BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Lewis & Clark//NONSGML v1.0//EN BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZNAME:PDT DTSTART:20120311T100000 RDATE:20120311T100000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0800 TZOFFSETTO:-0700 END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:America/Los_Angeles BEGIN:STANDARD TZNAME:PST DTSTART:20121104T090000 RDATE:20121104T090000 TZOFFSETFROM:-0700 TZOFFSETTO:-0800 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121207T153000 DTEND;TZID=America/Los_Angeles:20121207T170000 LOCATION:J.R. Howard Hall 202 GEO:45.451619;-122.669391 SUMMARY:"Dyadic Truth" by Zoltán Gendler Szabó (Yale University) DESCRIPTION:Dyadic Truth \; Zoltán Gendler Szabó Yale Universit y \; Philosophical orthodoxy holds that 'true' is a monadic predic ate. I think this view is only halfway correct: there is indeed a monadic truth-predicate in English and other natural languages but this is not t he fundamental truth-predicate we use. What can be true simpliciter are p articular mental states (beliefs\, hopes\, wishes\, etc.) a thinker might be in or particular speech acts (assertions\, denials\, suppositions\, e tc.) a speaker might perform. These mental states and speech-acts are tru th-apt because they have propositional contents. But propositions are not true simpliciter – they are true ofsituations. Thus\, the fundamental notion of truth is relational. My argument for this claim is simple. Mona dic truth-predicates are ill-suited for the purposes of semantics. Those who think semantic explanations are any good must provide adequate paraph rases for the various relational notions we employ in formulating those e xplanations. For most non-monadictruth-predicates employed by semanticist s adequate paraphrases in terms of monadic propositional truth can be giv en. But when it comes to 'sentence S is true at context c and situation s ' we can only provide a paraphrase in terms of dyadic propositional truth . Since our best semantics arguably needs this particular truth-predicate we have good reason to think that propositional truth is dyadic. \; X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:
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Philosophical orthodoxy holds that 'true' is a monadic predicate. I thi nk this view is only halfway correct: there is indeed a monadic truth-pre dicate in English and other natural languages but this is not the fundame ntal truth-predicate we use. What can be true simpliciter are particular mental states (beliefs\, hopes\, wishes\, etc.) a thinker might be in or particular speech acts (assertions\, denials\, suppositions\, etc.) a spe aker might perform. These mental states and speech-acts are truth-apt bec ause they have propositional contents. But propositions are not true simp liciter – they are true ofsituations. Thus\, the fundamental notion of truth is relational. My argument for this claim is simple. Monadic truth- predicates are ill-suited for the purposes of semantics. Those who think semantic explanations are any good must provide adequate paraphrases for the various relational notions we employ in formulating those explanation s. For most non-monadictruth-predicates employed by semanticists adequate paraphrases in terms of monadic propositional truth can be given. But wh en it comes to 'sentence S is true at context c and situation s' we can o nly provide a paraphrase in terms of dyadic propositional truth. Since ou r best semantics arguably needs this particular truth-predicate we have g ood reason to think that propositional truth is dyadic. \;
UID:20121207T233000Z-12772@college.lclark.edu DTSTAMP:20120904T164806Z URL:https://college.lclark.edu/live/events/12772-dyadic-truth-by-zoltan-g endler-szabo-yale LAST-MODIFIED:20121120T210153Z ATTACH:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/height/80/cr op/1/src_region/8,29,128,149/31646_3e761fecea90200636d41634167434b41716b4 2.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-TYPE:events X-LIVEWHALE-ID:12772 X-LIVEWHALE-TIMEZONE:America/Los_Angeles X-LIVEWHALE-IMAGE:https://college.lclark.edu/live/image/gid/77/width/80/h eight/80/crop/1/src_region/8\,29\,128\,149/31646_3e761fecea90200636d41634 167434b41716b42.jpeg X-LIVEWHALE-CONTACT-INFO:Claire Kodachi\, Administrative Coordinator\, Ph ilosophy Department. \;503-768-7480 X-LIVEWHALE-SUMMARY:The Lewis &\; Clark College Philosophy Department hosts a regular colloquium series. Distinguished speakers from around the world present on a wide array of philosophical topics. X-LIVEWHALE-TAGS:faculty|humanities|lecture|open to the public|philosophy colloquium series|presentation|send-to-undergraduate END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR