Philosophy

Events

When Things Fall Apart: On The Insufficiency Of Virtue For Happiness by Emily Long (Lewis & Clark College)

Date: April 15 2010, 3:30pm Location: John R. Howard Hall 302

In the early dialogues, it is unclear whether Socrates thought virtue sufficient for happiness. In two passages in the Euthydemus, Socrates appears to contradict himself on the topic of non-moral goods, and whether they can contribute to, or are required for, one’s happiness. In this paper I investigate four perspectives on what Socrates thought was virtue’s relation to happiness, and more specifically whether the happiness of a virtuous person is static or eliminable. If a virtuous agent is stricken with a debilitating disease or physically constrained from committing virtuous acts — can they still be genuinely happy? However, the most salient reading of Socrates’ account is one that does not invoke a logical connection between virtue and happiness, but rather a nomological one — and in this paper I hope to show why this is supported by the text.