Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United Nations Intervention

Charles Anthony Smith and Heather M. Smith

Abstract
International relations literature is well developed on the effects of United Nations intervention on the duration of crises. The global human rights community has on a case-by-case basis addressed some of the unintended effects of UN intervention, namely, substantial increases in the human sex trafficking trade into crisis areas. We bridge these two literatures and evaluate the effects of UN involvement in Kosovo, Haiti and Sierra Leone. We look beyond the intended effects of UN intervention and consider the unintended effects in a systematic and generalizable way. We argue that UN involvement has the unfortunate and unintended effect of increasing the rates of human trafficking in these crisis areas. Our work concludes that the UN should proceed with caution into crisis areas and have plans in place to avoid the potentially devastating externalities of otherwise well-intentioned efforts.

Keywords
human trafficking, UN Intervention, Peace Keeping, human rights, women

Introduction

In July 1999 the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo, the war torn province of Serbia, in order to protect ethnic Albanians. This United Nations (UN) force was large by UN standards. More than 20,000 troops were on the ground within days of the passage of the authorizing UN Security Council Resolution. Within months the global human rights community drew attention to the establishment and intensification of human sex trafficking into Kosovo. In August 2004, Amnesty International reported that young women from Eastern Europe were being abducted, drugged, and sold into human trafficking rings in Kosovo. This report linked the introduction of the NATO and UN troops to the sharp increase in human trafficking.

Although the effects of UN intervention on the duration and intensity of conflict have been given tremendous attention, the development of human trafficking rings is an understudied effect
of UN intervention. We consider four cases: Kosovo, Haiti and Sierra Leone, where the UN intervened, and Nepal, where it did not. We demonstrate that the introduction of UN peacekeeping forces into a crisis area leads to an increase in the rate of human trafficking. We also find that the size of the force determines the magnitude of the increase in human trafficking.

Definitions

We narrow our consideration to sex trafficking because our primary focus is the aggravating circumstances and costly externalities of UN intervention. Many volumes have and will be written explicating other dimensions of human trafficking. Specifically, the dynamics of economic disparity, the role of gender and race in society, and the impact of globalization at the intersection of these separate identities and concerns are all emerging issue fields (Agathangelou, 2004; Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Razack, 2004; Samarasinghe, 2007). While UN intervention may lead to an expansion of human trafficking in other dimensions beyond sex workers, we limit the scope of our analysis in order to identify more fully the causal mechanism behind the expansion in trafficking.

Graycar (1999) suggests an important distinction, on which we rely, between trafficking and smuggling. He (1999: 2) argues that smuggling is the method by which people are moved across borders while trafficking is a more complex set of processes involving labor exploitation in the destination country that hinges on the concept of consent. He suggests that the two form a continuum. At one end individuals are trafficked completely against their will. Specific forms can include abduction, kidnapping and confinement by their abductors. At the other end is undocumented voluntary migration, wherein migrants ‘freely choose’ to work overseas (Graycar, 1999: 2). While smuggling is a means for transferring undocumented workers across borders, and it may or may not be associated with human rights abuses, trafficking is a far more severe process that exploits the labor of the victim. Although coercion is not a uniformly accepted or settled distinguishing feature between trafficking and smuggling (Haque, 2006), for analytical clarity we adopt Graycar’s distinction and focus our analysis on trafficking for the purposes of sexual slavery (Kyle and Koslowski, 2001).

The distinction between those who choose to be smuggled into a country to work in the sex industry and those who are so engaged wholly against their will may not always be easily discernible. Still, as we demonstrate below, by using data at the macro-level we can discern changes in scale if not in precise specifics.

Generally, the extant literature is concerned with the impact of UN or third-party intervention on the duration of conflict between combatants. This is likely a product of the mission: if the intention behind UN intervention is to quell hostilities and foster peace, then naturally a concern involves determining whether the UN is effective. However, the focus on conflict duration has come at the expense of a fuller consideration of the range of externalities of UN intervention. We seek to remedy this oversight by examining the impact of introducing UN peacekeeping forces on human trafficking.

Emergence of Human Sex Trafficking Rings

Theories of the emergence of markets in human trafficking often use an economic approach (Bales, 2005; Salt, 2000; Schloenhardt, 1999; Salt and Stein, 1997). That is, human trafficking is considered simply a morally suspect business (Bales, 2005; Salt, 2000). Others argue that trade in persons is best conceived of as an international crime (Aronowitz, 2001; Schloenhardt 1999; Stoecker and
Shelley, 2005). These approaches overlap where both emphasize the desire for profit as the motivation for the emergence of trafficking networks, but differ over the primary actors involved in the process. Importantly, much of the recent research into human trafficking orbits around the premise of human trafficking as a violation of human rights or as human rights abuse (Gallagher, 2004, 2006).

For the economic approach, individuals engage in human trafficking in response to a demand. The market driven approach traces the processes involved in the daily business of trafficking like economists might do for any legitimate business (Bimal and Hasnath, 2000; Salt and Stein, 1997; Schloenhardt, 1999: 214). The other approach to human trafficking, a contraband flow approach, focuses on the ways in which pre-existing transnational criminal organizations take advantage of a demand in the market to profit (Caldwell et al., 1999; Ruggiero, 1997; Shannon, 1999). The primary difference between these approaches is the role of pre-existing crime syndicates. Here, extant criminal actors shift their efforts in response to new opportunities including human trafficking rings.

Effects of United Nations Intervention on Civil Crises

The relative merits of UN intervention in conflict resolution is controversial. Those opposed to UN intervention in crises argue that UN effectiveness is inhibited because the UN is generally ‘late to the game’, loses interest once the conflict has abated and promotes a false peace that ultimately leads to a recurrence of hostilities (Diehl et al., 1996, 688). Regan (2002) argues that intervention lengthens the duration of conflict. Wilkenfeld and Brecher (1984) and Gilligan and Stedman (2003) suggest that between 1945 and 1975 the UN was more likely to intervene in serious conflicts but less likely to help the combatants achieve a peaceful resolution. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fortuna (2004) suggest that UN intervention can significantly reduce the likelihood of recurring hostilities.

Limitations to Both Literatures

These bodies of work present two distinct problems. The general human trafficking literature suffers from data limitations that prevent rigorous theory testing. Conversely, an abundance of duration oriented data about UN interventions led researchers to focus on conflict duration. The absence of empirical testing in the human trafficking literature is not surprising. Governments are reluctant to release information suggesting that trafficking networks are robust within their borders and often may not actually know or be able to determine the extent of trafficking. Those who find themselves enmeshed in trafficking are afraid or unable to come forward. Public officials with knowledge of trafficking often are complicit in the activity. Thus, the data limitations provide significant challenges to measuring human trafficking, especially in the context of UN intervention (Bales, 2005: 136–138; Laczko, 2002; Laczko and Lee, 2003).

Link between Human Trafficking and UN Intervention

We are concerned with the understudied externalities of UN intervention in general and human trafficking in particular. By externalities, we simply mean the costs imposed on the host country and others as a result of the UN intervention. We examine the ways in which the introduction of a global peacekeeping force may alter domestic demand and create conditions for the introduction
and expansion of a market in the trading of humans. In this sense, we build upon existing work that explores the relationship between military operations and the sex trade industry (Enloe, 2000; Mendelson, 2005; Moon, 2004; Zimelis, 2009). We also build upon the existing work that considers singular cases of intervention (Carpenter, 2003; Friman and Simon, 2007; Tritaki, 2003; Vandenberg, 2002) as well as work that considers peacekeepers and the sexual abuse of children (Csaky, 2008) and the global dimensions of human trafficking (Cameron and Newman, 2008; Klopcic, 2004). Notably, the unintended consequences of UN intervention have, of late, become the focus of more scholarly attention (Aoi et al., 2007; Barth, 2004; McKay and Mazurana, 2004). We propose a model that unites these strings of literature into a generalizable theory.

Our contribution begins by building on both the economic and organized crime models of human sex trafficking. For both, an increase in demand in the destination country is the primary force explaining the development of the human trafficking trade. Any factor that serves to increase domestic demand for prostitution will lead to the expansion of human sex trafficking rings. A largely understudied variable that will alter domestic demand is the introduction of a large, foreign military force into a crisis area.

Our theory begins with three observations. The initial observation that informs our theory is that foreign soldiers and the ancillary support networks that surround them use prostitutes (Elliot, 1996; Malone et al., 1993; Turner, 1994). Where there is a military presence; there is a demand for prostitutes. Second, because the UN is more likely to intervene in conflicts where the domestic military is small (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003), intervention introduces a sizeable increase in the military population and thus a corresponding increase in the demand for prostitution. Importantly, any UN intervention brings with it a host of NGOs, private military contractors and other internationals, which exponentially increase the actual presence arising from the intervention to well over the formal number of troops. For our purposes, we will simply refer to the UN presence as including all these categories because without the UN, none would be present. We will not be able to determine from our data the respective responsibility of UN peacekeepers as opposed to other internationals for the increase in trafficking in the case studies. Third, the presence of UN forces may suppress the forces that operate the extant criminal activity. This suppression of the existing local or parochial criminal networks opens the market for international human trafficking entrepreneurs. Of course, elements within the international force may also ignore criminal activity as outside the scope of mission or even actually work with the criminal groups. Regardless of whether the UN presence suppresses, collaborates or ignores the criminal network, UN intervention leads both to an increase in demand for prostitution as well as a reduction in the costs of entry into the market for the suppliers of human traffic.

Two testable hypotheses flow from our theory. First, the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force into a crisis area will serve to increase the rate of human trafficking into that crisis area. As additional military personnel are brought in, some will seek out prostitutes. Second, where the UN force begins with a large number of troops, we should witness a dramatic increase in the human trafficking. Where the UN sends in a relatively smaller force, we would expect to see a somewhat smaller increase.

**Research Design**

In order to assess whether UN intervention leads to human trafficking, and the extent of increased trafficking, we must overcome the paucity of reliable data on human trafficking. We utilize three categories of sources to achieve a reasonable approximation of the magnitude of changes in annual
trafficking activity for the focus countries. At the outset, we recognize that none of the reports contain perfect information or all data that would be ideal for our analysis. We have culled the best available data in order to gauge the magnitude of changes in human trafficking, while recognizing that we are unable to present precise data in all dimensions of trafficking that might be of concern. In short, this is the best data available concerning the independent variable (UN intervention) and the dependent variable (human sex trafficking) of interest.

**Category 1: Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Reports**

Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) operate and employ investigators that speak local languages in field offices in each of the regions that we present here. The workers of AI and HRW are well positioned to identify and publicize human trafficking and sexual exploitation. We use the country reports, press releases, special reports and calls to action that AI and HRW released before and after the introduction of peacekeeping forces. We count each mention of human trafficking in a given country in every available report from both AI and HRW. This allows us to measure the approximate increase or decrease in the reported incidence of human trafficking in a given country in a given year. While this is a surrogate measure for the actual existence of human trafficking, it is a reasonably sound approximation of whether the problem was significant before the introduction of UN peacekeepers.

**Category 2: The International Organization for Migration**

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was created in 1951 to assist European countries with post-World War II refugees. Today, with more than 127 member states, it possesses an operating budget of over US$1 billion with more than 450 field offices in 100 countries. It has researchers in the field that document human trafficking. We use both the field reports put out by the IOM as well as their Counter Trafficking Module Database to approximate the scope of the trafficking problem in the focus countries. This is a more direct measure but is tied to the outbreak of conflict which leads to migration. Accordingly, it aligns the expansion of human trafficking (albeit imperfectly) with the independent variable of greatest concern to us.

**Category 3: State Department Trafficking in Persons Annual Report**

Finally, since 2001 the US Department of State has published an Annual Trafficking in Persons Report. The report contains extensive information on all of the countries in the world and places countries in one of three tiers. Tier 1 countries are compliant with the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 2000 (VTVPA) while Tier 2 countries are not fully compliant but have made efforts. Tier 3 countries may be sanctioned because they have failed to sufficiently comply with the minimum standards (US Department of State, 2001). In conjunction with the other two categories of data, we can approximate the magnitude of human trafficking in the focus countries (Hughes, 2002).

**Case Studies**

Our case studies were selected to provide for geographic diversity and variation in conflict type and magnitude, and in order to maximize our usable data on human trafficking. Thus, our cases are from different regions of the world and arise from different types of conflict as demonstrated
below. By embracing a diversity of conflict type, we are able to more narrowly focus on our independent variable of interest: UN intervention. While the UN has intervened in 63 cases since 1948, the data used to create proxy measures for human trafficking only became broadly available from 2000. The US government’s Annual Trafficking in Persons Report was published for the first time in 2001. Similarly, the IOM’s Counter Trafficking Module Database starts in 2000. The diversity of case considerations and the availability of data led to our case selection. The cases of Sierra Leone, Haiti, Kosovo and Nepal follow. We also tested our theory on East Timor and on Sri Lanka. While both cases supported our theory, limitations on length dictate their omissions. While we would prefer to test all incidents of UN intervention since 1948, there is no practical way to build datasets of trafficking rates before and after intervention prior to the 2000 reports and certainly not before the reports which are created in the late 1990s discussed below. Since 2000, there have been 10 interventions. We have avoided selecting cases from one region of the world – sub-Saharan Africa is the most frequent location of intervention, in order to isolate UN intervention as a causal factor in a more generalizable sense. Even if post hoc construction of trafficking data was feasible, the post hoc constructed data would not be comparable to the data we utilize here, so would not be useful or generalizable vis-a-vis the current case studies.10

**Kosovo**

Kosovo is a province in southern Serbia with approximately 2 million inhabitants, roughly 90 percent of which are ethnic Albanians (Stojanovic, 1998). Accounts of the origins of the 1998–1999 conflict in Kosovo vary widely (Crawford, 2001; Naureckas, 1999; McCoubrey, 1999; Posen, 2000) but all agree that by March of 1998, hostilities between the Serbian Military Police, the Yugoslav Federal Army and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were critically high (Dimore, 1998; see also Ronay and Kovacic, 1998; Smucker, 1998; Wenge and Nettleton, 1998).

In March 1998, the Serbian military police massacred 12,000 Kosovar Albanians living in Prekaz, Lausha, Lybeniq, Poklek, Rahovec, Goluboc, Galica and Abria (Ramet, 2001a; 2001b). More than 230,000 people were displaced as a result of the conflict.11 The massacres led to protests in Pristina and further conflicts between Kosovar Albanians and Serb forces (Ramet, 2001b). Between 23 March and 10 June 1999 NATO conducted a bombing campaign against Serb forces.12

A large peacekeeping force entered Kosovo after the bombing campaign ended.13 The KFOR was sent in under the authority of NATO’s Operation Joint Guardian.14 KFOR’s mission was to provide for the public safety, verify that the KLA and Serb forces had disarmed, deter further hostilities and enforce a ceasefire.15 By June 1999, 20,000 troops had been moved into Kosovo.16 By August, that number doubled, to 40,000.17 At its largest, KFOR included 50,000 troops.18

With more than 50,000 peacekeepers under the joint authority of the UN and NATO and a civilian force of nearly 5000, by 2001 the number of foreign soldiers and police in this small province amounted to 2.4 percent of the Kosovo population. The introduction of these forces created a previously non-existent demand for human trafficking in Kosovo. Because of the large size of the UN force entering the country, we expect a dramatic expansion of the human trafficking trade there. Finally, our theory predicts that foreign women should be trafficked into Pristina, the capital of Kosovo and the headquarters for KFOR and UNMIK. In short, we expect that prior to the deployment of KFOR and UNMIK there was not a significant human trafficking problem in Kosovo. After their deployment, we expect a rapidly escalating problem.

During 1998, AI published 35 different reports on Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia. The reports address the Serb massacres of Kosovar Albanian villages, extra-judicial detention by Serb police and the deaths of Kosovar Albanians resulting from ill treatment in police custody. One
report is devoted exclusively to publicizing human rights violations against women in Kosovo. Yet for all of their coverage of the various rights violations taking place in Kosovo, the AI reports for 1998 (as well as 1997 and 1996) do not contain a single mention of human trafficking, sexual exploitation or forced labor.

Similarly, HRW published 26 reports that addressed the conflict in Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia in 1998. While these reports list various rights violations from ethnic-cleansing to torture, there is no mention of human trafficking or sexual exploitation. Taken together the absence of any reference to human trafficking in Kosovo contained in the periodic reports of well respected human rights groups on the ground in Kosovo supports the assertion that there was not a serious trafficking problem in Kosovo prior to the introduction of foreign troops.

In June 1999 there were 20,000 KFOR troops in Kosovo; that number increased to 37,000 in March 2000 and 50,000 by late 2001. The consequent spike in prostitution and the trafficking of women and girls into Kosovo during this period was dramatic. Official numbers are difficult to obtain, but AI suggests that the number of trafficked women and girls exploited in Kosovo increased from just 18 in 1999 to over 200 in 2003. The IOM issued a report based on the stories of 474 victims of sexual trafficking in Kosovo they interviewed and assisted between February 2000 and June 2005. The majority of the women and girls trafficked into Kosovo in this period came from Moldova. Significant numbers of women and girls also came from Romania and the Ukraine.

Those that patronized these women were the same soldiers who were deployed to bring peace and security to Kosovo. AI explains:

Following the arrival of the international community in Kosovo in 1999 there was an unprecedented escalation of the sex industry based on trafficked women and girls. In 1999–2000 it was estimated that internationals comprised 80 percent of the clients of trafficked women and girls.

In their 2002 World Report, HRW referred to the ‘surge’ in human trafficking into Kosovo for the purposes of sexual exploitation, noting that between 2000 and 2001 there had been at least 160 victims of trafficking that were assisted in Kosovo by the IOM. The US Department of State listed Yugoslavia, with special reference to Kosovo, as a Tier 3 country, meaning that the Federal Government was not complying with the US VVTPA in their first annual Trafficking in Persons Report (US Department of State, 2001: 104). In subsequent years, the USA lists Serbia as a Tier 2 country (signifying an improvement in state efforts to combat trafficking), though this is largely the result of the passage of the UNMIK’s regulations outlawing human trafficking in Kosovo and does not imply that the trafficking problem decreased during this period. By 2004, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo are situated in the State Department’s Tier 2 Watch List because little more was done to combat the growing problem (US Department of State, 2004: 173). According to the US Department of State (2005: 195):

In 2004, UNMIK’s Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit (TPIU) made 77 arrests, conducted 2,386 raids, and assisted 48 victims, 17 percent of whom were minors. The number of victims assisted in Kosovo consistently declined; this is believed to be due to increasingly sophisticated criminal networks reacting to anti-trafficking enforcement efforts and shifting the commercial sex trade out of public bars and into private homes.

The 2386 raids conducted by the TPIU in Kosovo in 2004 is shocking given there are only 2 million people residing in Kosovo. Basically, 1 in every 838 people came into contact with TPIU in 2004.
In response to the dramatic escalation of human trafficking, UNMIK announced in October 2000 the creation of a special police unit charged solely with preventing human trafficking and prostitution in Kosovo. In 2001, UNMIK passed Regulation 2001/4 to provide for assistance to the victims of traffickers, criminalize the act of trafficking women into and out of Kosovo, and provide penalties for those who patronage women trafficked into Kosovo.

AI was slow to recognize the problem but began to issue reports on the trafficking problem in 2004. Of the 62 reports that AI issued on the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo between 1999 and 2000 the issue of sexual exploitation was mentioned a mere four times. HRW was similarly slow to recognize and publicize the problem. Between 1999 and 2000 there was just one mention of the human trafficking problem in Kosovo in their periodic reports. By 2003, HRW began publicizing the trafficking crisis in their World Report.

Finally, the IOM kept records of the number of individuals that it assisted in Kosovo between 1999 and 2006. The introduction of KFOR and UNMIK corresponds with the dramatic increase and the 2001 spike in human trafficking cases in Kosovo. By 2003 the effects of the regulations passed by UNMIK outlawing trafficking may have served to reduce the problem. Or, as the US Department of State argued in their 2005 Annual Trafficking in Persons Report, this reduction may have been the result of more sophisticated trafficking methods. By 2005, assistance from the IOM had dropped to pre-intervention levels. Our findings in Kosovo provide strong support for our theory.

Haiti

Haiti held two contested elections in 2000. The legislative elections, held in May of 2000, were intended to restore legitimacy to the faltering democratic government. While the Election Monitoring Commission for the Organization for American States suggested that voter registration and voter participation in the elections were ‘notable achievements’, fraud and irregularities surrounded the counting of the votes (MOASH, 2001). The votes were not counted according to the rules outlined in the Constitution, which mandated a series of run-off elections for close races. Instead, Head of the Provisional Electoral Council, Leon Manus, under intense pressure from restored President Jean Bertrand Aristide, awarded the Senatorial seats to Aristide’s Lavalas party. Manus then promptly fled the country. In response, the OAS left the country, and refused to certify the legislative elections or oversee the upcoming presidential elections.

The November 2000 presidential elections were deeply flawed. Based on a claim of anticipated fraud, a group of opposition parties, under the umbrella name The Democratic Convergence, boycotted the election. Aristide ran against six candidates from lesser known parties and won the election. The Haitian Provision Electoral Commission reported a 60 percent turnout rate (MOASH, 2001). Observers challenged that figure, suggesting that turnout was between 5 and 20 percent. Irregularities at polling locations and questionable vote counting methods cast doubt on the results. Aristide’s mandate was weak and two years prior to the end of his term, he faced armed opposition from former members of the Haitian military. On 29 February 2004, Aristide resigned as President and fled to the Central African Republic. Pursuant to the constitution, the President of the Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre, was sworn in as President of Haiti. President Alexandre quickly requested that the Security Council send peacekeeping troops to Port-au-Prince to restore order.

The population of 8.7 million faced staggering poverty. Between 2002 and 2003 Haiti dropped from 146th to 150th on the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Ranking, recording a fall in life expectancy from 52.6 to 49.1. Approximately two-thirds of Haiti’s population lives below the poverty line and infant mortality rates are twice the regional average at 95 per 1000
births (Wucker, 2004: 292). The government’s inability to quell domestic violence, widespread poverty and the introduction of a foreign military force created favorable conditions for the emergence of human trafficking in Haiti.

Security Council Resolution 1529, adopted in February 2004, authorized the deployment of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to Haiti to maintain peace. Resolution 1542 authorized the creation of the UN Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) in Haiti in April 2004. The resolution transferred authority from MIF to MINUSTAH. Originally MINUSTAH consisted of 6700 military personnel.\textsuperscript{31} That number grew to nearly 9000 by August 2007.

Prior to the introduction of MINUSTAH in 2004, neither AI, nor HRW issued a single report or mentioned human trafficking in Haiti. This is consistent with the expectations of our theory – if MINUSTAH’s arrival in 2004 drives the demand for prostitutes, then we would not expect to find references to human trafficking in these NGO reports prior to February 2004. However, the US Department of State placed Haiti on its annual list in its Trafficking in Persons Report as a Tier 2 country in 2001. This suggested two things. First, that there was indeed a human trafficking problem in Haiti prior to 2004. Second, the Haitian government was making efforts to outlaw trafficking and passing laws that would severely punish traffickers. The inclusion of Haiti on the list suggests the existence of a human trafficking problem there as early as 2001, yet the inclusion of the Haitian government for our purposes is misleading. The US Department of State was primarily concerned with children trafficked within Haiti for domestic labor. This is part of a centuries-old practice in Haiti, wherein female children, whose parents lack the resources to care for them, are sent to work as domestic servants (US Department of State, 2001). This focus is echoed in the 2002 report (US Department of State, 2002).

The 2003 Report lists Haiti as a Tier 3 country, meaning that the government there was doing less to prevent and punish traffickers in 2003 than it had done in 2002 (US Department of State, 2003). The US Department of State presented the Haitians with a ‘work plan’, to combat trafficking. The Haitian government responded by creating a 20-person police unit in Port-au-Prince whose purpose was to prevent trafficking. The Ministry of the Interior developed a new policy that required border guards to closely check documents from those entering the country.\textsuperscript{32} In recognition of Haiti’s efforts, then President George W. Bush issued an executive order moving Haiti back up to Tier 2 status in September 2003. The 2003 report is the first to mention women from the Dominican Republic being trafficked into Haiti for prostitution (US Department of State, 2003). With the collapse of the Aristide government in 2004, the US Department of State had no government to evaluate and hence no listing for Haiti during this time. The 2005 report places Haiti on the Tier 2 Watch List and there is mention of women and girls being trafficked into Haiti from the Dominican Republic (US Department of State, 2005). Haiti is listed as a special case in 2006 because the government essentially collapsed and the US Department of State could not evaluate the government’s efforts to combat trafficking. The 2007 report again lists Haiti as a special case, but notes that women are increasingly being trafficked into Haiti from the Dominican Republic to work as prostitutes to serve UN peacekeepers (US Department of State, 2007).

Though neither AI nor HRW explicitly mentioned human trafficking into Haiti for the purposes of sexual exploitation after 2004, the AI reports contain numerous references to forced abductions of women and children, widespread rape and violence against women.\textsuperscript{33} These allegations are only mentioned in the reports in the period after 2004, suggesting at the very least that MINUSTAH’s deployment occurred at the same time that violence against women increased in Haiti. Better evidence of the growing trafficking problem in Haiti after 2004 stems from the work of the IOM, US government and the international media. A conference was held in Port-au-Prince in June 2006, put
on jointly by the IOM and the US Department of State. The purpose of the conference was explicitly to raise awareness about the growing human trafficking problem in Haiti.

In 2005, the IOM interviewed 1886 people involved in the Haitian human trafficking trade (IOM, 2006). Survey information was obtained from victims, smugglers, intermediaries and the heads of trafficking rings. The results suggest that women and girls were being drawn to Port-au-Prince to serve as sex workers in bars and brothels. Victims cited poverty and lack of opportunities as their motivations for traveling to the West to work in the sex trade. Others were promised jobs as maids and domestic workers and were held captive by the traffickers that brought them to Port-au-Prince.

By 2007 the UN had expelled 114 UN peacekeepers from Haiti for paying for sex with Haitian women and girls (New York Times, 2007). The report by the UN committee that investigated the sex scandal remains confidential but reports from media outlets suggest that undetermined number of UN peacekeepers have been patronizing Haitian women since they arrived in Haiti in 2004. The LA Times captured the desperation of the women and girls involved in the sex trade in Haiti:

Young girls have congregated outside peacekeeping posts since the first U.N. troops arrived in the summer of 2004 … After dark, scores of young girls in skimpy shorts or dresses can be seen loitering in the streets, waving to signal their availability to off duty soldiers. (Williams, 2007: 1)

The increase in violence against women and human trafficking in Haiti after 2004 supports our first hypothesis and demonstrates that the introduction of UN troops preceded the spike in human trafficking in Haiti. We also hypothesized that the size of the UN force would critically affect the level of human trafficking a country experienced. In Kosovo we expected to find a large effect, because KFOR consisted of more than 50,000 troops at its peak. In Haiti, MINUSTAH never reached more than 9000 troops. While a human trafficking problem developed in Haiti after 2004, it was less dramatic and took time to draw the attention of the international community because the UN had deployed a smaller force.

**Sierra Leone**

The conflict in Sierra Leone and the subsequent rise of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has its origins in neighboring Liberia, when an attack on government forces in 1989 by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) started a full-scale civil war. Within a year, the fighting crossed the border of Sierra Leone, with the RUF taking control of the resource-rich Kailahun area (Gershoni, 1997). Backed by NPFL units, the RUF employed brutal tactics similar to those used by Charles Taylor in Liberia (Abdullah and Muana, 1998). From its inception, the RUF campaign utilized systematic sexual violence and slavery (HRW, 2003). In March 1997, one year after his election, President Kabbah was overthrown in a coup led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma.

In March 1998, President Kabbah was reinstated, and by mid-1998 a force of 12,500 troops from the Economic Community of West African States Monitory Group (ECOMOG) had established control over nearly two-thirds of the country (HRW, 1998). In October 1999, UNOMSIL gave way to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was mandated to maintain the ceasefire with a maximum troop strength of 6000. Two more Security Council resolutions followed, increasing troop strength to 11,100 in February 2000 and then again to 13,000 in May. Despite the strengthened mandate and increased presence, fighting continued. RUF/AFRC forces failed to meet deadlines for disarmament and also continued to abduct women and force
them into sexual slavery (AI, 2001). The ceasefire dissolved completely in May 2000, when the RUF captured more than 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers and military observers. On 30 March 2001, the UN Security Council authorized yet another expansion of UNAMSIL, pushing the total number of troops to 17,500 including 260 military observers.\textsuperscript{36}

As with Kosovo, we hypothesize that the presence of a large foreign peacekeeping force created a previously non-existent or at least limited demand for human trafficking. This increase should be most noticeable in locales such as Freetown, where the vast majority of foreign troops were deployed. However, because UNAMSIL and ECOMOG represent a smaller percentage of the total population than KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo, we also expect a smaller comparative increase, similar to that found in Haiti. Further, the overwhelming presence of internal trafficking by rebel forces prior to the introduction of peacekeeping forces would partially mask overall increases due to UN peacekeepers.

From January 1998 to March 2001, the month in which UNAMSIL reached its peak troop level, AI reports make a combined 18 references to abduction or sexual slavery, implicating the RUF, AFRC or pro-government forces.\textsuperscript{37} The reports define sexual slavery as any situation where girls and women ‘are forced into “marriage,” domestic servitude or other forced labor that ultimately involves forced sexual activity, including rape by their captors’.\textsuperscript{38} While these reports also make references to human rights abuses perpetrated by ECOMOG, they are primarily concerned with summary detention and execution of suspected rebels or rebel-sympathizers, not with sexual slavery or human trafficking.

For the same period, HRW reports give significantly more attention to the issue, with 71 references to abduction or sexual slavery.\textsuperscript{39} However, there are no references to an increase in trafficking as a direct result of the limited presence of ECOMOG or UNAMSIL forces, and an April 2001 report explicitly states that there were no documented cases of rape by soldiers in either force.\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, though the relatively high number of reported incidents confirms the presence of trafficking before the arrival of peacekeeping forces, nothing in the reports indicate an established commercial trafficking network or predictable flow of human traffic to a particular area.

In addition to the AI and HRW reports for two years before and after maximum troop strength, we also examined press releases by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). As in Kosovo, Annual Trafficking in Persons Reports and available IOM Counter Trafficking data were used when available. The 2001 Annual Trafficking in Persons Report corroborates the trend shown in the HRW and AI reports, noting that RUF occupation of approximately two-thirds of the country posed practical barriers to investigating trafficking, but that ‘there are no reports of trafficking … in areas under the control of the government’ (US Department of State, 2001). Classifying Sierra Leone as a Tier 2 country, the report makes no mention of commercial trafficking or increases in prostitution among children or women. It is also important to note that at this point in the conflict Freetown had been wrested from the RUF (HRM, 1999). This suggests that any increase in commercial trafficking or prostitution in government-controlled areas was not significant enough to warrant a Tier 3 classification (US Department of State, 2001: Introduction).

Less than a year after the peacekeeping force reached maximum strength, human rights organizations began noting increased instances of prostitution in Freetown as a direct result of the UNAMSIL forces stationed there. The first of such reports appeared in February 2002 as part of a combined effort by the UNHCR and the UK charity Save the Children.\textsuperscript{41} According to the report, sexual exploitation in the form of prostitution was rampant, especially in Freetown, where nationals ‘spoke about the behavior of the “boys in blue helmets” with a feeling of helplessness and
sadness. The report also indicates that women were being trafficked to Freetown from as far as Guinea and Liberia. UN officials found the allegations credible enough to warrant a statement on the matter, and pledged on 28 February to take corrective measures.

An AI report published that October echoed similar findings, asserting that UNHCR must ‘provide sufficient assistance and protection to refugees … to prevent vulnerable women and children from turning to prostitution and sexual slavery’. The report also makes specific mention of the UNHCR findings. HRW (2003) released a statement in January 2003 exhorting UNAMSIL to investigate allegations of sexual violence, and also suggested that sexual exploitation was widely underreported, owing largely to the low status of women and girls in the region.

In 2004, Sierra Leone received a Tier 3 classification in the Annual Trafficking in Persons Report (US Department of State, 2004). The reclassification reflects an increase in trafficking, and the report itself notes that Freetown was the destination for the majority of internal and cross-border trafficking, with some victims trafficked to areas in Freetown where international peacekeepers are concentrated. Although the Report does not clarify whether this was in response to the increases illustrated in 2002, or due to a continuing problem, both circumstances strengthen our hypothesis. That the change in the flow of human trafficking coincides and runs parallel with the deployment of peacekeeping troops is particularly striking.

Anecdotal evidence from these reports, especially those contained within the UNHCR report, speaks even more directly to the underlying economic dynamic that we hypothesize drives such increases. According to testimony included in the UNHCR report, peacekeepers are among the highest paying customers for commercial sex, offering from US$5 to US$300. Pressured by dire economic circumstances, young women turn to prostitution because of the relatively large economic payoff: ‘why are you suffering here wasting your time’, one girl in a displaced persons camp allegedly said, ‘if you want to live good go to UNAMSIL’.

Non-UN Intervention Case: Nepal

We next turn to Nepal where the UN did not intervene. Nepal is located in Asia, a region plagued by human trafficking and a frequent destination for the global sex tourism industry (Samarasinghe, 2007). Nepal provides a particularly difficult test for our theory (King et al., 1994: 209–210). If human trafficking networks are not found in Nepal, despite the strong prevalence of sex trafficking in Asia, we can more confidently conclude that UN intervention contributes to human trafficking.

In 1990, pro-democracy protests organized by the Nepali Congress Party (NCP) and other left-wing groups were violently suppressed by security forces. King Birendra acquiesced to intense pressure, and by November 1990 the Panchayat – a caste based council system – had been replaced by a new democratic constitution. Successful elections were undertaken in May 1991. The NCP gained the most seats and installed Girija Prasad Koirala as prime minister.

Street protests by the Communist Party of Nepal (UML) and others led Koirala to fire civil servants with UML associations. Tensions increased on 6 April 1992 when a demonstration led to the deaths of at least 12 people (Whelton, 2005: 189). In July 1994, the Koirala government lost a parliamentary no-confidence vote and was replaced by a communist coalition. That government fell in September 1995 to a similar no-confidence vote and Sher Bahadur Deuba, the leader of the NCP, became prime minister.

In February 2000, the United People’s Front was dissolved. Following the dissolution, the Maoists formed ‘people’s governments’ that existed alongside local governing bodies (Sharma, 2004: 41). Government security forces were mobilized in response, and a state of emergency was declared, lasting until August 2002. Scores of political dissidents were arrested by security forces under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act 2002, which allowed security forces to arrest and detain suspects for up to 90 days without a warrant. The Maoists retaliated with abductions and summary executions, giving Nepal the highest disappearance rate in the world in 2002.50

More than 8000 had been killed by December 2003, and political instability in the capital continued with the resignation of Prime Minister Chand in May. Bowing to international pressure, in November 2006, the Nepalese government signed a peace accord with Maoist rebels, giving the latter positions in a transitional government.

With no international intervention, our theory predicts that significant networks for human trafficking should be less likely to develop in Nepal as an externality of that conflict. The relative poverty of Nepal in relation to its southern neighbors, especially India, has resulted in sustained external trafficking of women and children for the purpose of bonded labor and prostitution. External trafficking networks provide a baseline with which to measure changes in traffic flows over the time period for which sufficient data is available. If the emergence of international trafficking derives from the infusion of demand resulting from international peacekeeping forces, we would expect to see no noticeable change in pre-existing trafficking conditions.

AI published 508 reports on the Nepal conflict over a six-year period from March 1999 through November 2005.51 The vast majority of AI reports are devoted to tracking and updating the status of civilians and politicians abducted or killed by Maoist and government forces. Human trafficking references occur almost exclusively in the context of sexual abuse of women and children exported to India.52 Although the first AI report was published three years after the Maoist insurgency began, there is no evidence in the subsequent reports to suggest the emergence of international trafficking.

HRW reports from August 2000 to November 2005 fail to mention international trafficking into Nepal. The only report about trafficking concerns the Bhutanese refugees who fled to Nepal.53 The sexual abuse faced by these refugees, however, does not constitute a criminally driven shift in traffic flow, nor does it suggest an emerging internal market.

The US Department of State’s Annual Trafficking in Persons reports from 2001 to 2007 suggest a higher level of internal trafficking than either HRW or AI, and a more pervasive web of criminal networks for its external trafficking.54 The 2003 and 2005 reports make specific mention of the former trend, with women and children trafficked from rural areas to cities for commercial sexual exploitation (US Department of State, 2003, 2005). The reports all focus on the external trafficking to India, China and the Gulf states. The 2006 report estimates that 12,000 women and children are trafficked annually into Indian brothels alone (US Department of State, 2006). Still, there is no apparent increase in trafficking as a result of the conflict. In short, Nepal continues to be a source country for human trafficking, but no increase in the domestic consumption occurred because of the conflict.

Analysis

What do these cases tell us about the role of UN peacekeeping forces in contributing to the emergence of human trafficking networks? In each of our three test cases: Kosovo, Haiti and Sierra Leone, we find strong support for the link between UN intervention and the emergence of human trafficking networks. In both Kosovo and Sierra Leone prior to the introduction of UN forces,
prominent NGOs made limited mention of domestic human trafficking problems there. In Haiti, while the IOM, HRW and AI were aware of a serious human trafficking problem prior to the arrival of UN forces – this was a qualitatively different type of trafficking problem. NGOs voiced concern regarding the restavek system, wherein young children from impoverished families are sold as domestic servants to families that can afford to care for them. Preceding the deployment of MINUSTAH in Haiti, the NGO community made no attempt to publicize, research or assist victims of a global sex trafficking industry, suggesting that such networks were absent in Haiti prior to the arrival of the UN. In short, we demonstrate that prior to the introduction of UN forces, there was an absence of global human trafficking networks in Kosovo, Haiti and Sierra Leone. After the introduction of UN forces, human trafficking networks grew in all three cases.

Our control case in Nepal provides further support for our theory. In Nepal the UN chose not to send troops and all available evidence suggests an absence of human trafficking into Nepal. Instead, Nepalese women were being trafficked out of Nepal and into neighboring India regardless of the conflict. Despite being situated in Asia, a region notable as a destination for global sex tourism, trafficking networks simply did not develop in Nepal.

Our theory also proposes that the rise in trafficking should be related to the size of the UN force entering a given country. Where the UN force is large, as in Kosovo, we expected to find a sharp increase in the number of women being trafficked there. When the UN initially sent a smaller force, as it did in Haiti, we expected a more limited increase in the development of human trafficking rings. At the point when KFOR (in Kosovo) and UNAMSIL (in Sierra Leone) reached their peak troop levels, our work identifies a dramatic spike in the rate of human trafficking for the purposes of sexual slavery into these countries. While we found an increase in the rate of trafficking into Haiti after MINUSTAH reached its peak troop strength, because there were fewer troops, the impact on the human trafficking trade was less pronounced. In all three cases NGO efforts to publicize the emerging trafficking problem came after the introduction of UN troops. The severity of the trafficking problem in these countries seems quite clearly tied to the size of the entering UN force.

In Kosovo, where the UN was responsible for sending 50,000 foreign troops, we saw the most dramatic increase in the rate of human trafficking. AI numbers bring the problem there into sharp focus. Prior to KFOR’s arrival AI suggested that there had been just 18 documented cases of foreign women being trafficked into Kosovo for the purposes of sexual slavery. By 2003, after the introduction of KFOR there were 200 documented cases. Similarly, in Sierra Leone UNAMSIL reached a strength of 17,500 troops by 2001. In the years immediately following, Sierra Leone experienced a surge in human trafficking centered in Freetown, where UNAMSIL was based. The Haitians were exposed to the smallest of the three UN forces that we examine here with troops numbering between 6700 and 9000 after 2004. The consequent emergence in human trafficking networks in Haiti was more limited. This finding is consistent with the expectations of our theory: a smaller UN force should offer fewer opportunities for entrepreneurs to exploit a demand in the market. In Haiti, the IOM and the US government grew increasingly concerned about the influx of women from the Dominican Republic after MINUSTAH reached its peak troop strength of 9000.

Conclusion

These findings underscore the need to consider the impact of UN intervention, not simply on the duration of conflict, but also on human rights. Our work demonstrates how the UN contributes to grave human rights violations. When large numbers of foreign troops are sent to an unstable and often impoverished state, conditions are ripe for the emergence of trafficking networks. Thus, a seemingly benevolent UN action, intended to bring peace, serves to promote a shadow economy
with dramatic and negative consequences for the population at risk. While it is true that the conditions that lead to UN intervention could also contribute to increases in trafficking regardless of the intervention, human trafficking is an economic activity. Accordingly it seems a stretch to assert that these same increases in trafficking would have occurred without the peacekeepers, their desires and their money. While the NGO community has publicized the emergence of human trafficking networks in the wake of UN intervention, neither the UN nor the states that host these networks have given sufficient attention to these dynamics, despite their demonstrably negative effects from both a short and long-term perspective.

The increase in human trafficking that results from UN peacekeeping intervention has not been given sufficient systematic attention from policymakers or the academy. The insight about individual interventions (Friman and Reich, 2007; Mendelson, 2005; Vandenberg, 2002) lends weight to our analysis and supports the suggestion that increases in human trafficking are systematic and occur irrespective of local or regional supply-side constraints. Future attempts to prevent this increase must therefore address the inherent consequences of introducing a substantial foreign military force into impoverished, war-torn regions rather than focusing narrowly on location-specific trafficking dynamics. This will require identifying and remediing several institutional factors, the disparity between the wealth of peacekeeping troops and the local population not least among them.

A potentially important consideration that should be examined in the future is whether the composition of the peacekeeping force or its supervising command structure alters the rate of human trafficking. A substantial body of work finds that sexual violence during war varies based on a host of factors including the norms of the combatants, small group dynamics and leadership strategies, among others (Wood, 2006). While it might be true that the UN peacekeeping forces tend to have similar compositions over time because the same states normally bear the brunt of troop provisions, it may also be the case that the origin countries of the primary composition of the force leads to significant variation in outcome with respect to human trafficking. Finally, international monitoring of conflict areas fluctuates significantly depending on levels of violence or instability, yielding a piecemeal and ultimately insufficient picture of long-term trafficking trends. More aggressive monitoring of trafficking patterns following the departure of peacekeeping forces will aid in the policymaking process by providing a more complete understanding of the enduring legacy of foreign interventions. A consideration of the best method for reducing the spread of human trafficking in the wake of UN intervention should be undertaken before the next intervention.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their assistance and improvement of the manuscript. We also thank the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California – Irvine and Lewis and Clark College for providing funding and support for this project. We are especially indebted to Miles Kahler, Zehra Kabasakal Arat, Wayne Sandholtz, Diana Kapiszewski and Brandon Miller-de la Cuesta, as well as the participants of the Law and Latte Speaker workshop at University of California – Irvine for valuable input and insight.

Notes

i HRW/Africa, ‘We’ll kill you if you cry: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict,’ January 2003, Vol. 15, No.1 (A)


3. While definitions might normally be expected to be contained with the theoretical explication, here we have chosen to begin with definitional considerations because the definitional disputes are at the heart of many of the disputes in the extant literature.

4. Although international law has developed a jurisprudence about international trafficking and smuggling, for example, the UN Convention on Transnational Crime 2000 provided for trafficking and smuggling protocols, the diplomatic compromises of these definitional forays lead to less clarity. For more on this, see Dauvergne (2008).


6. We also recognize that there are epistemological problems with using ‘reports’ as data. The various organizations may have agendas that bias their reports, they may simply not be concerned with the issue of human trafficking as a discreet problem, or might not frame it consistently. However, this is the best information we have and we can expect that, because we are considering change in magnitude, much of the bias will remain constant through the analysis.


9. While we recognize some bias oriented criticism could be made of our use of US Trafficking in Persons reports, there is no obvious basis for bias in our cases. Moreover, any concern about a US bias in these reports should be ameliorated by the concomitant use of the NGO reports.

10. Because our baseline analysis depends on the kinds of reports that began in 2000, without some comparable data source, we lack an ability to directly compare earlier data with these.


13. Three different international forces were in Kosovo, and a number of peacekeepers in neighboring countries beginning in 1999. The first force was the ill-fated Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which was sent in by the OSCE and consisted of 1500 troops at its peak. KFOR, discussed above was the second and by far the largest force deployed to Kosovo. The UNMIK subsequent to KFOR was a civilian mission and was also much smaller than KFOR.


22. Ibid.: 3. Although there is an ongoing debate about whether forced prostitution and voluntary prostitution are distinct or substantially similar, for our purposes, the legality of prostitution and the theoretical distinction (if any) between forced and voluntary prostitution are not germane. Nonetheless, for more on these issues, see Dozema (2000), Hauber (1998), Samarasinghe (2007) and Taylor and Jamieson (1999) among others.

42. Ibid., Section III.c., ‘Key Findings’.
43. UN Mission in Sierra Leone, ‘Statement by Acting-Special Representative of the Secretary-General Mr. Behrooz Sadry, in reaction to the UNHCR-Save the Children Report’, press release, 28 February 2002.
45. See note 42.
46. Ibid.
47. We apply the same methods to the conflict in Sri Lanka. In the interest of space those findings are not reported here but mirror our findings in Nepal.
54. The 2001 Trafficking in Persons Report notes that government officials suspect ‘organized crime groups and ‘marriage brokers’ are the primary traffickers in Nepal’ (US Department of State, 2001).

References


Csaky C (2008) No One to Turn To: The Underreporting of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Aid Workers and Peacekeepers. London: Save the Children UK.


HRW (1998) Sowing terror: atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone. July, 10(3(A)).

HRW (1999) Getting away with murder, mutilation and rape: new testimony from Sierra Leone. July, 11(3(A)).


INTRODUCTION


**Biographical Notes**

Charles Anthony Smith is an assistant professor at the University of California – Irvine. He received his JD from the University of Florida and his PhD from the University of California – San Diego.

Heather M. Smith is an assistant professor at Lewis and Clark College. She received her PhD from the University of California – San Diego.