BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Lewis & Clark//NONSGML v1.0//EN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20160313T100000 RDATE:20160313T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20161106T090000 RDATE:20161106T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20160930T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20160930T163000 LOCATION:JRHH 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:The Veridicality of Perception in Aristotle\, Rosemary Twomey (Si mon Fraser) DESCRIPTION:Aristotle repeatedly characterizes our perception of the spec ial objects — colors\, odors\, flavors\, and sounds — as true\, or no t mistaken. He is less explicit about other kinds of perception\, includi ng the perception of so-called common objects like shape and size and the perception of incidental\, macro objects\, but what he does say about su ch cases has led many to think that misperception is possible. To the con trary\, I argue that Aristotle is committed to the veridicality of all pe rception\, and that his recognition of this commitment can be seen in his treatment of the psychological capacity of imagination. The claim that p erception is always veridical might first sound stipulative: we don't say that someone who mistakes a parrot for a human voice has perceived a hum an voice. However\, I argue that perception's accuracy follows from Arist otle's metaphysical account of perception\, and in particular from the es sential causal role that the external object plays in the activity of per ception. As such\, the claim that perception is always accurate is a subs tantive thesis\, one that can help to ground his empiricism. I neutralize the passages that have been thought to acknowledge misperception. Accord ing to my interpretation\, these statements can be read as addressing how likely we are to be in error about the special objects as opposed to the common and incidental objects: Aristotle never claims that when we are w rong about common or incidental objects it is because we are perceiving t hem incorrectly. X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
Aristotle repeatedly characterizes our perception of the special objects — colors\, odors\, flavors\, and soun ds — as true\, or not mistaken. He is less explicit about other kinds o f perception\, including the perception of so-called common objects like shape and size and the perception of incidental\, macro objects\, but wha t he does say about such cases has led many to think that misperception i s possible. To the contrary\, I argue that Aristotle is committed to the veridicality of all perception\, and that his recognition of this commitm ent can be seen in his treatment of the psychological capacity of imagina tion. The claim that perception is always veridical might first sound sti pulative: we don't say that someone who mistakes a parrot for a human voi ce has perceived a human voice. However\, I argue that perception's accur acy follows from Aristotle's metaphysical account of perception\, and in particular from the essential causal role that the external object plays in the activity of perception. As such\, the claim that perception is alw ays accurate is a substantive thesis\, one that can help to ground his em piricism. I neutralize the passages that have been thought to acknowledge misperception. According to my interpretation\, these statements can be read as addressing how likely we are to be in error about the special obj ects as opposed to the common and incidental objects: Aristotle never cla ims that when we are wrong about common or incidental objects it is becau se we are perceiving them incorrectly.
UID:20160930T223000Z-191414@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20160914T111455Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/191414-the-veridicality-of-per ception-in-aristotle CATEGORIES:Open to the Public LAST-MODIFIED:20160923T213525Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/62492_rtwomeyimg-2079304359.rev.1474666516.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:191414 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/62492_rtwomeyimg-2079304359.rev.1474666516.jpg X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:Aristotle repeatedly characterizes our perception of the special objects — colors\, odors\, flavors\, and sounds — as true \, or not mistaken. He is less explicit about other kinds of perception\, including the perception of so-called common objects like shape and size and the perception of incidental\, macro objects\, but what he does say about such cases has led many to think that misperception is possible. To the contrary\, I argue that Aristotle is committed to the veridicality o f all perception\, and that his recognition of this commitment can be see n in his treatment of the psychological capacity of imagination. The clai m that perception is always veridical might first sound stipulative: we d on't say that someone who mistakes a parrot for a human voice has perceiv ed a human voice. However\, I argue that perception's accuracy follows fr om Aristotle's metaphysical account of perception\, and in particular fro m the essential causal role that the external object plays in the activit y of perception. As such\, the claim that perception is always accurate i s a substantive thesis\, one that can help to ground his empiricism. I ne utralize the passages that have been thought to acknowledge misperception . According to my interpretation\, these statements can be read as addres sing how likely we are to be in error about the special objects as oppose d to the common and incidental objects: Aristotle never claims that when we are wrong about common or incidental objects it is because we are perc eiving them incorrectly. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty event|faculty|open to the public|philosophy coll oquium series|send-to-undergraduate|student event END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR