief about the Eifel Tower unless that person was causally connected (however indirectly) in the right way with the actual Eifel Tower. \; Similarly many externalists have maintain ed that linguistic and conceptual norms in a person's community constrain what belief contents can be properly attributed to her. \; I'll defe nd semantic externalism as an empirical claim about human cognitive psych ology\, albeit a claim that only a philosopher would dream up. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|presentation END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130301T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130301T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:"Kant's Cosmopolitan Conception of Philosophy and the Methodology of the "Critique of Pure Reason" by Pierre Keller (University of Califor nia\, Riverside) DESCRIPTION: \;I argue for a novel reading of Kant's critical enterpr ise and of Kant's Copernican Revolution\, but especially of the First Cri tique. In the process\, I explain why Kant devotes the second half of the First Critique to what he calls the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. I interpret the First Critique as a critical defense of what Kant calls th e world\, cosmic or cosmopolitan conception of philosophy against the pre tensions of academic philosophy. This event is open to the public. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\;I argue for a novel reading of K ant's critical enterprise and of Kant's Copernican Revolution\, but espec ially of the First Critique. In the process\, I explain why Kant devotes the second half of the First Critique to what he calls the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. I interpret the First Critique as a critical defense of what Kant calls the world\, cosmic or cosmopolitan conception of phil osophy against the pretensions of academic philosophy.
This event is open to the public.
UID:20130301T233000Z-12776@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T170145Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12776-kants-cosmopolitan-conce ption-of-philosophy-and CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20130226T192503Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/0,40,160,200/34874_pierrekeller.rev.1373936887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12776 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,40\,160\,200/34874_pierrekeller.rev.1373936 887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:I argue for a novel reading of Kant's critical enterp rise and of Kant's Copernican Revolution\, but especially of the First Cr itique. In the process\, I explain why Kant devotes the second half of th e First Critique to what he calls the Transcendental Doctrine of Method. I interpret the First Critique as a critical defense of what Kant calls t he world\, cosmic or cosmopolitan conception of philosophy against the pr etensions of academic philosophy.Re presentationalism in the philosophy of mind holds that every conscious me ntal state is a representational mental state. Some philosophers claim th at representationalism can solve the hard problem of consciousness. The i dea is that if conscious mental states are representational and we unders tand the conditions required for mental representation\, then we can also understand the conditions required for conscious experience. However\, I argue that the possibility of spectrum inversion - the possibility that\ , say\, what it is like for you when you see a lime is phenomenally ident ical with what it is like for me when I see a strawberry and vice versa - prevents the representationalist from offering such a solution. Given sp ectrum inversion\, representationalist theories of consciousness must con front the same issues as functionalist theories\, and are therefore in no special position to solve the hard problem.
This event is
open to the public
CANCELLED AND WILL BE RESCHEDULED FOR A LATER DATE. KEEP AN EYE OUT FOR THE NEW DATE AND TIME WHICH WILL BE POST ED SOON.
\;
UID:20130315T223000Z-12777@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T170453Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12777-the-quality-of-employmen t-law-rights-by-jeffrey CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20130314T184749Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/0,23,180,203/34875_7790_jones_b2e9d988f82a26b14152a61554a 3d26a.rev.1373936887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12777 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,23\,180\,203/34875_7790_jones_b2e9d988f82a2 6b14152a61554a3d26a.rev.1373936887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:CANCELLED AND WILL BE RESCHEDULED FOR A LATER DATE. K EEP AN EYE OUT FOR THE NEW DATE AND TIME WHICH WILL BE POSTED SOON. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|law|lecture|open to the public|philos ophy colloquium series|presentation|send-to-law|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130405T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130405T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:"What is the Scope of Aesthetic Experience?" Nicholas Silins (Cor nell University) DESCRIPTION:In the first half of the talk\, I examine: (Blindspot): you only experience a part of a work of art if you attend to it. I critically examine support for Blindspot one might draw from psychology literature on "inattentional blindness". I also discuss whether some artistic practi ce presupposes that Blindspot is false. In the second half of the talk\, I examine: (Surface): if you can't tell two works of art or experiences of art apart\, then they have the same value for you. Surface applies to experiences as well as works of art and other entities. I review how one might support Surface\, and then reject Surface in light of psychology l iterature on "change blindness". X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:In the first half of the talk\, I exami ne:
(Blindspot): you only experience a part of a work of art if y ou attend to it. I critically examine support for Blindspot one might dra w from psychology literature on "inattentional blindness". I also discuss whether some artistic practice presupposes that Blindspot is false.
< p> In the second half of the talk\, I examine:(Surface): if you can't tell two works of art or experiences of art apart\, then they have the same value for you. Surface applies to experiences as well as works of art and other entities. I review how one might support Surface\, and t hen reject Surface in light of psychology literature on "change blindness ".
UID:20130405T223000Z-12778@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T170750Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12778-what-is-the-scope-of-aes thetic-experience-nicholas CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20130131T214439Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/0,7,130,137/35115_nicholas_silins.rev.1373936887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12778 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,7\,130\,137/35115_nicholas_silins.rev.13739 36887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:In the first half of the talk\, I examine:According to mainstream 'evolutionary p sychology' evolutionary theory makes an important methodological contribu tion to human social psychology. \;Plausible evolutionary scenarios regarding early human social behavior are said to provide a methodologica lly independent source of insights\, identifying some psychological theor ies as those 'predicted' or otherwise especially supported by evolutionar y theory. \;In practice the theories so identified are reductionist or nativist theories which minimize the role of social structures and of learning in explaining human social behaviors.
In fact\, there is significant methodological independence between evolutionary scenarios a nd psychological theories but that independence guarantees that such scen arios do not favor reductionist or nativist theories over theories that e mphasize the role of learning and of social structures (or vice versa).&# 160\; So\, in practice\, appeals to evolutionary theory function as a sor t of methodological anesthesia\, directing psychologists' attention away from scientifically important alternatives to reductionist or nativist th eories.
\;
UID:20130411T223000Z-16990@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20130308T142358Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/16990-evolutionary-theory-as-m ethodological-anesthesia CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20130314T183018Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/34873__main_image_richard-boyd-large.rev.1373936887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:16990 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/34873__main_image_richard-boyd-large.rev.1373936887.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:According to mainstream 'evolutionary psychology' evo lutionary theory makes an important methodological contribution to human social psychology. \;Plausible evolutionary scenarios regarding earl y human social behavior are said to provide a methodologically independen t source of insights\, identifying some psychological theories as those ' predicted' or otherwise especially supported by evolutionary theory.  0\;In practice the theories so identified are reductionist or nativist th eories which minimize the role of social structures and of learning in ex plaining human social behaviors. \;Employment law scholars are unanimous i n their disappointment with U. S. employment law and the protections prov ided to employees. A few conservative and libertarian thinkers seek to fu rther deregulate employment laws – that group will always be there. The majority of employment law scholars are searching for ways to provide em ployees with greater legal protection\; protections they believe are requ ired to approximate what might be called legal justice or fairness in wor k relationships. What is missing from the latter group's scholarship is a ny clear moral or theoretical basis for mandating greater protection of e mployees. The law as it is certainly does not help. The U. S. has made cl ear it rejects the notion that employment rights are also human or even c onstitutional rights. Worse still\, within the common law\, employment pr otections regularly give way to other common law interests such as contra cts and property. What is needed is an account of the interests at stake in employment and a showing that such interests are somehow fundamental r ights that deserve greater priority in the American legal landscape. This work in progress looks at several ways to raise the value or moral quali ty of employment rights.
UID:20130412T223000Z-17222@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20130319T102637Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/17222-the-quality-of-employmen t-law-rights-by-jeffrey LAST-MODIFIED:20130409T160908Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/36574_jeff_jones.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:17222 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/36574_jeff_jones.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Employment law scholars are unanimous in their disapp ointment with U. S. employment law and the protections provided to employ ees. A few conservative and libertarian thinkers seek to further deregula te employment laws – that group will always be there. The majority of e mployment law scholars are searching for ways to provide employees with g reater legal protection\; protections they believe are required to approx imate what might be called legal justice or fairness in work relationship s. What is missing from the latter group's scholarship is any clear moral or theoretical basis for mandating greater protection of employees. The law as it is certainly does not help. The U. S. has made clear it rejects the notion that employment rights are also human or even constitutional rights. Worse still\, within the common law\, employment protections regu larly give way to other common law interests such as contracts and proper ty. What is needed is an account of the interests at stake in employment and a showing that such interests are somehow fundamental rights that des erve greater priority in the American legal landscape. This work in progr ess looks at several ways to raise the value or moral quality of employme nt rights. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|presentation|send-to-graduate|send-to-law|send-to-unde rgraduate|student event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130426T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130426T170000 LOCATION:JRHH 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:Natural kinds and ceteris paratis generalizations: In praise of h unches Christopher Boyd (UC Irvine) and Dick Boyd (Lewis & Clark Coll ege\, Cornell University) DESCRIPTION:Traditional philosophy of science focuses on 'laws' and gener alizations that are true\, or approximately true\, or true ceteris paribu s and on highly reliable patterns of scientific inference. \; Kinds o r categories are said to be 'natural kinds' just in case they figure in s uch laws\, generalizations or inference patterns. \; Examples from th e inferential architecture of synthetic chemistry illustrate the need for a broader philosophical conception encompassing the roles of generalizat ions that are true ceteris paratis (true if you fiddle things right)\, of inferences that rely on informed hunches that are true saepe satis   \;(true often enough)\, and of natural kinds appropriate for such general izations and inferences. \;NOTE: The speakers promise to make this talk accessible both to philosophers and to chemists. This event is open to the public X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Traditional philosophy of science focus es on 'laws' and generalizations that are true\, or approximately true\, or true ceteris paribus and on highly reliable patterns of scien tific inference. \; Kinds or categories are said to be 'natural kinds ' just in case they figure in such laws\, generalizations or inference pa tterns. \; Examples from the inferential architecture of synthetic ch emistry illustrate the need for a broader philosophical conception encomp assing the roles of generalizations that are true ceteris par atis (true if you fiddle things right)\, of inferences that rely on informed hunches that are true saepe satis  0\;(true often enough)\, and of natural kinds appropriate for su ch generalizations and inferences.
\;
NOTE: The speakers promise to make this talk accessible both to philosop hers and to chemists.
This event is open to the public
UID:20130426T223000Z-16991@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20130308T142955Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/16991-natural-kinds-and-ceteri s-paratis-generalizations CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20130401T182420Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/0,0,150,150/36918_christopherboyd.rev.1373936888.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:16991 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,0\,150\,150/36918_christopherboyd.rev.13739 36888.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7450 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Traditional philosophy of science focuses on 'laws' a nd generalizations that are true\, or approximately true\, or true ce teris paribus and on highly reliable patterns of scientific inferenc e. \; Kinds or categories are said to be 'natural kinds' just in case they figure in such laws\, generalizations or inference patterns. \; Examples from the inferential architecture of synthetic chemistry illust rate the need for a broader philosophical conception encompassing the rol es of generalizations that are true ceteris paratis (true if you fiddle things right)\, of inferences that rely on infor med hunches that are true saepe satis \;(t rue often enough)\, and of natural kinds appropriate for such generalizat ions and inferences. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|presentation|send-to-graduate|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130927T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20130927T170000 LOCATION:JRHH 202 SUMMARY:Philosophy Colloquium Series: Language\, the Parent of Thought: H egel and Language\, According to Vernon\, McCumber\, and Forster DESCRIPTION:By co-authors Samantha Park Alibrando\, J. M. Fritzman\, Sara h Marchand Lomas\, and McKenzie Judith Southworth: Hegelian dialectics h as three moments\, as everyone knows\, except when it has more. \;Ou r paper has four. \;We read Hegel on language through critiques of t he interpretations given by Jim Vernon\, John McCumber—followed by an e xcursus linking monistic Kaśmiri Śaivism's mantras with Hegel's mechani cal memory—and Michael N. Forster. \; \; X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:By co-authors Samantha Park Alibrando\, J. M. Fritzman\, Sarah Marchand Lomas\, and McKenzie Judith Southworth:< /p>
Hegelian dialectics has three moments\, as everyone knows\, excep t when it has more. \;Our paper has four. \;We read Hegel on la nguage through critiques of the interpretations given by Jim Vernon\, Joh n McCumber—followed by an excursus linking monistic Kaśmiri Śaivism's mantras with Hegel's mechanical memory—and Michael N. Forster. \; \;
UID:20130927T223000Z-20465@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20130918T135551Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20465-philosophy-colloquium-se ries-language-the-parent CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20130918T210608Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/0,41,403,444/41022_hegelglasses.rev.1379537629.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20465 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/0\,41\,403\,444/41022_hegelglasses.rev.1379537 629.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire KodachiIn the Clarke Collins Correspondence of 1707-08 an important part of the debate involves what has come to be cal led the Homogeneity Principle. \; That Principle says in effect that the properties of matter such as extension\, bulk\, figure and shape can only produce properties of the same kind – hence homogeneity. Because t hey can only cause properties of the same kind\, they cannot produce eith er the properties of life or mental properties\, properties of a differen t kind. \;In part what this means is that that there are no real eme rgent properties\, such as life or mind arising from matter. \; This was one of the main pillars of dualism and in the Correspondence Samuel C larke\, the dualist\, maintains the principle while Anthony Collins\, the materialist\, denies it. Scholars are in some disagreement about how wel l Collins does in showing that real\, emergent properties – the propert ies of life and mind – arise from material properties. \; However\, Hume in his chapter on the immateriality of the soul in his Treatise of Human Nature\, while rejecting substance claims from both sides\ , refutes dualist arguments from the Homogeneity Principle on the basis o f his new theory of causality thus destroying one of the main props of du alism. \; He thus bolsters materialist solutions to the mind body pro blem and the reality of emergent properties. \;
\;
UID:20131018T223000Z-20619@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20130925T163119Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20619-hume-on-homogeneity-the- mind-body-problem-and CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20131015T175236Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20619 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:In the Clarke Collins Correspondence of 1707-08 an im portant part of the debate involves what has come to be called the Homoge neity Principle. \; That Principle says in effect that the properties of matter such as extension\, bulk\, figure and shape can only produce p roperties of the same kind – hence homogeneity. Because they can only c ause properties of the same kind\, they cannot produce either the propert ies of life or mental properties\, properties of a different kind.  \ ;In part what this means is that that there are no real emergent properti es\, such as life or mind arising from matter. \; This was one of the main pillars of dualism and in the Correspondence Samuel Clarke\, the du alist\, maintains the principle while Anthony Collins\, the materialist\, denies it. Scholars are in some disagreement about how well Collins does in showing that real\, emergent properties – the properties of life an d mind – arise from material properties. \; However\, Hume in his c hapter on the immateriality of the soul in his Treatise of Human Natu re\, while rejecting substance claims from both sides\, refutes dual ist arguments from the Homogeneity Principle on the basis of his new theo ry of causality thus destroying one of the main props of dualism. \; He thus bolsters materialist solutions to the mind body problem and the r eality of emergent properties. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:alumni|faculty event|faculty|humanities|philosophy collo quium series|send-to-graduate|send-to-law|send-to-undergraduate|staff eve nt|staff|student event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131022T184500 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20131022T194500 LOCATION:John R. Howard Hall 259 SUMMARY:Philosophy Department: Meet Your Major DESCRIPTION:Unsure about your major? Come hear from the Philosophy Depart ment about why their major is the most exciting around! Already declared? Learn from faculty and upperclassmen about what's coming up. \;To RSVP\, please click here: X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Unsure about your major? Come hear from the Philosophy Department about why their major is the most exciting aro und! Already declared? Learn from faculty and upperclassmen about what's coming up.
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UID:20131023T014500Z-20986@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20131009T141331Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20986-philosophy-department-me et-your-major LAST-MODIFIED:20131015T180756Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20986 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Unsure about your major? Come hear from the Philosoph y Department about why their major is the most exciting around! Already d eclared? Learn from faculty and upperclassmen about what's coming up.Please join us for a talk by Allen Thompson \;from Oregon State University.
\;
In this pap er I outline a broad understanding of adaptation to environmental change\ , regardless of cause\, and argue that such a concept must have a key rol e in any environmental ethic suitable to the emerging Anthropocene epoch. Since it's inception\, the preservation of nature\, either for its intri nsic or instrumental value\, has provided the central normative orientati on for environmental ethics. On my view\, the future of environmental eth ics – in light not only of climate change but also other radical anthro pogenic environmental changes – will focus more and more on normative q uestions about adapting our humanity\, both individually and collectively – to the conditions of life on Earth for which we\, as humanity\, are causally \;responsible. My thesis is that the future of environmental ethics will be about living well at the end of nature\, about adapting o urselves and the rest of life to the world that we are \;morally  \;responsible for. \;
PLEASE \; NOTE ROOM CHANGE TO JRHH 132
\;
Please join us for a talk by <
a href="http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/%7Eeg35/About.html">Ephraim Glick
\;from St. Andrews University.
"What is a Singular Prop
osition?"
On one view\, for a proposition to be singular is
for it to have an object as a constituent. On another view\, a singular p
roposition is one that is ontologically dependent on an object. A variety
of other accounts appear in the literature\, but rarely accompanied by a
careful comparison with rivals or even by an explanation of why the acco
unt captures the background ideas that motivate drawing a distinction bet
ween singular and general propositions in the first place. Indeed\, it is
often unclear exactly what the background ideas are which would help us
gauge the success of an account of singularity. My project in this paper
is to clarify the motivation for the singular / general distinction and a
dvocate a simple analysis of that distinction. The idea will be to give e
xplanatory priority to singular thoughts\, rather than explaining singula
r thoughts as thoughts whose contents are singular propositions. I will a
rgue that there is no promising independent account of what it is for a p
roposition to be singular. Extant accounts either fail to respect the bas
ic motivations for the notion of singularity\, leave the explanation of s
ingularity insufficiently clear\, or rely on commitments to the metaphysi
cs of propositions in an undesirable way.
In this talk I will describe a variety of real-world reporting practices\; I call them cases of 'low-fidelity sa me-saying'. They are described as 'real-world' because they track the way s that speakers actually use expressions like 'said that' in messy\, theo retically unstable ways. They are 'lo-fi' because their content (a) often lacks propositional and locutionary fidelity to the original utterance\; and (b) their reported content is derived from contextual artifacts alon gside the original linguistic content. Then I will suggesta meta physics of language around this phenomenon. I will briefly outline the im plications for direct quotation\, linguistic content outside of reporting practices\, and a deflationary speaker- and token-based metaphysics of l anguage.
Please join us for a talk by Rusty Jones \;fro
m Harvard University. \;
Finding Wisdom in Plato's \;Euthydemus&#
160\;
My aim in this talk is twofold: \; First\, I clari
fy the \;aporia \;(the confused impasse) of \;Eu
thydemus \;288-92\, showing exactly what gives rise to it and th
en showing a way out of it. \; The effect is to undermine th
e standard view that Plato's motivation for constructing this section of
the dialogue is to repudiate the craft analogy. \; This\, in turn\, i
ndicates that wisdom actively \;produces eudaimonia \;(h
uman well-being)\, rather than simply \;constituting eudaimonia
em>. \; Second\, and more briefly\, I engage in a more speculative pi
ece of interpretation\, suggesting that all this gives us some resources
for getting clearer on the nature of Platonic \;eudaimonia.&
#160\; In particular\, I'll argue that the conventional goods (such as he
alth\, influence\, and good looks) are (i) \;genuine\, thoug
h \;conditional\, goods\, (ii) at least sometimes \;
final \;goods\, and so (iii) are \;components \
;of \;eudaimonia\, rather than mere conditions for \;eudaimonia.
When I close my hand into a fist\, have I created a new object or merely rearranged some previously existing thi ngs? Is a sheet of paper with letters written on its two sides one object or two? Do holes exist? Such questions — seriously addressed by many p hilosophers — are often cited as examples of the excesses of speculativ e metaphysics. Philosophers of science have argued that the only way to m ake metaphysics an intellectually respectable enterprise is to "naturaliz e" it. But it is not at all straightforward to say what naturalized metap hysics amounts to. If it means only maintaining a sort of vague "science- friendliness"\, then it will not rule out much\; if it means (as Ladyman and Ross hold) limiting its scope to very specific unification projects i n science\, then it appears unduly restrictive. A popular (and initially plausible) happy medium suggests that metaphysics should \;defer< /em> \;to science on all matters — for after all\, while the former is speculative and a priori\, the latter is empirical and (as these thin gs go) secure. I will use the case study of the attempt to provide a meta physics of species — a paradigm topic for naturalized metaphysics — t o argue that this proposal also fails. I will then make some suggestions for how to best approach the naturalistic project.
UID:20140226T233000Z-20623@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20130925T164524Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20623-metaphysical-contention- over-the-ontological CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140224T230516Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/5,0,195,190/43748_matthewslater285.rev.1392227536.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20623 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/5\,0\,195\,190/43748_matthewslater285.rev.1392 227536.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:When I close my hand into a fist\, have I created a n ew object or merely rearranged some previously existing things? Is a shee t of paper with letters written on its two sides one object or two? Do ho les exist? Such questions — seriously addressed by many philosophers are often cited as examples of the excesses of speculative metaphysics. Philosophers of science have argued that the only way to make metaphysic s an intellectually respectable enterprise is to "naturalize" it. But it is not at all straightforward to say what naturalized metaphysics amounts to. If it means only maintaining a sort of vague "science-friendliness"\ , then it will not rule out much\; if it means (as Ladyman and Ross hold) limiting its scope to very specific unification projects in science\, th en it appears unduly restrictive. A popular (and initially plausible) hap py medium suggests that metaphysics should \;defer \;to science on all matters — for after all\, while the former is speculativ e and a priori\, the latter is empirical and (as these things go) secure. I will use the case study of the attempt to provide a metaphysics of spe cies — a paradigm topic for naturalized metaphysics — to argue that t his proposal also fails. I will then make some suggestions for how to bes t approach the naturalistic project. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140307T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140307T163000 LOCATION:JRHH 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:"What Linguistic Determinism can Teach Us about Embodied Cognitio n" by Lawrence Shapiro (University of Wisconsin-Madison) DESCRIPTION:A line of research within embodied cognition seeks to show th at an organism's body is a determinant of its conceptual capacities. Comp arison of this claim of \;body determinism \;to linguistic determ inism bears interesting results. Just as Slobin's (1996) idea of \;th inking for speaking \;challenges the main thesis of linguistic determ inism\, so too the possibility of \;thinking for acting \;raises difficulties for the proponent of body determinism. However\, recent stud ies suggest that the body may\, after all\, have a determining role in co gnitive processes of sentence comprehension. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:A line of research within embodied cogn ition seeks to show that an organism's body is a determinant of its conce ptual capacities. Comparison of this claim of \;body determinism  \;to linguistic determinism bears interesting results. Just as Slobin's ( 1996) idea of \;thinking for speaking \;challenges the main thesi s of linguistic determinism\, so too the possibility of \;thinking fo r acting \;raises difficulties for the proponent of body determinism. However\, recent studies suggest that the body may\, after all\, have a determining role in cognitive processes of sentence comprehension.
UID:20140307T233000Z-25184@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20140228T121018Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25184-what-linguistic-determin ism-can-teach-us-about CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140228T201018Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/44241_shapeimage_3.rev.1393618145.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25184 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/44241_shapeimage_3.rev.1393618145.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:A line of research within embodied cognition seeks to show that an organism's body is a determinant of its conceptual capaciti es. Comparison of this claim of \;body determinism \;to linguisti c determinism bears interesting results. Just as Slobin's (1996) idea of& #160\;thinking for speaking \;challenges the main thesis of linguisti c determinism\, so too the possibility of \;thinking for acting \ ;raises difficulties for the proponent of body determinism. However\, rec ent studies suggest that the body may\, after all\, have a determining ro le in cognitive processes of sentence comprehension. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140314T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140314T170000 LOCATION:JRHH 202 SUMMARY:"Responsibility from the Outside In: Shaping the Moral Ecology Ar ound Implicit Bias" by Daniel Kelly (Purdue University) DESCRIPTION:The main claim I aim to defend is that people can be responsi ble for actions that are influenced by implicit biases they do not know t hey have\, and that they would disavow if they were made aware of. My def ense of that claim will involve framing the issue in terms of kinds of co ntrol-based and knowledge based exculpating conditions commonly taken to excuse actions\, laying out the core features of implicit biases\, and co nsidering whether anything about the character or operation of implicit b iases themselves satisfies those conditions\, or guarantees that actions influenced by them should be excused. I formulate and reject several argu ments that suggest a positive answer. I then present a thought experiment designed to support my central claim\, and pump the intuition that not a ll of the knowledge relevant to moral responsibility and exculpation need be "in the head" of the agent whose actions are being evaluated. Finally \, I comment on some general features of my approach and the questions th at it raises. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:The main claim I aim to defend is that people can be responsible for actions that are influenced by implicit bia ses they do not know they have\, and that they would disavow if they were made aware of. My defense of that claim will involve framing the issue i n terms of kinds of control-based and knowledge based exculpating conditi ons commonly taken to excuse actions\, laying out the core features of im plicit biases\, and considering whether anything about the character or o peration of implicit biases themselves satisfies those conditions\, or gu arantees that actions influenced by them should be excused. I formulate a nd reject several arguments that suggest a positive answer. I then presen t a thought experiment designed to support my central claim\, and pump th e intuition that not all of the knowledge relevant to moral responsibilit y and exculpation need be "in the head" of the agent whose actions are be ing evaluated. Finally\, I comment on some general features of my approac h and the questions that it raises.
UID:20140314T223000Z-20624@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20130925T164817Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/20624-responsibility-from-the- outside-in-shaping-the CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140314T161831Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:20624 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The main claim I aim to defend is that people can be responsible for actions that are influenced by implicit biases they do no t know they have\, and that they would disavow if they were made aware of . My defense of that claim will involve framing the issue in terms of kin ds of control-based and knowledge based exculpating conditions commonly t aken to excuse actions\, laying out the core features of implicit biases\ , and considering whether anything about the character or operation of im plicit biases themselves satisfies those conditions\, or guarantees that actions influenced by them should be excused. I formulate and reject seve ral arguments that suggest a positive answer. I then present a thought ex periment designed to support my central claim\, and pump the intuition th at not all of the knowledge relevant to moral responsibility and exculpat ion need be "in the head" of the agent whose actions are being evaluated. Finally\, I comment on some general features of my approach and the ques tions that it raises. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140321T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140321T163000 LOCATION:JRHH 202 SUMMARY:"How Research on Symbiosis Should Transform Our Understanding of Adaptation" by Frédéric Bouchard (Université de Montréal) DESCRIPTION:Evolutionary Biology has relied ever increasingly on the mode ling of population dynamics. Most have taken for granted that we all agre e on what is a population. Recent work has re-examined this perceived con sensus. I will argue that there are good reasons to restrict the term pop ulation to collections of related replicators and interactors\, and that if this is correct\, many existing models in population biology exclude b y definition many genuine evolving biological individuals such as symbiot ic communities. We will examine how symbiotic associations transform our understanding of adaptation and biological individuality. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Evolutionary Biology has relied ever in creasingly on the modeling of population dynamics. Most have taken for gr anted that we all agree on what is a population. Recent work has re-exami ned this perceived consensus. I will argue that there are good reasons to restrict the term population to collections of related replicators and i nteractors\, and that if this is correct\, many existing models in popula tion biology exclude by definition many genuine evolving biological indiv iduals such as symbiotic communities. We will examine how symbiotic assoc iations transform our understanding of adaptation and biological individu ality.
UID:20140321T223000Z-24328@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20140130T085022Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/24328-how-research-on-symbiosi s-should-transform-our CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140319T211109Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:24328 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Evolutionary Biology has relied ever increasingly on the modeling of population dynamics. Most have taken for granted that we all agree on what is a population. Recent work has re-examined this perce ived consensus. I will argue that there are good reasons to restrict the term population to collections of related replicators and interactors\, a nd that if this is correct\, many existing models in population biology e xclude by definition many genuine evolving biological individuals such as symbiotic communities. We will examine how symbiotic associations transf orm our understanding of adaptation and biological individuality. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T150000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T162500 LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575 SUMMARY:"Legends of the Sperm" by Scott Gilbert (Swarthmore College) DESCRIPTION:Accounts of fertilization are narratives of origins. Since th e discovery of fertilization in the 1870s\, these narratives have often r eflected the idea that the sperm and egg are the respective microscopic e mbodiments of that which is masculine and that which is feminine. The sci entific discoveries of the interactions between the sperm and egg often b ecome enmeshed in socially constructed stories\, wherein the sperm and eg g becoming surrogates for men and women. This has skewed the way that we think about our bodily origins\, emphasizing differences between the game tes and focusing on masculine agency. Recently\, fertilization narratives have begun to include the idea of DNA as the secular analogue of soul. T he notion that our DNA is our essence and the basis of our behaviors is d elivered to us daily by advertisements\, news reports\, and visual cultur e. These ideas play important\, but often unacknowledged\, roles in the a bortion and stem cell debates. Analyzing fertilization stories allows us to propose a critical realism wherein being socially constructed does not necessarily mean being wrong and where controls are needed to rein in so cial myths as well as alternative scientific explanations. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Accounts of fertilization are narrative s of origins. Since the discovery of fertilization in the 1870s\, these n arratives have often reflected the idea that the sperm and egg are the re spective microscopic embodiments of that which is masculine and that whic h is feminine. The scientific discoveries of the interactions between the sperm and egg often become enmeshed in socially constructed stories\, wh erein the sperm and egg becoming surrogates for men and women. This has s kewed the way that we think about our bodily origins\, emphasizing differ ences between the gametes and focusing on masculine agency. Recently\, fe rtilization narratives have begun to include the idea of DNA as the secul ar analogue of soul. The notion that our DNA is our essence and the basis of our behaviors is delivered to us daily by advertisements\, news repor ts\, and visual culture. These ideas play important\, but often unacknowl edged\, roles in the abortion and stem cell debates. Analyzing fertilizat ion stories allows us to propose a critical realism wherein being sociall y constructed does not necessarily mean being wrong and where controls ar e needed to rein in social myths as well as alternative scientific explan ations.
UID:20140403T220000Z-25699@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20140321T141331Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25699-legends-of-the-sperm-by- scott-gilbert-swarthmore CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140401T234848Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/31,0,344,313/44749_scott_gilbert_0.rev.1395436297.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25699 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/31\,0\,344\,313/44749_scott_gilbert_0.rev.1395 436297.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Accounts of fertilization are narratives of origins. Since the discovery of fertilization in the 1870s\, these narratives have often reflected the idea that the sperm and egg are the respective micro scopic embodiments of that which is masculine and that which is feminine. The scientific discoveries of the interactions between the sperm and egg often become enmeshed in socially constructed stories\, wherein the sper m and egg becoming surrogates for men and women. This has skewed the way that we think about our bodily origins\, emphasizing differences between the gametes and focusing on masculine agency. Recently\, fertilization na rratives have begun to include the idea of DNA as the secular analogue of soul. The notion that our DNA is our essence and the basis of our behavi ors is delivered to us daily by advertisements\, news reports\, and visua l culture. These ideas play important\, but often unacknowledged\, roles in the abortion and stem cell debates. Analyzing fertilization stories al lows us to propose a critical realism wherein being socially constructed does not necessarily mean being wrong and where controls are needed to re in in social myths as well as alternative scientific explanations. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|open to the public|phil osophy colloquium series|science|send-to-undergraduate|student event|stud ent END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T163500 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140403T180000 LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575 SUMMARY:"Nothing in Ethics Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution?? by Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis & Clark College) DESCRIPTION:Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\, along with other phil osophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\, the \;natural goo dness approach\, that claims moral evaluations are\, or are on a par with \, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically\, an organism's flourishing is characterized by how well they function as spe cified by the species to which they belong. In this essay\, I first sketc h the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second\, I argue that c ritics who claim that this sort of approach is inconsistent with evolutio nary biology due to its species essentialism are incorrect. Third\, I con sider the prospects of understanding ethical normativity as a species of biological teleology claiming that this would be incompatible with our co nsidered moral judgments. Fourth\, after presenting gene-culture coevolut ion theory\, I argue that the only way of reconciling naturalism and norm ativity in accordance with the natural goodness approach requires amendin g the selected effects function account to include cultural evolution. Ho wever\, this approach\, though not biologically reductionistic\, still ge nerates claims incompatible with our considered moral judgments. Finally\ , I end with a discussion of methodology and revisionistic moral theories . X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\, along with other philosophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\, the \;natural goodness approach\, that claims moral evaluat ions are\, or are on a par with\, teleological claims made in the biologi cal sciences. Specifically\, an organism's flourishing is characterized b y how well they function as specified by the species to which they belong . In this essay\, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness ap proach. Second\, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approac h is inconsistent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentiali sm are incorrect. Third\, I consider the prospects of understanding ethic al normativity as a species of biological teleology claiming that this wo uld be incompatible with our considered moral judgments. Fourth\, after p resenting gene-culture coevolution theory\, I argue that the only way of reconciling naturalism and normativity in accordance with the natural goo dness approach requires amending the selected effects function account to include cultural evolution. However\, this approach\, though not biologi cally reductionistic\, still generates claims incompatible with our consi dered moral judgments. Finally\, I end with a discussion of methodology a nd revisionistic moral theories.
UID:20140403T233500Z-25994@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20140331T113941Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25994-nothing-in-ethics-makes- sense-except-in-the-light CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140401T235020Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/44880_jay_odenbaugh.rev.1396291353.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25994 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/44880_jay_odenbaugh.rev.1396291353.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse\, along with ot her philosophers\, have argued for a metaethical position\, the \;natural goodness approach\, that claims moral evaluations are\, or are on a par with\, teleological claims made in the biological sciences. Specifically\, an organism's flourishing is characterized by how well the y function as specified by the species to which they belong. In this essa y\, I first sketch the Neo-Aristotelian natural goodness approach. Second \, I argue that critics who claim that this sort of approach is inconsist ent with evolutionary biology due to its species essentialism are incorre ct. Third\, I consider the prospects of understanding ethical normativity as a species of biological teleology claiming that this would be incompa tible with our considered moral judgments. Fourth\, after presenting gene -culture coevolution theory\, I argue that the only way of reconciling na turalism and normativity in accordance with the natural goodness approach requires amending the selected effects function account to include cultu ral evolution. However\, this approach\, though not biologically reductio nistic\, still generates claims incompatible with our considered moral ju dgments. Finally\, I end with a discussion of methodology and revisionist ic moral theories. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|humanities|philosophy c olloquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student|symposia END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T090000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T102500 LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575 SUMMARY:"Science—For Better or Worse\, a Source of Ignorance as well as Knowledge" by Janet A. Kourany (University of Notre Dame) DESCRIPTION:Science is gendered in a variety of ways. One is the way scie nce has produced knowledge of men at the same time that it has produced i gnorance of women. Until the end of the twentieth century\, for example\, archaeology investigated men's contributions to the great turning points of human evolution while it ignored the contributions of women\, and thi s left the impression that still persists today that men are the great in novators and controllers of human destiny\, not women. A second way in wh ich science is gendered also concerns the balance of knowledge and ignora nce produced by science\, but this time it concerns the way science somet imes persists in producing knowledge when it might more usefully refrain that is\, when it might more usefully maintain ignorance. For example\, for centuries it was claimed that women are intellectually inferior to m en\, and for centuries the basis for such inferiority was sought in biolo gy and later also in psychology. And now\, even after centuries of such r esearch\, scientists are still seeking to determine whether women are the intellectual equals of men. Meanwhile\, studies have documented the harm done to women and girls by the publication of much of this research. So\ , the question arises whether such cognitive differences research should still continue\, or whether ignorance would be preferable. I shall argue that an acceptable balance of scientifically produced knowledge and igno rance regarding women and men should reflect societal needs for gender eq uality as well as the need for freedom of research and the intrinsic valu e of knowledge. And I shall argue that this will also best meet the deman ds of objectivity. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html: Science is gendered in a variety of way
s. One is the way science has produced knowledge of men at the same time
that it has produced ignorance of women. Until the end of the twentieth c
entury\, for example\, archaeology investigated men's contributions to th
e great turning points of human evolution while it ignored the contributi
ons of women\, and this left the impression that still persists today tha
t men are the great innovators and controllers of human destiny\, not wom
en. A second way in which science is gendered also concerns the balance o
f knowledge and ignorance produced by science\, but this time it concerns
the way science sometimes persists in producing knowledge when it might
more usefully refrain—that is\, when it might more usefully maintain ig
norance. For example\, for centuries it was claimed that women are intell
ectually inferior to men\, and for centuries the basis for such inferiori
ty was sought in biology and later also in psychology. And now\, even aft
er centuries of such research\, scientists are still seeking to determine
whether women are the intellectual equals of men. Meanwhile\, studies ha
ve documented the harm done to women and girls by the publication of much
of this research. So\, the question arises whether such cognitive differ
ences research should still continue\, or whether ignorance would be pref
erable.
I shall argue that an acceptable balance of scientif
ically produced knowledge and ignorance regarding women and men should re
flect societal needs for gender equality as well as the need for freedom
of research and the intrinsic value of knowledge. And I shall argue that
this will also best meet the demands of objectivity.
Since Noah Rosenberg et al.'s (2002) di scovery of human population structure that looks racial\, philosophers ha ve been scrambling to understand what these results mean for the nature a nd reality of race. \; Although there have been many objections to in terpreting any level of human population structure as racial\, for the pu rposes of this talk\, I will focus on one specific objection: that biolog ical races must be objectively real. \; In my talk\, I will debunk th is view by arguing that biologically real entities can reasonably be unde rstood as what I call 'genuine biological entities'\, which are not neces sarily objectively real. \; After introducing the theory\, I will mot ivate it with examples from the history of biology. \; Finally\, I wi ll return to the original problem and show that all human populations are biologically real despite not being objectively real. \; I leave it as an open question as to whether any human populations are races.
UID:20140404T173500Z-25777@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20140329T174239Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/25777-biological-reality-and-t he-problem-of-biological CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140331T172737Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/44867_quashawn_spencer.rev.1396140045.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:25777 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/44867_quashawn_spencer.rev.1396140045.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Since Noah Rosenberg et al.'s (2002) discovery of hum an population structure that looks racial\, philosophers have been scramb ling to understand what these results mean for the nature and reality of race. \; Although there have been many objections to interpreting any level of human population structure as racial\, for the purposes of this talk\, I will focus on one specific objection: that biological races mus t be objectively real. \; In my talk\, I will debunk this view by arg uing that biologically real entities can reasonably be understood as what I call 'genuine biological entities'\, which are not necessarily objecti vely real. \; After introducing the theory\, I will motivate it with examples from the history of biology. \; Finally\, I will return to t he original problem and show that all human populations are biologically real despite not being objectively real. \; I leave it as an open que stion as to whether any human populations are races. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:conference|faculty event|faculty|open to the public|phil osophy colloquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T131000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140404T142500 LOCATION:Gregg Pavilion GEO:45.4506477144909;-122.671172383575 SUMMARY:"Morton's Skulls\, Gould's Statistics\, and the Objectivity of Da ta" by Jonathan Kaplan (Oregon State University) DESCRIPTION:In 2011\, Lewis et al published a paper arguing that Gould's criticisms of Morton's analyses of skull volumes were\, broadly\, mistake n. Gould had argued that the average differences in the volumes of skulls between the 'races' reported by Morton were the result of Morton's uncon scious biases\; Gould further argued that more appropriate methods showed no average volume differences of any significance. Lewis et al counter t hat in fact Morton's analysis is to be preferred\, and Gould's analysis i nappropriate and biased. But both Gould and Lewis et al are mistaken\; bo th attempt\, somewhat foolishly\, \;to analyze data that cannot spea k to the questions it is supposed to. In the end\, arguments about the be st statistical techniques to deploy serve only to obscure the poverty of the data. While it is possible to accurately measure the skulls that Mort on happened to collect\, and both Gould and Lewis et al believe\, in the end\, that Morton did so\, there is no appropriate way to use those skull s to answer any of the plausibly interesting questions about the 'populat ions' from which those skulls were drawn (often stolen). Followed by a p anel discussion with: Jay Odenbaugh\, Lewis &\; Clark College Janet Kourany\, University of Notre Dame Scott Gilbert\, Swarthmore College J onathan Kaplan\, Oregon State University Quayshawn Spencer\, University of San Francisco X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:In 2011\, Lewis et al published a paper arguing that Gould's criticisms of Morton's analyses of skull volumes we re\, broadly\, mistaken. Gould had argued that the average differences in the volumes of skulls between the 'races' reported by Morton were the re sult of Morton's unconscious biases\; Gould further argued that more appr opriate methods showed no average volume differences of any significance. Lewis et al counter that in fact Morton's analysis is to be preferred\, and Gould's analysis inappropriate and biased. But both Gould and Lewis e t al are mistaken\; both attempt\, somewhat foolishly\, \;to analyze data that cannot speak to the questions it is supposed to. In the end\, arguments about the best statistical techniques to deploy serve only to o bscure the poverty of the data. While it is possible to accurately measur e the skulls that Morton happened to collect\, and both Gould and Lewis e t al believe\, in the end\, that Morton did so\, there is no appropriate way to use those skulls to answer any of the plausibly interesting questi ons about the 'populations' from which those skulls were drawn (often sto len).
Followed by a panel discussion with:
Jay Odenbaugh\
, Lewis &\; Clark College
Janet Kourany\, University of Notre D
ame
Scott Gilbert\, Swarthmore College
Jonathan Kaplan\, Or
egon State University
Quayshawn Spencer\, University of San Franci
sco
\n Jay Odenbaugh
\, Lewis &\; Clark College
\n Janet Kourany\, University of Notr
e Dame
\n Scott Gilbert\, Swarthmore College
\n Jonathan Kapl
an\, Oregon State University
\n Quayshawn Spencer\, University of S
an Francisco\n
It is our pleasure to invite you to the first Festival of Scholars\, an opportunity for student-scholars and art ists to present their research and art\, while also learning from one ano ther. We have set aside Saturday\, April 26\, 2014\, 1:00-4:00 pm \, for this exciting event\, which is sponsored by a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
Scheduled are performances of or iginal compositions\, an exhibition of original art\, a play produced and performed by students\, and research presentations in a variety of field s\, including international affairs\, political science\, religious studi es\, environmental studies\, chemistry\, mathematics\, computer science\, and many more. Click here for the full program.
Opening introductio n and library presentation at Smith Hall at 1 pm.
UID:20140426T200000Z-26472@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20140421T082641Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/26472-festival-of-scholars CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140421T152641Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/558/width/80/height/80/c rop/1/45438_div-a2-1110-0011.rev.1397848053.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:26472 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/558/width/80/ height/80/crop/1/45438_div-a2-1110-0011.rev.1397848053.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:It is our pleasure to invite you to the first Festiva l of Scholars\, an opportunity for student-scholars and artists to presen t their research and art\, while also learning from one another. END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140919T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20140919T170000 LOCATION:JRHH 102 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:Real Moral Progress: Why Pragmatic Naturalism Requires Moral Real ism by William Rottschaefer DESCRIPTION:In his recent book\, The Ethical Project\, Philip Kitcher off ers a pragmatic naturalistic metaethical account of moral progress. \ ; Examining ethical practice\, Kitcher presents a functional account of i t as a social technology for alleviating altruism failures\, one exemplif ied in a phylogeny of moral practice including elimination of chattel sla very and recognition of both women's rights and gay rights. \; He sug gests a theory of bio-cultural evolution as an ultimate explanation of th is phylogeny and\, as proximate mechanisms\, social-cultural learning\, s ocially engaged normative guidance and cognitively equipped emotions. 0\; Given these scientifically supported bases\, Kitcher argues that prag matic naturalism offers the best metaethical account of why these changes in moral practice are morally progressive. \; Making use of these sa me scientific bases\, I argue that Kitcher's metaethical account requires the adoption of an objective moral realism\, one\, nevertheless\, that i s compatible with his core pragmatism. \; X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:In his recent book\, The Ethical Pr oject\, Philip Kitcher offers a pragmatic naturalistic metaethical a ccount of moral progress. \; Examining ethical practice\, Kitcher pre sents a functional account of it as a social technology for alleviating a ltruism failures\, one exemplified in a phylogeny of moral practice inclu ding elimination of chattel slavery and recognition of both women's right s and gay rights. \; He suggests a theory of bio-cultural evolution a s an ultimate explanation of this phylogeny and\, as proximate mechanisms \, social-cultural learning\, socially engaged normative guidance and cog nitively equipped emotions. \; Given these scientifically supported b ases\, Kitcher argues that pragmatic naturalism offers the best metaethic al account of why these changes in moral practice are morally progressive . \; Making use of these same scientific bases\, I argue that Kitcher 's metaethical account requires the adoption of an objective moral realis m\, one\, nevertheless\, that is compatible with his core pragmatism. 0\;
UID:20140919T223000Z-29236@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20140908T150226Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/29236-real-moral-progress-why- pragmatic-naturalism CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20140909T220057Z X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:29236 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:\n In his recent book\, The Ethical Project
em>\, Philip Kitcher offers a pragmatic naturalistic metaethical account
of moral progress. \; Examining ethical practice\, Kitcher presents a
functional account of it as a social technology for alleviating altruism
failures\, one exemplified in a phylogeny of moral practice including el
imination of chattel slavery and recognition of both women's rights and g
ay rights. \; He suggests a theory of bio-cultural evolution as an ul
timate explanation of this phylogeny and\, as proximate mechanisms\, soci
al-cultural learning\, socially engaged normative guidance and cognitivel
y equipped emotions. \; Given these scientifically supported bases\,
Kitcher argues that pragmatic naturalism offers the best metaethical acco
unt of why these changes in moral practice are morally progressive. \
; Making use of these same scientific bases\, I argue that Kitcher's meta
ethical account requires the adoption of an objective moral realism\, one
\, nevertheless\, that is compatible with his core pragmatism. \;\n
p>
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oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20141021T190000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20141021T200000
LOCATION:JRHH Philosophy Offices (2nd floor)
SUMMARY:Explore Potential Majors 2014
DESCRIPTION:Still unsure about your major? \;Come hear from faculty\,
staff\, and students about why a Philosophy major is exciting!Already de
clared? \;Learn from faculty and upper division students about what's
coming up next! You can also attend multiple events over four evenings
to make or confirm your choice. Each gathering will start with a short pr
esentation\, so please be on time. Also\, there will be free food! You ca
n \;RSVP here. (https://docs.google.com/a/lclark.edu/spreadsheet/view
form?fromEmail=true&\;formkey=dGdfWWViOTU5TzkwM05FYXVPZVgtWVE6MQ)
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html: Still unsure about your major?&#
160\;Come hear from faculty\, staff\, and students about why a Philosophy
major is exciting! Already declared? \;Learn from fac
ulty and upper division students about what's coming up next! You
can also attend multiple events over four evenings to make or confirm yo
ur choice. Each gathering will start with a short presentation\, so pleas
e be on time. Also\, there will be free food! You can \;RSVP here.
a> \n Still unsure about your major? \;
Come hear from faculty\, staff\, and students about why a Philosophy majo
r is exciting!\n \n Already declared? \;Learn from
faculty and upper division students about what's coming up next! Metaphorical utterances are construed a
s arrayed along a continuum\, on one end of which are semi-conventionaliz
ed cases amenable to analysis in terms of semantic content\, speaker mean
ing\, and satisfaction conditions\, and where image-construction is permi
ssible but not mandatory. I call these \;image-permitting metaphors (
IPM's)\, and contrast them with image-demanding metaphors (IDM's) inhabit
ing the continuum's other end and whose understanding mandates the constr
uction of a mental image. This construction\, I suggest\, is spontaneous\
, is not restricted to visual imagery\, and its result is typically somat
ically marked sensu Damasio. IDM's may accordingly be used in service of
self-expression\, and thereby in the elicitation of empathy. Even so\, ID
M's may also be vehicles of speaker meaning\, and may reasonably provoke
banter over the aptness of the imagery they evoke. \n Metaphorical utterances are construed as array
ed along a continuum\, on one end of which are semi-conventionalized case
s amenable to analysis in terms of semantic content\, speaker meaning\, a
nd satisfaction conditions\, and where image-construction is permissible
but not mandatory. I call these \;image-permitting metaphors (IPM's)\
, and contrast them with image-demanding metaphors (IDM's) inhabiting the
continuum's other end and whose understanding mandates the construction
of a mental image. This construction\, I suggest\, is spontaneous\, is no
t restricted to visual imagery\, and its result is typically somatically
marked sensu Damasio. IDM's may accordingly be used in service of self-ex
pression\, and thereby in the elicitation of empathy. Even so\, IDM's may
also be vehicles of speaker meaning\, and may reasonably provoke banter
over the aptness of the imagery they evoke.\n Professor of Philosophy at University o
f California at Riverside\, \;John Martin Fischer \;criticizes Va
n Inwagen's strategy for defending free will and moral responsibility und
er the assumption of causal determinism: metaphysical flipflopping. \
; Given that flipflopping is unavailable\, Fischer contends that libertar
ianism has the cost of implying that our status as free and morally respo
nsible hangs on a thread. \; This is a problem for libertarianism. Jay Odenbaugh\, Associate Professor of
Philosophy\, Lewis &\; Clark College According to
moral sentimentalism\, moral judgments necessarily involve emotions. The
most sophisticated version of sentimentalism is that articulated by Allan
Gibbard in his \;Wise Choices\, Apt Feelings. On his view\,
a moral judgment that an action is wrong expresses acceptance of norms t
hat permit guilt for having done it and resentment on the part of others.
Shaun Nichols\, in his \;Sentimental Rules\, argues that Gi
bbard's account is fatally flawed. First\, children cannot experience or
recognize guilt until they are six or seven years old. Second\, children
can make moral judgments as early as three or four years old as shown by
their ability to pass the moral-conventional task. In this talk\, I respo
nd on behalf of Gibbard showing Nichols' argument fails. Finally\, I turn
to a more pressing worry about guilt. Since guilt is so difficult to sho
w sincerely\, how can it coordinate our moral lives? Using evolutionary g
ame theory\, I show how one might respond to this worry. \;<
/p> Visit his webpage \;here I argue that the identification of virt
ue with knowledge (a Socratic view in character) and the thesis that virt
ue alone is a good closely connects the view that the sage is free from h
arm with what is 'in accordance with nature': if being happy is the end f
or the sake of which everything else is done\, and if this consists in li
ving according to virtue\, living in agreement\, and living according to
nature (which is the same thing)\, one cannot suffer harm. Why? Because t
he only real harm is vice\, but if one's soul is virtue\, the soul (and t
hereby the person) cannot be harmed. In some passages of this paper I quo
te and try to interpret some passages taken from Plato's Apology\, Crito\
, Gorgias\, and to connect them with the Stoics. \n \;\n As we
navigate through life\, we adopt an implicit model of time that is very i
mportant to us. In this model the present is special and the past fixed\,
and this whole structure "flows" forward. Physics suggests that this con
ception of time is fundamentally wrong about time. It is commonly dismiss
ed as an illusion and removed from their desks and placed on the desks of
psychologists. However\, psychologist don't know it's been put on their
desks. So why we have no explanation of why we all naturally adopt this p
icture of falling through time. The cosmologist Gold emphasized that befo
re we can dismiss the flow we need to explain the "self-consistent set of
rules that would give a beast this kind of phoney picture of time." Here
I take up this interdisciplinary project. Appealing to the hard facts of
life in a relativistic world\, evolution\, cognitive science and psychol
ogy\, I develop a theory of why "beasts" like us feel like we're falling
through time. \n As we navigate through life\, we adopt an impl
icit model of time that is very important to us. In this model the presen
t is special and the past fixed\, and this whole structure "flows" forwar
d. Physics suggests that this conception of time is fundamentally wrong a
bout time. It is commonly dismissed as an illusion and removed from their
desks and placed on the desks of psychologists. However\, psychologist d
on't know it's been put on their desks. So why we have no explanation of
why we all naturally adopt this picture of falling through time. The cosm
ologist Gold emphasized that before we can dismiss the flow we need to ex
plain the "self-consistent set of rules that would give a beast this kind
of phoney picture of time." Here I take up this interdisciplinary projec
t. Appealing to the hard facts of life in a relativistic world\, evolutio
n\, cognitive science and psychology\, I develop a theory of why "beasts"
like us feel like we're falling through time.\n
\n
\n You can also attend multiple events over four evenings to make
or confirm your choice. Each gathering will start with a short presentat
ion\, so please be on time. Also\, there will be free food! You can \
;RSVP here.\n
Visit his webpage \;here.
\nVisit his webpa
ge he
re.
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oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20141205T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20141205T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall room 102
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:A Guilt Trip: Moral Psychology\, Expressivism\, and the Basic Emo
tions
DESCRIPTION:Jay Odenbaugh\, Associate Professor of Philosophy\, Lewis &am
p\; Clark College According to moral sentimentalism\, moral judgments ne
cessarily involve emotions. The most sophisticated version of sentimental
ism is that articulated by Allan Gibbard in his \;Wise Choices\, Apt
Feelings. On his view\, a moral judgment that an action is wrong expresse
s acceptance of norms that permit guilt for having done it and resentment
on the part of others. Shaun Nichols\, in his \;Sentimental Rules\,
argues that Gibbard's account is fatally flawed. First\, children cannot
experience or recognize guilt until they are six or seven years old. Seco
nd\, children can make moral judgments as early as three or four years ol
d as shown by their ability to pass the moral-conventional task. In this
talk\, I respond on behalf of Gibbard showing Nichols' argument fails. Fi
nally\, I turn to a more pressing worry about guilt. Since guilt is so di
fficult to show sincerely\, how can it coordinate our moral lives? Using
evolutionary game theory\, I show how one might respond to this worry. &
#160\; Visit his webpage \;here (https://college.lclark.edu/live/pro
files/76-jay-odenbaugh)
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
\n
\n According to moral se
ntimentalism\, moral judgments necessarily involve emotions. The most sop
histicated version of sentimentalism is that articulated by Allan Gibbard
in his \;Wise Choices\, Apt Feelings. On his view\, a moral
judgment that an action is wrong expresses acceptance of norms that perm
it guilt for having done it and resentment on the part of others. Shaun N
ichols\, in his \;Sentimental Rules\, argues that Gibbard's
account is fatally flawed. First\, children cannot experience or recogniz
e guilt until they are six or seven years old. Second\, children can make
moral judgments as early as three or four years old as shown by their ab
ility to pass the moral-conventional task. In this talk\, I respond on be
half of Gibbard showing Nichols' argument fails. Finally\, I turn to a mo
re pressing worry about guilt. Since guilt is so difficult to show sincer
ely\, how can it coordinate our moral lives? Using evolutionary game theo
ry\, I show how one might respond to this worry.\n
\n
\n<
br />\nVisit his webpage \;here
X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll
oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event|student
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20150130T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20150130T170000
LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall Room 102
GEO:45.451619;-122.669391
SUMMARY:"The Stoics on Living in Agreement with Nature: Why Isn't the Per
son Who is Doing What is in Agreement with Nature Subject to be Harmed?"
by Marcelo D. Boeri (Universidad Alberto Hurtado\, Chile)
DESCRIPTION:I argue that the identification of virtue with knowledge (a S
ocratic view in character) and the thesis that virtue alone is a good clo
sely connects the view that the sage is free from harm with what is 'in a
ccordance with nature': if being happy is the end for the sake of which e
verything else is done\, and if this consists in living according to virt
ue\, living in agreement\, and living according to nature (which is the s
ame thing)\, one cannot suffer harm. Why? Because the only real harm is v
ice\, but if one's soul is virtue\, the soul (and thereby the person) can
not be harmed. In some passages of this paper I quote and try to interpre
t some passages taken from Plato's Apology\, Crito\, Gorgias\, and to con
nect them with the Stoics.
X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
\n
\n