Philosophy

Events

“Transparent Qualia and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy” by Scott Hendricks (Clark University)

Date: April 19 3:30am - 5:00am Location: J.R. Howard Hall - J.R. Howard Hall 202

 The “knowledge” and “zombie” arguments attempt to show that not all mental states are physical states, and hence, that physicalism is false. A popular strategy for defending physicalism against these arguments is the “phenomenal concept strategy.” Relying on Brian Loar’s classic articulation of this strategy, the central idea is that the concepts we employ to think about our phenomenal states (our qualia, in other words) are semantically peculiar and paying attention to the peculiar properties of these so-called “phenomenal” concepts makes clear why the anti-physical arguments are unsound. The phenomenal concept strategy has, naturally, come under attack and my aim is to defend the strategy against a particular criticism leveled by Horgan and Tienson, a criticism that I call “the Transparency Argument.”